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FOREWORD
 
A forward flow to the peace process in Northern Ireland is not inevitable. 
While there were two steps forward and only one step back a sense of 
hope and ambition defined the process, and confidence empowered fruitful 
actions.
In recent times, however, there is a sense and reality of stasis – a society 
standing still, a political process paused, and civil society frustrated at what 
might have been while praying it will not become another lost opportunity.
This peace monitor report, the fifth in a series of monitors, highlights 
the challenges facing our peace and political processes in the honest and 
comprehensive way that is needed for all people who can influence for the 
better going forward. The challenges are significant, and overcoming them 
will be more exhausting still because they exist in a political vacuum.
Out of such situations come clear choices; another cross roads moment 
is upon us. Indifference to the peace process is as damaging as lack of 
understanding.  Silence affords ignorance a respectability and acceptance.  
We must all ask ourselves will we be bystanders or participants?
Our thanks are due to the team that researched and wrote this peace 
monitor report at Ulster University independent of the Community Relations 
Council. That team of authors led by Gillian Robinson included Ann Marie 
Gray, Jennifer Hamilton, Gráinne Kelly, Brendan Lynn and Martin Melaugh.  
Their colleagues from Ulster University Economic Policy Centre, Richard 
Johnston and Jordan Buchanan, contributed the section on the economy.   
They have provided us with a peace monitor report that highlights the 
challenges so succinctly yet comprehensively as a tool for now and as a 
record for historians in the future.
I would also like to thank the advisory group which contributed so much to 
the report and its final flavour.  I’d particularly highlight the good humour 
and incisive mind of the advisory group chair, Adrian Guelke, and all of the 
other members who made this such an enjoyable and thought-provoking 
process: James Anderson, Frank Gaffikin, Neil Gibson, Paddy Hillyard, Tony 
McCusker, Jennifer Todd and Sophie Long, who represented the Joseph 
Rowntree Charitable Trust. 
The Community Relations Council would like to thank the Joseph Rowntree 
Charitable Trust (JRCT) for funding the NI Peace Monitoring Report. 
Peter Osborne,  
Chair 
Community Relations Council
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TEN KEY POINTS
1. The absence of a functioning devolved government in Northern 
Ireland (NI) since January 2017 has resulted in legislative and political 
paralysis.  Decisions requiring ministerial accountability have ground to 
a halt in the absence of willingness on the part of central government 
to impose direct rule, despite the persistent failure of talks to revive the 
devolved government. 
The NI Executive ceased to function at 5.00 pm on Monday 9 January 2017.  
Elected ministers ceased to hold their offices on 2 March 2017, the date 
of the NI Assembly election.  Since that date there has been no devolved 
government in the region.  Instead, civil servants have taken decisions based 
on previous policy and budgets, and two Secretaries of State have acted at 
Westminster to ensure that a new budget was put in place in 2017 and 2018.  
In a legal challenge, the High Court ruled that a civil servant did not have the 
power to give the go-ahead to a major infrastructure project and thus called 
into question a range of significant decisions taken since March 2017.  The 
backlog of issues requiring ministerial decisions continues to grow as the 
British government has continued to show itself reluctant to impose direct 
rule. 
2. The implications of the impact of Brexit on the Northern Ireland 
peace process remain uncertain but are likely to prove far-reaching.  
While the Brexit negotiations between the United Kingdom (UK) and the 
European Union (EU) have progressed in 2018, many issues remained 
unresolved and it is clear that the UK’s decision to leave the EU will have 
significant and far-reaching implications for Ireland, north and south.  Even 
before the final agreement is known, Brexit has already placed additional 
strains on the relationship between the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and 
Sinn Féin (SF), and soured that between the British and Irish governments.  
This in turn has made the task of restoring Stormont more difficult and 
placed further stress on the Belfast / Good Friday Agreement.  There is 
some evidence that Brexit has increased the support among the nationalist 
community for a united Ireland.   The potential date of a future referendum 
on Irish re-unification may be sooner than might otherwise have been 
anticipated.  All parties, both inside and outside the Brexit negotiations, have 
indicated that there is no appetite for the return of a hard border on the 
island of Ireland.  The implications of any new border infrastructure on the NI 
economy and trade relations with the EU remain uncertain.    
3. Inter-governmental relations, which have been crucial to the peace 
process, are weakening.
It has proven difficult for the three-stranded approach of the 1998 
Agreement – based on the importance of relations within NI, between 
North and South as well as East and West - to operate in the prevailing 
political conditions.  Relationships between the British and Irish governments 
have become strained by the Brexit referendum result, which has damaged 
their roles as joint upholders of the Belfast / Good Friday Agreement.  In 
addition, Brexiteers and elements of the British media have criticised the 
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attitude and response of the Irish government to the Brexit negotiations.  
Similarly, cross-border relationships have been tested as the DUP and the 
authorities in Dublin have traded verbal blows over Brexit.  The ‘confidence 
and supply’ arrangement between the DUP and the Conservative Party has 
called in to question the neutrality of the British government in the ongoing 
attempts to restore devolved government in NI.  The reversal of previous US 
administrations’ active engagement in the NI peace process by the Trump 
administration has left a noticeable gap in terms of external support and 
leverage to encourage the political parties back to the negotiating table.  
4.  The lack of progress on everyday social policy issues is permeating 
every aspect of life and is disproportionately affecting the most 
vulnerable people in the society.  
There are persistent, and in some cases, growing inequalities in relation 
to socio-economic conditions, educational attainment and health status 
in NI.   There has been little change in poverty rates over the past decade 
and economic projections indicate that the welfare reforms currently being 
rolled out will have a negative impact on the most vulnerable households 
and will result in increasing child poverty and destitution rates.  Despite 
general improvements in the health of the population, across a wide range of 
indicators stark differences in health outcomes between the least and most 
deprived areas remain. Housing costs in NI compare favourably to many 
other regions of the UK but housing tenure has changed dramatically in 
recent years.  Of particular note is the substantial increase in private renting, 
particularly among those in lower age groups. Just over 50 per cent of 18-
34 year olds are renting from private landlords, almost double the number 
doing so a decade ago.  Such changes have implications for social policy, 
particularly in light of evidence that housing costs are impacting significantly 
on the living standards of low-income households in the private rented 
sector.  Successive governments have failed to address some substantive 
areas of social policy over the long term and so lack of progress cannot 
wholly be attributed to the collapse of the Executive in January 2017. 
5. The Economy: stronger performance but significant challenges persist.
Current conditions in the NI economy remain largely positive. 
Unemployment is at an historic low and compares favourably to UK, Ireland 
and EU averages. Employment rates are at a record high.  The tourism 
sector has significantly benefited from peace with the number of trips to NI 
increasing by 80 per cent over the past two decades and contributing over 
£2.0Bn of output and 52,000 jobs in the local economy. However, significant 
economic challenges persist including high and increasing levels of economic 
inactivity (compared to a decline in the rest of the UK), lower average wages 
and levels of productivity compared to UK and Ireland and a high long term 
unemployment rate (more than double the UK average). Economic growth 
has slowed in recent months, attributed, at least in part, to the uncertainty 
generated by the Brexit referendum.  Brexit may also have implications for 
NI’s labour market as the migrant workforce has been a major factor in 
supporting the increase in employment levels in recent years. Sectors such 
as manufacturing and hospitality may face recruitment challenges as labour 
shortages are beginning to emerge.  
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It is also within this challenging economic context that welfare reforms 
imposing greater conditionality and stronger sanctions are being introduced. 
6. Northern Ireland is increasingly out of step with other parts of the 
islands on key equality issues.  
Since the 2016 Peace Monitoring Report there has been increased attention 
focused on equality issues, particularly around reform of abortion law and 
equal marriage. The absence of policy and legislative change by the NI 
devolved Assembly means that NI is increasingly out of step with other parts 
of these islands and has come under criticism from international human 
rights bodies. Evidence from the Northern Ireland Life and Times survey 
and opinion polls show that the majority of the population in NI support 
liberalising the law on these issues.  It also suggests that the stances of 
some political parties are at odds with those of voters. In both these areas 
it is now being argued that change is being further hindered by the lack of a 
functioning Assembly and pressure has been mounting on the Westminster 
government to take action. On both subjects it is clear that while under the 
devolution settlement the UK government could intervene and legislate, it is 
reluctant to move, arguing that both issues are devolved matters for the NI 
Assembly- a contestable point given that responsibility for human rights and 
the implementation of international conventions rests with the Westminster 
government. 
7. The culture war continues as the issues of contention evolve and 
mutate, and are exploited for political purposes. 
While there has been a noticeable lack of direct confrontation around 
parading issues in recent years, there still remains considerable unease, 
particularly within the unionist/loyalist community, as to how the issue has 
been dealt with.  Elsewhere problems remain around the public display of 
official flags and those of proscribed organisations, and their more recent 
appearance in the vicinity of explicitly mixed housing estates.  Similarly, 
issues surrounding paramilitary control of bonfires, their location, and what 
is being burned on them, continues to create intra- and inter-communal 
tensions.  In turn, this has posed a challenge for public agencies tasked 
with dealing with bonfires and flag-flying, with uncertainty over their roles 
and responsibilities.  The debate around the recognition and status of the 
Irish language in NI has become central to the ongoing political stalemate 
between Sinn Féin and the DUP.  Across this whole spectrum the search for 
solutions has not been helped by the delays to the work of the Commission 
on Flags, Identity, Culture and Tradition. 
8 .  The patterns of educational under-achievement within specific 
sections of the society remain unchanged.
The unchanging patterns of educational under-achievement, with marked 
inequalities in education attainment persisting or getting worse, is worthy 
of particular note.  The greatest inequality in educational attainment is the 
difference between the achievement levels of children who attend grammar 
schools and those who do not.  While there is under-achievement among 
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working class pupils generally - and this is worse among boys - working 
class Protestant boys continue to have lower educational attainment 
than Catholic boys.  Traveller children have exceptionally poor educational 
outcomes.  Data on educational outcomes discussed in this report are not 
new and their persistence is an outcome of the failure of the NI government 
to tackle fundamental problems regarding the structure of education in NI, 
including the inability to agree a system for post-primary transfer and to 
tackle the underlying issue of poverty. 
9.  Catholic recruitment to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) 
has levelled out following the ending of the 50:50 recruitment process.  
Catholic police officers currently represent 32 per cent of the total.
A stated aim of the PSNI is to have a workforce that is representative of the 
community it serves.  This means representative in terms of religion, gender, 
ethnicity and sexual orientation.  In the context of NI’s recent conflict, the 
most politically-sensitive marker has been that of Catholic representation in 
the police service.  In the years prior to the Patten reforms, Catholics made 
up eight per cent of PSNI police officers.  The policy of 50:50 (Catholic : 
Protestant) recruitment saw this figure increase to 30 per cent.  Following 
the ending of equal recruitment in March 2011 the figure has marginally 
increased to 32 per cent in 2018.  There have been slight improvements in 
the composition of the service in terms of gender and ethnic minorities.  
However, at current rates of change it could be decades before the PSNI truly 
reflects the society it polices.
10. Twenty years on from the Belfast / Good Friday Agreement, 
Northern Ireland appears no closer to finding an acceptable way of 
dealing with the past.
The failure to address the legacy of the past continues to manifest itself in 
many areas.  The campaign to secure a pension for those survivors injured 
as a direct result of the conflict continues to be held up by an on-going 
debate over the statutory definition of a ‘victim’ and thereby included in any 
scheme.  Further problems have arisen over the need to implement a fully-
funded programme to complete many of the legacy-related inquests that 
are still waiting to be dealt with.  Alongside this has been the discussion as to 
whether the time has come for some form of amnesty to be granted to halt 
the prosecution of individuals suspected of being involved in conflict-related 
incidents.  One aspect of these has been the call for the British government 
to introduce a statute of limitations for those members of the security 
forces who served in Northern Ireland.  That question largely dominated the 
headlines in June 2018 when the British government finally established a 
consultation process on the legacy proposals first set out in the Stormont 
House Agreement (2014) and Fresh Start Agreement (2015).
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INTRODUCTION
 
This is the fifth iteration of the Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report 
and covers the period October 2016 to September 2018.
The first three reports were authored by Paul Nolan and published in 2012, 
2013, and 2014.  The fourth report covered a period of two years, was 
authored by Robin Wilson and published in 2016.  The current report also 
covers a period of two years.  This report has been compiled and written by 
members of the ARK team who are based at Ulster University.  The economy 
section has been compiled by Richard Johnston and Jordan Buchanan at 
Ulster University’s Economic Policy Centre.
The first Peace Monitoring Report (Nolan, 2012) contained the following 
which we feel is worth repeating here:
 
1. Why a Peace Monitoring Report?
The NI Peace Monitoring Report will provide independent monitoring 
of Northern Ireland’s journey out of violence, and of the efforts 
to create a society in which all can live free from fear, and in 
relationships of trust and safety with their fellow citizens.  An 
indicator framework will be created to allow the measurement of 
change towards the goals of equality, social cohesion, sharing, and 
the ability to deal with political difference through open dialogue 
and accommodation.  The findings will be made available to all 
through the publication of an annual report.
Each of the Peace Monitoring Reports presents a wide range of information 
on a variety of topics related to Northern Ireland (NI).  In the case of some of 
the information, for example, that on the activities of paramilitary groups, it 
will be immediately apparent to readers that there is a relationship between 
this information and the peace in the region.  However, the relationship 
may not be so clear with regard to information on other topics, for example,  
abortion, the arts, the gender gap, or at first sight Brexit.  Without delving 
into the theoretical explanations for conflict in NI, it is possible to say 
that any factor which adds stress to society in NI could have an impact 
on the prospects for a lasting peace in the region.  If any such factor has a 
differential effect on one section of the community then its influence may 
also be more obvious.  However, even when the stress is evenly applied across 
the community, the additional stress might trigger inter-communal conflict.  
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1.1  The indicator framework
As in previous reports it is important to remind the reader how this project 
has decided to monitor peace.1   When the project commenced in 2010 there 
were no obvious models available and it was decided to use a four domain 
indicator framework.  This structure is also followed in this report. The four 
domains are:
Political progress
This can be measured in how (or if) the political institutions set up under 
the Belfast / Good Friday Agreement are working.  It can include attitudes 
towards different constitutional preferences.  In this report the changing 
macro situation with Brexit is an important consideration as is the fact that 
for 19 of the 23 months covered the NI Assembly was not sitting.  Because 
of these major developments political progress is presented first in this report 
rather than last as in previous reports.
The sense of safety
Perhaps the simplest measure of how peaceful a society is comes from the 
sense of security experienced by citizens.  This includes safety in different 
contexts: the home; the neighbourhood; the workplace and public space.  The 
report includes crime statistics, attitudinal data and academic reports and 
papers which provide a measure of how safe people in NI feel.  It also reports 
on policing and the prison service in NI. Key indicators include crime rates, 
hate crime, domestic violence and sexual crime, paramilitary activity and 
peace walls.
Equality
It is well documented not least in previous Peace Monitoring Reports that 
the ‘troubles’ developed against a background of structural inequality in 
housing, employment and life-chances between the two main communities, 
Catholic and Protestant.  The years leading up to the Belfast / Good Friday 
Agreement saw the implementation of many policies designed to promote 
greater equality, for example the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 
1989.  The Agreement emphasised equality as a key aspect of the settlement 
and an Equality Commission was established. The report includes wealth, 
poverty and inequality statistics.  It also examines equality and inequality in 
education and health.  This report also includes a new section focusing on the 
NI Assembly and social policy making.
1 A fuller explanation of the indicator framework and how it was devised can be found in the 
first Peace Monitoring Report, which can be accessed on the Community Relations Council 
website.  An article on the same subject can be found in Shared Space journal, Issue 16, 
November 2012, also available on CRC website. 
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Cohesion and sharing
Earlier reports have defined a cohesive society as one where citizens feel 
themselves to belong to a community and they recognise others as their 
fellow citizens.  This balances celebration of diversity and tolerance of others’ 
cultural practices with sharing and solidarity.  Given the fact that NI is now a 
multi-ethnic society it is important not just to consider the ‘two traditional 
communities’ but the broader cultural diversity. This dimension examines 
well-being, sharing and separation in housing, schools and public space.  It 
also looks at arts and sport and participation in public life.
1.2  The limitations of research
Previous reports have noted that the Peace Monitoring Report aims to 
present an evidence-based approach to peace and conflict in NI drawing 
on publicly available data. Much of this data is based on surveys which 
are open to sampling error and official statistics, for example, on crime are 
based on what is reported which is not a full representation of what crime is 
happening.  Nonetheless the figures provide an important look at the current 
situation in NI and how that has changed (or not).  The report uses a wide 
range of data and supports this with as many additional sources as possible.
Background and context
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BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
 
1.  The economy: record performance   
 but challenges persist
 Richard Johnston and Jordan Buchanan, Ulster University  
 Economic Policy Centre
2018 marked the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Belfast / Good Friday 
Agreement and the evidence confirms significant improvements in economic 
life and wellbeing.  At the time of writing, unemployment is at record lows, 
employment at an all-time high and the economy is undergoing the process 
of rebalancing to be more private sector led.  These improvements have 
continued while the Northern Ireland (NI) Executive has been absent and in 
the looming shadow of Brexit.  It could be argued that Brexit has resulted in 
a short-term boost for the economy as it weakened the exchange rate and 
boosted tourism and helped exporters and Foreign Direct Investors, although 
it has also resulted in inflation and some uncertainty for business.  
Furthermore, two sectors that benefit directly from the peace in NI as well 
as other factors - tourism and FDI - are creating jobs and opportunities 
across the skills spectrum and many areas in NI. Surveys suggest that citizens 
are amongst the happiest in the UK.  Two decades on from signing the 
Agreement, there is much to be positive about in NI.
Whilst the NI economy has posted a relatively strong performance in some 
regards, there are several key indicators where NI’s performance is relatively 
weaker than counterparts and competitors.  These economic challenges have 
been a persistent feature of the NI economy and include relatively lower 
income levels per capita and employment rates, higher levels of economic 
inactivity, weaker productivity and as a result, a sizeable annual fiscal transfer 
from Westminster.  
These are persistent issues for NI and are the focus of a range of policies and 
programmes to boost growth.  More recently, economic growth has slowed 
and this has been attributed, at least in part, to the uncertainty generated by 
the Brexit referendum.  However, it remains unclear whether the slowdown 
is a Brexit induced effect, or the result of NI’s legacy of structural economic 
weaknesses.
The NI economy has grown and changed structurally since 1998.  This is 
due to a range of factors including increased consumer and government 
spending, business investment, recent exchange rate depreciations and a 
stronger export base – and of course – a more peaceful and normalised 
society.  Whilst the improvement across key metrics over the past two 
decades is encouraging, there is further progress required if NI is to achieve 
its economic aspirations.
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1.1 Economic growth
The NI economy grew2 rapidly from 1998 up to the recession, ahead of the 
UK rate.  This growth can be attributed to several factors including; the spill-
over effects of the rapid growth of the Celtic tiger as real estate, construction 
and finance benefitted in both parts of the island; increased government 
spending in the UK which resulted in growth in NI Departmental expenditure; 
increased consumer spending; business investment, exports and tourism as 
well as peace in NI.
NI’s recovery from the 2008 recession was more modest than the rest of the 
UK.  Employment recovered, but productivity growth lagged behind the UK 
rate and economic inactivity remained persistently high, which resulted in NI 
growing on a lower trajectory after the recession.  Indeed, economic growth 
has been sluggish over the past few years.
Figure 1:  Economic growth, UK & NI, 1998 - 2018
 
2 Economic growth is measured by real Gross Value Added (GVA) growth, which removes the 
effects of inflation.  
Source: ONS, UUEPC analysis
Note: GVA in 2015 constant prices
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1.2  Income
GVA per capita measures the level of income per person in an economy and 
is a commonly used method of comparing standards of living across different 
economies.  NI has the third lowest GVA per capita of the UK regions, ahead 
of Wales and North East of England.  On this indicator, NI is 25 per cent 
below the UK average and almost 55 per cent lower than London and Ireland.  
Analysis3 shows that output per person is lower in NI predominantly due 
to lower employment rates (relatively fewer people in employment) and 
lower productivity (those people in employment producing relatively less 
than their UK counterparts).   Increasing employment and productivity to 
boost economic growth and in turn living standards are the two main anchor 
points within economic strategies published by the NI Executive, including 
the Economic Strategy (2012)4  and the current draft Industrial Strategy5  
and the Programme for Government6. 
3  https://www.ulster.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/118385/Understanding_
productivity_in_Northern_Ireland_27_September_2016.pdf 
4  https://www.northernireland.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/nigov/ni-
economic-strategy-revised-130312_0.pdf 
5  https://www.economy-ni.gov.uk/consultations/industrial-strategy 
6  https://www.northernireland.gov.uk/programme-government
Source: ONS, UUEPC analysis
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Source: ONS, UUEPC analysis
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1.3  Wellbeing
In recent years, wellbeing has become an important measure to economists, 
government and policy makers as efforts are made to measure societal 
progress beyond the financial or ‘hard’ economic indicators to take account 
of qualitative factors that impact upon quality of life for citizens. 
NI’s performance is exceptional in terms of wellbeing, especially when 
considered relative to other economic indicators and health statistics.  The 
region is ranked as one of the top in the UK in terms of having low levels 
of anxiety or stress and high levels of life satisfaction happiness.  Whilst 
incomes, employment, productivity, mental health indicators from Health 
Trusts and other indicators may suggest that living standards are lower and 
incidences of poor mental health are higher, the wellbeing indicators counter 
this perspective.  It has been suggested that relatively strong community 
and family bonds, shorter commutes to work, relatively higher levels of 
government expenditure and living in a peaceful society all play a part in 
terms of how people in NI feel and respond to these surveys.  More research 
may be required to fully understand the driving factors, but NI has performed 
well in these indicators across many years and geographies and as such, 
can be regarded as one of the better points about living in NI.  Wellbeing is 
discussed further in dimension four of the report.  
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Figure 3:  Adults who rate their happiness as very high, UK regions, 2016-17
Source: ONS, UUEPC analysis
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1.4  Productivity
NI’s productivity7 levels have typically lagged the UK average by 15 per cent 
to 20 per cent over the last two decades.  Boosting productivity to improve 
average living standards is a key economic challenge for NI.  However, the 
productivity challenge is not unique to NI.  The UK has also experienced a 
slowdown in productivity growth relative to its G7 peer group and the gap is 
now 15 per cent.  This implies that on average a G7 country can produce in 
3 days what takes a UK worker 4 days and an NI worker 5 days to produce.  
Understanding the reasons for weak productivity performance has been a key 
challenge for economists and policy makers in recent years.
The productivity gap can be divided into two component parts.  Firstly, the 
sectoral composition of the NI labour market (what we do) and, secondly; 
efficiency (how well we do it).  In general, NI has a higher concentration of 
employment in lower productivity sectors and workers within those sectors 
also produce lower levels of output than their UK counterparts.   This can in 
part, be explained by headquarter effects, such as attribution of profits or 
higher wages in London HQ’s, but there are opportunities for NI to catch 
up to UK and international standards, which would increase the rate of 
economic growth and standards of living.
 
7  Productivity reflects an economy’s ability to produce outputs (such as goods and services) 
taking into consideration the amount of inputs (such as raw materials, capital and labour).
Source: ONS, UUEPC analysis
Note: Jobs based on total workforce jobs
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Figure 4:  Productivity gap, UK & NI, 1998 - 2016
Source: ONS, UUEPC analysis  
Note: Jobs based on total workforce jobs
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1.5  Labour Market
Employment is at its highest level on record and unemployment at a historic 
low in NI, which are both very encouraging from an NI perspective.  Taking a 
broader view, NI still has the lowest employment rate of the UK regions; 69.7 
per cent, which is significantly below the UK average of 75.6 per cent and 
almost four percentage points lower than Wales, the second lowest region.  
NI has benefitted from an employment-based recovery, but worryingly, the 
rate of improvement has been the slowest of the UK regions from the lowest 
base. 
Reducing unemployment has been a real success story for NI, declining 
markedly over the past year.  The rate is now a full percentage point below 
the UK average and at historically low levels.  However, despite higher 
employment and lower unemployment, economic inactivity rates are 
persistently high – seven percentage points above the UK.  Whilst rates have 
declined nationally, the opposite has been the case in recent years in NI. 
 
Figure 5:  Labour market profile: UK & NI, Q1 2018
Following the recession in 2008, there was a spike in unemployment 
in both the UK and NI economies. Unemployment rates are at record 
lows prompting some economic commentators to suggest that both 
economies may be approaching full employment.  However, the relatively 
low employment rate and high inactivity rate, combined with limited 
wage growth and increases in part-time and relatively insecure forms of 
employment (such as zero hours contracts) suggests that there is some 
available capacity in the labour market.  Companies, business representatives 
and support organisations report that the market is challenging in terms of 
securing employees at the more highly skilled and experienced end of the 
spectrum, which is where demand appears to be most robust.  However, the 
demand for level one and two skills is lower, perhaps due to the automation 
of some tasks and increasingly global production chains.
Source: ONS and NISRA, Labour Force Survey, UUEPC analysis
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Welfare reform (including the introduction of Universal Credit, Personal 
Independence Payments and changes to Housing Benefit and Employment 
Support Allowances) is likely to incentivise people to move from 
unemployment to employment if opportunities permit but may also have 
resulted in the unintended consequence of some individuals moving from 
unemployment into economic inactivity.  Benefits top-ups that are allocated 
in NI will undoubtedly go some way to ameliorate the impact of the reforms 
and will be welcomed by the most marginalised in society.  “What are the 
overall impacts of welfare reform in NI” is a good question and further 
research could be carried out to conclude on the economic and social 
impacts and set these against the cost to the NI Executive, which is broader 
than the economic perspective considered here. 
Relatively high rates of economic inactivity remain one of NI’s most 
persistent and challenging economic issues.  To provide perspective, NI has 
had the highest working age economic inactivity rate of the UK regions in 
94 of the last 104 quarters.  In addition, over the last decade, while the UK 
inactivity rate has declined annually, the rate has been persistently high in NI 
and has increased over the last two years.  The diverging trend is concerning 
and creating a more significant economic issue for future generations to deal 
with in NI.  Further information on the trends and composition of economic 
inactivity in NI can be found in an EPC Working Paper (EPC, Working Paper, 
November 2016).
Source: ONS, UUEPC analysis
Figure 6:  Unemployment rate (16-64 population) UK & NI, 1998 - 2018
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Figure 7:  Economic inactivity rates: UK & NI, 1998 - 2018
The number of economically inactive (excluding students) in 1997 was 
233,000 and the figure in 2017 was 235,000.  
Within the economic inactivity group, people are classified as; long term 
sick, looking after family/home, retired, a full-time student or other. Full time 
students represent approximately one quarter of the total economically 
inactive population in NI and can be viewed as a positive for society, as the 
investment in human capital and skills development should help to generate 
future economic activity. 
NI has the largest proportion classified as long-term sick or disabled of the 
UK regions, equivalent to 10 per cent and almost double the UK rate of 5.1 
per cent.   Two decades after the Belfast / Good Friday Agreement, mental 
health issues such as post-traumatic stress disorders and intergenerational 
mental health issues persist and are above GB rates.  Research by O’Reilly 
and Stevenson, 20038 suggests that “it is probable that the mental health 
of the population of NI has been significantly affected by the Troubles”.  It 
therefore follows that at least part of the explanation for the proportion of 
the population reporting mental health issues is higher in NI than other parts 
of the UK and could take several generations to dissipate.  It is concerning to 
note however that since 2013, the overall trend has been upwards.  
Source: ONS, UUEPC analysis
8  https://pure.qub.ac.uk/ws/files/515947/Mental health in Northern Ireland -  
have The Troubles made it worse - J Epidemiol Community Health 2003 -  
O_’Reilly D, Stevenson - MR..pdf
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1.6  Tourism
The development of the tourism sector and promotion of NI as a place to 
visit has been assisted by two decades of peace in NI.  When combined with 
the depreciation of Sterling following the 2008 recession and then again 
following the Brexit referendum, the impact has been a significant boost to 
tourism visitors and expenditure.
Tourism visits to NI increased during the 1990’s and in 1998 there were 
almost 1.5M overnight trips to the region.  By 2017 that number had 
increased by 80 per cent to 2.7M.  In 2013, Deloitte estimated the tourism 
sector in NI contributed £2.0Bn of output and 52,000 jobs, equivalent to 
almost 7 per cent of the economy9.   Over two decades, tourism sector has 
grown markedly in NI, with 80 per cent more overnight trips to NI in 2017 
than in 1998.
Source: Department for the Economy, UUEPC anaylsis. 
Note: Based on a 4 quarter moving average, and excludes students.
9  Deloitte, Economic Impact- Deloitte- Tourism- Jobs & Growth, November 2013
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Figure 8:  Long term sick rates: UK & NI, 1997-2017
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Source: 1998-2010 Northern Ireland Tourist Board; 2010 onwards 
Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency
Figure 9:  Overnight trips to NI, 1998-2017
1.7  Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
Two decades of peace will also have helped to attract FDI, making NI 
a more attractive place to do business when considered alongside NI’s 
internationally competitive offering in terms of highly skilled workers, a 
competitive cost base (including the depreciation of Sterling, wages and 
office rents) and Government support for inward investment projects.
During 1998, the Industrial Development Board reported to Parliament that 
the organisation had promoted 1,422 jobs during 1997/810.  Over the most 
recent five years for which data are available, FDI intelligence reports that 
on average 3,000 jobs per annum were created by FDI companies in NI11.   
Clearly, NI’s FDI performance has improved markedly since the signing of the 
Agreement as job creation levels have more than doubled over the past two 
decades. 
 
10  https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmniaf/198/19803.htm
11  Note that IDB reports on jobs promoted, i.e. the intention to create jobs as a project is 
approved and FDI intelligence reports on a jobs created basis.
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1.8  Brexit
Brexit negotiations continue, although uncertainty prevails regarding whether 
a deal can be struck and if it can, what it may bring for trade, market 
access, regulation and movement of people.  Uncertainty has impacted on 
confidence locally.  Many companies have chosen to ‘wait and see’, some 
others have taken steps to open a base across the border and indeed, some 
Irish companies have considered opening an NI base as a route that may 
help them export into GB.  The longer-term economic impacts of Brexit are 
challenging to model and will be until the terms of a deal are agreed, or the 
UK exits the EU without one.  
Short term impacts are already apparent, as one of the immediate effects 
of the Brexit referendum in June 2016 was the depreciation in the value 
of Sterling which has had both positive and negative implications.  On the 
upside, Sterling’s depreciation has acted as a boon for the UK and NI tourism 
industry, FDI investors and exporters as their international competitiveness 
has improved. 
On the downside, the Sterling depreciation led to rising levels of inflation 
as imports became more expensive.  Consumer Price Inflation (CPI) was 
0.5 per cent at the time of the referendum, then increased to 3.1 per cent 
18 months later.  In recent months inflation has moderated to 2.5 per 
cent as import cost pressures have passed through.  Rising inflation has 
squeezed consumers and households as wage growth has not kept pace.  This 
means that consumers cannot buy as many goods and services and with 
consumption driving c70 per cent of the NI economy, imported inflation has 
acted as a brake.
1.9  Conclusions
On the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Belfast / Good Friday 
Agreement there are clear signs of economic progress.  Employment is at 
a record high; unemployment rates are at historical lows and citizens are 
amongst the happiest in the UK according to some surveys.  Peace is an 
important element of this success and when combined with increased 
consumer and government spending, business investment, recent exchange 
rate depreciations and a stronger export base, these factors coalesce to 
create a stronger economy in 2018.
Tourism visits have increased by 80 per cent and FDI job creation has more 
than doubled since 1998 providing a gauge of the improvement so far.  
Other sectors have benefitted from the downstream effects as tourists and 
FDI companies purchase from their local supply chains and employees spend 
their wages.  These include agri-food, entertainment, retail and wholesale, 
construction, logistics and manufacturing, amongst others.
Whilst the NI economy has posted a strong performance in a historical 
context, there are several key indicators where NI’s performance is relatively 
weaker than counterparts and competitors.  These economic challenges have 
been a persistent feature of the NI economy and include relatively lower 
income levels per capita and employment rates, higher levels of economic 
inactivity, weaker productivity and as a result, a sizeable annual transfer from 
Westminster.  
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Economic inactivity rates are concerning as they are relatively high and 
rising at a time when they are falling across the UK.  NI has a relatively 
higher incidence of sickness, and within that group, individuals reporting 
incidences of mental health illnesses.  Research by O’Reilly and Stevenson 
(2003) suggests that the Troubles have impacted on the levels of mental 
health issues in the local population providing part of the explanation. Logic 
suggests that these issues could persist for several generations as families 
continue to deal with the effects of historical events.
More recently, economic growth has slowed, and this has been attributed, at 
least in part, to the uncertainty generated by the Brexit referendum.  Locally, 
the absence of an Executive has impacted on economic policy making.  One 
example of this is the devolution of Corporation Tax setting powers, which 
could be used to try to generate additional FDI.  Whether an advocate of the 
policy or not, it is an example of the impact at this point in time. 
In conclusion, the economy has grown and changed structurally since 1998 
when the Agreement was signed.  This is due to a range of factors including 
consumer and government spending, business investment, recent exchange 
rate depreciations and a stronger export base – and of course – a more 
peaceful and normalised society.  Whilst there are many issues to tackle in NI 
and much more potential to fulfil, society is in a better place.  
2.  Society
The first Peace Monitoring Report (Nolan, 2012) gave a history and 
background to the conflict.  Previous reports have also given detailed 
analyses of the demography of NI including the religious balance and the 
migration into NI that has given rise to an increasingly diverse society.  The 
last census was held in 2011 and estimates of key variables are released 
annually.
The NI population at 30 June 2017 was estimated to be 1.871 million, an 
increase of 8,700 people (0.5 per cent) since mid-2016 (NISRA). The increase 
can mainly be attributed to natural growth of 7,700 people (i.e. 23,600 births 
minus 15,900 deaths) and net inward migration of 1,200 people (i.e. 22,100 
people moving here to live and 20,900 people leaving to live elsewhere).  The 
level of emigration (i.e. people leaving NI to live elsewhere) and immigration 
(i.e. people coming here to live) both decreased in the year ending mid-
2017, by 6.5 per cent and 7.3 per cent respectively. (NISRA, 2017 Population 
Estimates, 28 June 2018).
The third Peace Monitoring Report (Nolan, 2014) examined the findings from 
the 2011 census of population.  The key statistic was the narrowing of the 
gap between Catholics (45.1 per cent) and Protestants (48.4 per cent).  This 
was the first time the Protestant population was not the majority in the 
history of the region.
Other significant points that are important to remember are first that the 
spatial distribution of the population shows a very clear divide with the East 
and South of NI more Protestant while the West and North is more Catholic.  
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The second point is that the age structure is different for the two 
communities with Protestants dominating in the older age cohorts and 
Catholics in the younger age cohorts.  
An important element in the change over time in the religious make-up 
of the population of NI has been the fact that Catholics, those belonging 
to Other religions, those with no religion and those who have not stated a 
religion have younger age distributions than those who are Protestants and 
other Christians. In 2011, 54 per cent of usual residents with No religion 
/ Religion not stated, 51 per cent of Catholics and 48 per cent of those 
belonging to Other religions were aged under 35, compared with 40 per cent 
of those who belonged to Protestant and Other Christian denominations. 
In contrast, one in five (20 per cent) of Protestants and Other Christians 
were aged 65 and over, compared with 11 per cent of Catholics, 11 per cent 
belonging to Other religions and 8.7 per cent with No religion/Religion not 
stated (NISRA, Religion in NI).
>60% more Protestant than Catholic
30% to 60% more Protestant than Catholic
0% to 30%% more Protestant than Catholic
0% to 30%% more Catholic than Protestant
>60% more Catholic than Protestant
>60% more Catholic than Protestant
Figure 10:  Spatial distribution of Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, 2011
Source: Based on 2011 Census (http://i.imgur.com/KwnE1Ep.png)
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Figure 11:  Age and Religion in Northern Ireland 2011 Census
Figure 12 presents a number of key demographic comparisons between NI 
and the other UK countries. The table reveals that NI:
• Had the second fastest growing population in the UK (0.7 per cent 
annual increase) between 2004 – 2014;
• Has the youngest population in the UK (average age, 38.0 years in 2014);
• Has the highest fertility rate in the UK (1.97 births per woman in 2014). 
By 2024, the rate is projected to rise to 2.00, still higher than any other 
UK country; and
• Has the lowest death rate (8.0 per thousand population in 2014) of any 
UK jurisdiction.
 
Source:  NI Assembly, Research Matters: Demographic Profile, 29 April 2016. 
 
Figure 12 presents a number of key demographic comparisons between NI and the 
other UK countries. The table reveals that NI: 
• Had the second fastest growing population in the UK (0.7 per cent annual 
increase) between 2004 – 2014; 
• Has the youngest pop l tion in the UK (average age, 38.0 years in 2014); 
• Has the high st fertility rate in the UK (1.97 births per woman in 2014). By 
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Figure 12:  Population of Northern Ireland: comparisons with other UK 
Jurisdictions 
 
United 
Kingdom England Wales Scotland 
Northern 
Ireland 
POPULATION (millions, rounded) 
2011 (Census) 63.2 53.0 3.1 5.3 1.8 
2014 (Estimate) 64.6 54.3 3.1 5.3 1.8 
2024 
(projection) 69.0 58.4 3.2 5.5 1.9 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Catholic
Protestant and Other Christian
No religion/ not stated
Other Religions
Aged 0-35 Aged 35-64 Aged 65 and over
%
Source: NI Assembly, Research Matters: Demographic Profile, 29 April 2016.
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The next Census is in 2021, however, using other statistics including the 
School Census and Labour Force Religion survey, Nolan reports (The Irish 
Times, 19 June 2018) that the Catholic population will continue to grow and 
by 2021 may outnumber the Protestant population.  He goes on to speculate 
that given the different age cohorts the next stage will be that the Catholic 
electorate will outnumber the Protestant electorate. 
Traditionally the Catholic population in NI have largely identified as Irish 
while the Protestant population have largely identified as British.  The 
Life and Times survey (and previously the NI Social Attitudes survey) has 
monitored this since 1989 and the data show little change over this almost 
30 year period.
United 
Kingdom England Wales Scotland
Northern 
Ireland
POPULATION (millions, rounded)
2011 (Census) 63.2 53.0 3.1 5.3 1.8
2014 (Estimate) 64.6 54.3 3.1 5.3 1.8
2024 (projection) 69.0 58.4 3.2 5.5 1.9
Annual average % growth rate, 2004-14 0.7 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.7
MEDIAN AGE (years)
2014 40.0 39.7 42.1 41.9 38.0
2024 40.9 40.6 42.8 42.9 40.1
TOTAL FERTILITY RATES (children per women)
2014 1.82 1.83 1.78 1.62 1.97
2024 (projected) 1.87 1.89 1.88 1.63 2.00
DEATHS (crude rate per thousand population)
1984 11.4 11.3 12.0 12.1 10.1
2014 8.8 8.6 10.2 10.1 8.0
Source: NISRA, ONS
Figure 12:  Population of Northern Ireland: comparisons with other UK Jurisdictions
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Source: Northern Ireland Life and Times survey 1998 2017; Northern Ireland Social 
Attitudes survey 1989-1997.
Source: Northern Ireland Life and Times survey 1998 2017; Northern Ireland Social 
Attitudes survey 1989-1997.
 
Figure 13:  National Identity and Religion in Northern Ireland (percentage), 1989-2017
Figure 14:  Percentage of Protestants describing themselves as Unionist, and Catholics describing themselves as 
Nationalist (percentage), 1989 -2017 (discontinuous)
 
Source: Northern Ireland Life and Times (1998-2017) and Northern Ireland Social Attitudes surveys (1989-1996) 
However when we look at overall constitutional preferences we see a slight decline 
in Protestants who claim to be Unionist with a slight rise in Catholics who claim to be 
Nationalist. 
 
Figure 14: Percentage of Protestants describing themselves as Unionist and 
Catholics describing themselves as Nationalist 1989 -2017 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
P
er
 c
en
t
Year
Protestant and British Catholic and Irish
Linear (Protestant and British) Linear (Catholic and Irish)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
Protestant and Unionist Catholic and Nationalist
Linear (Protestant and Unionist) Linear (Catholic and Nationalist)
 
Source: Northern Ireland Life and Times (1998-2017) and Northern Ireland Social Attitudes surveys (1989-1996) 
However when we look at overall constitutional preferences we see a slight decline 
in Protestants who claim to be Unionist with a slight rise in Catholics who claim to be 
Nationalist. 
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In terms of the detail of constitutional preferences. The majority of 
Protestants want to remain part of the UK preferably under devolution.   
A small minority support a united Ireland.
 
For Catholics the overall trend is a decrease in those wanting a united Ireland 
although since 2013 that percentage has been increasing.  Since 2006 there 
has been an increase in Catholics whose preference is to stay in the UK with 
devolution, again since 2013 this has been decreasing to a point where in 
2017 the two positions are almost equal.
Source: Northern Ireland Life and Times survey 1998 2017; Northern Ireland 
Social Attitudes survey 1989-1997.
Source: Northern Ireland Life and Times survey 1998 2017; Northern Ireland Social 
Attitudes survey 1989-1997. 
 
In terms of the detail of constitutional preferences. The majority of Protestants want 
to remain part of the United Kingdom preferably under devolution.  A small minority 
support a United Ireland. 
 
Figure 15: Constitutional preferences of Protestants 
 
Source: Northern Ireland Life and Times survey 1998 2017; Northern Ireland Social 
Attitudes survey 1989-1997. 
 
For Catholics the overall trend is a decrease in those wanting a United Ireland 
although since 2013 that percentage has been increasing.  Since 2006 there has 
been an increase in Catholics whose preference is to stay in the UK with devolution, 
again since 2013 this has been decreasing to  oint where in 2017 the two 
positions are almost equal. 
 
Figure 16: Constitutional preferences of Catholics 
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Figure 15:  Constitutional preferences of Protestants (percentage), 1989-2017 (discontinuous)
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Source: Northern Ireland Life and Times survey 1998 2017; Northern Ireland 
Social Attitudes survey 1989-1997.
NISRA figures show the trend in migration to and from NI over the past 16 
years.  From 2003 there was an increase in those coming in to NI as a result 
of the accession of the Eastern European Union members such as Poland but 
this was short lived.  From 2007 with the recession the numbers dropped 
until a slight rise again from 2013.  Wilson (2016) noted in the fourth Peace 
Monitoring Report that since the 2011 Census detail on the makeup of the 
immigrant population is difficult to assess. One data set that is helpful is 
the School Census collated by the Department of Education that shows 
that in 2001/02 there were 868 children, 0.5 per cent of the official register 
in primary school for whom English was a second language.  This has risen 
gradually over the years to 2017/18 where some 11,423 children, 6 per cent 
of the official register in primary school have English as a second language.  
The comparable figures for post primary schools are 2001/02 463 young 
people, 0.3 per cent rising to 2017/18 2839, 2 per cent.
 
Source: Northern Ireland Life and Times survey 1998 2017; Northern Ireland Social 
Attitudes survey 1989-1997. 
 
NISRA figures show the trend in migration to and from NI over the past 16 years.  
From 2003 there was an increase in those coming in to NI as a result of the 
accession of th  Eastern European Union m mbers such as Poland but this was 
short lived.  From 2007 with the recession the numbers dropped until a slight rise 
again from 2013.  Wilson (2016) noted in the fourth Peace Monitoring report that 
since the 2011 Census detail on the makeup of the immigrant population is difficult to 
assess. One data set that is helpful is the School Census collated by the Department 
of Educ  that show  that in 2001/02 there were 868 children, 0.5 per cent of the 
official register in primary scho l for whom English was a second language.  This 
has risen gradually over the years to 2017/18 where some 11,423 children, 6 per 
cent of the official register in primary school have English as a second language.  
The comparable figures for post primary schools are 2001/02 463 young people, 0.3 
per cent rising to 2017/18 2839, 2 per cent. 
 
Figure 17: Components of population change, 2001-02 to 2016-17 
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Figure 17:  Components of population change, 2001- 02 to 2016 -17
Later in this report (Dimension Two) we discuss hate crime and racism and 
present some worrying trends.  However, a majority (80 per cent or higher) 
of those living in NI report feeling a sense of belonging and this has been 
rising slowly over the years since 2013 when the question was first asked in 
the Northern Ireland Life and Times survey.
Source: NISRA
Year
Northern 
Ireland 
%
Rest of  UK 
%
Rep. of 
Ireland 
%
A8 
Countries 
%
Other 
Countries 
%
1998 86 7 3 0.008 2
2010 82 5 3 5 5
2016 83 4 3 5 6
Source: NISRA
Figure 18:  Births registered in Northern Ireland classified by Mother’s country of birth, 1998, 2010 and 2016 
shown as percentage of total births
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Figure 18: Births registered in Northern Ireland classified by Mother’s country 
of birth, 1998, 2010 and 2016 shown as percentage of total births 
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This section has provided a brief overview of the economy and society in NI. 
The report now proceeds to examine the detailed situation under each of 
the four dimensions. First political progress is explored; this is followed by an 
examination of the sense of safety; the report then examines equality related 
issues and finally the report focusses on cohesion and sharing.
Source: Northern Ireland Life and Times survey 2013-2017
Figure 19:  And thinking about Northern Ireland as a whole, the kind of place it is and the kind of people who 
live here, would you say that you feel a sense of belonging to Northern Ireland? (percentage), 2013-2017
 
Figure 19: And thinking about Northern Ireland as a whole, the kind of place it 
is and t e kind f people who live her , would you say that you feel a sense of 
belonging to Northern Ireland? 
 
 
Source: Northern Ireland Life and Times survey 2013-2017 
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the sense of safety; the report then examines equality related issues and finally the 
report focusses on cohesion and sharing. 
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DIMENSION ONE 
Political progress
1. INTER-PARTY TALKS
The previous Peace Monitoring Report (Wilson, 2016) contained an 
assessment of the political situation in Northern Ireland (NI) that covered 
the period up until the summer of 2016.  On the one hand there was some 
positivity in that, ‘after another period of shakiness, NI’s political institutions 
had become more stable’, and that consequently, ‘the devolved ship of state’ 
appeared more stable than it had for some time (Wilson, 2016:11).  However, 
all of this also came with a caveat in terms of the possible implications 
following the outcome of the Assembly election of May 2016 as well as the 
result of the Brexit referendum in June 2016.  It was therefore apparent that 
the ‘Northern Ireland kaleidoscope had certainly been shaken.  How it would 
settle was, however, by no means certain’ (Wilson, 2016:179). Politics in 
NI has endured a testing time marked by divisions over Brexit and political 
wrangling that has led to the region being without a devolved government 
since January 2017.  Alongside this has been the apparent absence of a 
continuing commitment to the three-stranded approach that emerged in the 
1990s that helped secure the Belfast / Good Friday Agreement in 1998.  Not 
only have the key relationships - within NI, between Belfast and Dublin, as 
well as Dublin and London - deteriorated but the structures put in place to 
manage these have either been suspended or failed to secure the necessary 
political backing to make them work.  Another aspect has been the gradual 
disengagement of the United States government on matters relating to NI.  
Although initially the British government and unionist politicians viewed 
such external involvement with some suspicion it did undoubtedly prove 
beneficial at certain important moments.  But since early 2017 the role of 
American special envoy to NI has remained unfilled, and there has been a 
long delay in the appointment of the American ambassador to Ireland.  As 
things stand all of this has produced a situation where stalemate has become 
entrenched, with no obvious solution forthcoming to find a way out of the 
impasse.
1.1  Talking the talk: March 2017 - 
February 2018
Following the Assembly election on 2 March 2017 James Brokenshire, then 
Secretary of State, faced the challenge of instigating a new round of political 
talks aimed at restoring devolved government in the region.  The process got 
underway in earnest on 6 March with a three week deadline in place to allow 
the negotiations to produce an agreement that would allow a new power-
sharing executive to be formed.  Immediate prospects looked bleak however 
with Sinn Féin (SF) repeating its demand that Arlene Foster could not be 
reinstated as First Minister whilst the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) Inquiry 
continued.  The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) countered by dismissing 
this ultimatum by making clear that, ‘It is not for Sinn Fein to dictate our 
nominee’ (Belfast Telegraph, 6 March 2017).
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In spite of this discussions continued but then were to be halted temporarily 
with the death of deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness on 21 March.  At 
the funeral two days later, on 23 March in Derry, the First Minister Arlene 
Foster and the SF Assembly leader Michelle O’Neill publicly shook hands 
and for some this was taken as a positive sign in terms of the ongoing talks.  
But it soon became clear that there was little prospect of progress and on 
26 March Michelle O’Neill announced that the current process had come 
to an end and consequently that SF would not be nominating her as deputy 
First Minister the following day.  In effect this meant that no power-sharing 
executive could be formed before the formal deadline on the afternoon of 
Monday 27 March (The Guardian, 26 March 2017).  As for the DUP Arlene 
Foster was clear that the failure at this juncture rested with SF and not her 
party (ITV News, 26 March 2017).  Figure 20 highlights key political events 
between June 2016 and August 2018. 
Figure 20:  Key political events, June 2016 - August 2018
Key Political Events
23 June 2016 - Referendum on the UK’s membership of the 
EU.  Whole UK - 51.9% in favour of leaving and 48.1% for 
remaining.  In NI 44.2% vote to leave and 55.8% to remain.
9 January 2017 - Martin McGuinness resigned as deputy First 
Minister.
16 January 2017 - SF refused to nominate anyone as deputy 
First Minister.  This move threatened to bring down devolved 
government in NI. James Brokenshire (Secretary of State) 
announced that the NI Assembly would be dissolved on 26 
January with a new election set for 2 March.
2 March 2017 - Polling for the NI Assembly Election.  When 
votes were counted, SF came within one seat of replacing the 
DUP as the largest party.  For the first time there was no overall 
unionist majority.
6 March 2017 - Negotiations involving all the main political 
parties in NI, as well as the British and Irish governments, got 
underway in an attempt to restore devolved government.
21 March 2017 - Death of Martin McGuinness.
26 March 2017 - Michelle O’Neill (SF Assembly leader) stated 
that the political talks had failed and that SF would not be 
nominating anyone for deputy First Minister.  This meant 
that no new Executive would be formed before the 27 March 
deadline.
29 March 2017 - UK government issued a letter triggering 
Brexit.  The UK will leave the EU at 11pm on 29 March 2019.
18 April 2017 - Theresa May (Prime Minister) announced her 
intention to seek to dissolve the current parliament and call a 
Westminster election.  This effectively ended the political talks 
in NI.
8 June 2017 - Polling for the Westminster General Election.  
Although it remained the largest party in the House of 
Commons, the Conservative Party failed to win an overall 
majority.  In NI the DUP won 10 seats, SF won 7 seats with 1 
Independent Unionist holding the other seat.  Both the SDLP 
and UUP lost all the seats they were defending.  Theresa May 
sought the support of the DUP to allow her to form a new 
government.
1 November 2017 - In the wake of the ongoing failure of 
negotiations to restore devolved government in NI, James 
Brokenshire announced his intention to bring legislation before 
Westminster to provide a budget for NI to cover 2017-18.
18 January 2018 - Karen Bradley, recently appointed as 
Secretary of State, revealed she intended to start a new round 
of political negotiations on 24 January.
9 February 2018 - BBC News NI reported that a possible deal 
between the DUP and SF to restore the Assembly and the 
Executive, could be announced within a few days
12 February 2018 - Theresa May and Leo Varadkar (Taoiseach 
- Irish Prime Minister) arrived in Belfast to take part in the 
political talks.  They both left the following day with no 
apparent breakthrough in sight.
14 February 2018 - The negotiations ended in failure with the 
DUP and SF blaming each other for the collapse.
8 March 2018 - Karen Bradley published a budget setting out 
spending plans for NI that cover 2018-19.
26 April 2018 - Karen Bradley met all the main NI political 
parties in a series of discussions aimed at restoring devolution.  
But no announcement was made for any new round of 
negotiations.
9 August 2018 - BBC NI News reported that the Guinness 
World Records will not allow NI to claim the title of having 
the longest period without a peacetime government, which 
is currently held by Belgium, as it is judged to be a devolved 
administration rather than a sovereign state.
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A fresh round of negotiations with a new deadline of mid-April failed to 
secure a breakthrough and so James Brokenshire announced a pause in 
proceedings issuing  a warning that would soon become familiar – namely 
that the government could not accept the continuing stalemate with 
possible options including a further assembly election or even the return of 
direct rule.  He made clear that if there was no agreement after Easter he 
would bring in legislation at Westminster in order to set a regional rate for 
NI (BBC NI News, 11 April 2017,).  At this point events elsewhere intervened 
and on 18 April 2017 Theresa May announced a British General Election 
for 8 June.  This meant some immediate action needed to be taken with 
regard to NI and on 21 April the British government published the Ministerial 
Appointments and Regional Rates Bill which set out details to not only set a 
regional rate but also included provisions to extend the talks deadline once 
again until 29 June.
Whilst the election campaign that followed in NI may not have been as 
bitter as the one witnessed in March for the Assembly, the end result was 
to have major implications.  The DUP and SF made significant gains with 
both winning seats at the expense of their main political rivals the Ulster 
Unionist Party (UUP) and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP).  
Furthermore the overall result across the UK had huge significance for 
the DUP.  With Theresa May and the Conservative Party falling short of a 
majority in the House of Commons she was forced into a confidence and 
supply arrangement with the DUP whereby the party would support her 
minority government.  Such a development had obvious implications for the 
stalled negotiations in NI and not surprisingly apart from the DUP none were 
convinced that the deal between the Conservatives and DUP would make 
things any easier.  For instance Gerry Adams (SF leader) informed Theresa 
May ‘directly that she was in breach of the Good Friday Agreement’.  The 
SDLP stated that it was not ‘convinced that the DUP tail is not wagging the 
Tory dog’, and according to the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI), 
‘She (Mrs May) sought to give us reassurance on the issue of neutrality but 
we have to be practical about these things ... In reality, the government is 
here simply because the DUP allow it to be so’.  Finally for the UUP there 
were concerns, ‘that any deal reached is open and transparent’ and that ‘we 
are well aware coming from the Northern Ireland political situation of the 
side details that have been done in previous agreement’ (ITV News, 15 June 
2017).
These criticisms were brushed off by the British government and a new 
round of negotiations got underway.  These also failed to produce a result 
and in a statement to the House of Commons on 3 July the Secretary of 
State conceded that the talks had come to an end.  While emphasising 
that devolved government was the best option for NI he indicated that the 
Westminster parliament would have to step in ‘to give authority for the 
expenditure of Northern Ireland Departments through an appropriations Bill’ 
(Hansard, 3 July 2017).
In early September 2017 James Brokenshire met with the local parties in 
order to try and restart the talks process.  Whilst the DUP and SF restated 
their willingness to participate each indicated that the onus was on the other 
side to allow progress to be made.  Arlene Foster set out her proposals, which 
included an agreement to, restore an Executive immediately.  Alongside 
this would be, ‘a move to bring forward legislation to address culture and 
language issues in Northern Ireland within a time-limited period to be 
agreed.  If we fail to do that in a way that commands cross community 
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support then the Executive would cease to exist’ (Foster, Speech, 31 August 
2017).  These proposals were rejected by SF with Michelle O’Neill stating, 
‘Let’s agree to quickly conclude talks on implementation and rights, that 
is the only way to build a sustainable Executive that will last’ (Belfast 
Telegraph, 2 September 2017).
Despite these exchanges the DUP and SF did engage in the new round of 
discussions in early October.  Both were keen to stress that a deal could be 
reached but the size of the task to be overcome became evident at a very 
public spat between Foster and O’Neill at an event during the Conservative 
Party conference (BBC NI News, 3 October 2017).  Amidst such negativity 
there were still ongoing reports of a potential breakthrough.  Speaking in 
the Irish Senate on 12 October the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade 
in the Dáil, Simon Coveney (Irish Foreign Minister), expressed his optimism 
that there could be a successful conclusion to the current round of talks by 
the end of that week.  The following weekend the DUP were forced to deny 
a report that appeared in The News Letter suggesting that the party was 
engaged in an internal consultation exercise on the outline of a possible deal 
with SF (The News Letter, 14 October 2017).
Although James Brokenshire had avoided setting a specific deadline for this 
latest round of negotiations he had long warned failure to restore devolution 
would result in the UK  government having to legislate to set a budget for NI 
for 2016-17 and that this by its very nature put, ‘Northern Ireland on a path 
towards greater UK intervention in its day to day affairs’ (Written Statement, 
9 October 2017).  In the absence of progress in the talks the NI Budget Bill 
was passed on 16 November 2017 although the Secretary of State was 
keen to stress that this did not mean an immediate return to direct rule 
(Statement, 1 November 2017).
It was early 2018 before the process picked up again.  Due to ill-health James 
Brokenshire had been forced to step aside and his replacement, Karen Bradley 
had cabinet experience but little background in NI affairs.  She engaged in 
a series of discussions with all the main political parties in NI as well as the 
Irish government.  At a joint press conference with the Irish Foreign Minister 
Simon Coveney on 18 January she called for a new set of talks to begin on 
24 January.  She did not set out a specific deadline but indicated that she 
intended to give MPs at Westminster an update on progress no later than 7 
February (Statement, 18 January 2018).  The choice of date was not picked 
at random.  David Sterling, then head of the NI Civil Service, had stated 
during evidence given to the Northern Ireland Select Affairs Committee that 
8 February was the cut-off date to allow for clarity about setting a budget for 
the year 2018-19 (BBC NI News, 24 January 2018).
In Karen Bradley’s report to MPs on 7 February  she gave little away but just 
a few hours earlier a spokesperson for the government was making it known 
that ‘an agreement in the coming days, while not certain, is achievable’ (The 
Guardian, 6 February 2018).  On 9 February reports began to emerge from 
the BBC that there was potentially a deal in place between the DUP and SF 
that would finally see devolved government restored to NI.  The possibility 
of this happening was then further strengthened when it was announced 
that the British and Irish Prime Ministers would be arriving on Monday 12 
February to take part in the talks.  However both left Belfast the following 
day without any agreement in sight.  On 14 February 2018 it was announced 
that the process had ended acrimoniously with the DUP and SF blaming each 
other for its demise.
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A unique insight into the process was provided by journalists Eamon Mallie 
and Brian Rowan when they released what they claimed to be the draft of 
a paper exchanged between the parties on 9 February (EamonnMallie.com, 
Draft, 20 February 2018).  This seemed to indicate that the parties were 
edging towards an overall deal that could have seen devolved government 
restored.  Whilst later there were to be different interpretations between the 
DUP and SF as to the significance of the document it still provides a useful 
source as an indicator as to the positions of both parties.  
There appeared to be a commitment to put new arrangements in place that 
would ensure against a similar political crisis in the future.  This included:
• provisions to extend the period for an election of a First and deputy First 
Minister after an Assembly election or the resignation of either from one 
to six weeks;
• in the event of this being unsuccessful then a further 18 weeks would be 
provided to allow for a deal to be struck; 
• a review of the current system by which the Petition of Concern had 
operated in the Assembly; 
• the establishment of a Coalition Management Committee to provide 
an early warning system on any potential future areas that could cause 
friction;
• the creation of an Ad Hoc Committee within the Assembly, assisted by a 
panel of four experts, to consider the creation of a Bill of Rights for NI;
• the issue of same sex Marriage would be considered by means of a 
Private Members Bill in the Assembly and that ‘it is acknowledged that 
no Party alone can table a Petition of Concern’; and
• that the immediate priorities for any new Executive would be in the 
areas of Health and Brexit.  
 
With regards to the issues of language and dealing with the past there was 
every indication that more work needed to be done.  But Mallie and Rowan 
remained convinced that the document was an indication that on Friday 
9 February the DUP and SF were edging close to an overall settlement 
pointing to the fact that negotiators from both parties were at that stage 
corresponding with each other under the heading Draft Agreement Text.
In the immediate aftermath of the talks collapsing both parties gave 
contrasting views as to how close they had actually come to striking a deal.  
The SF position was outlined by Mary Lou McDonald (who had recently 
replaced Gerry Adams as the party’s president) at a press conference on 15 
February.  She made clear that SF believed that a draft agreement had been 
reached with DUP on Friday 9 February and that it had, ‘advised the DUP 
leadership that the deal should be closed before those opposed to it could 
unpick what we had achieved’ (McDonald, 15 February 2018).
The claim that elements within the DUP had scuppered a possible deal was 
now prevalent in the media.  Arlene Foster in an interview on RTE News 
denied the rumours as ‘nonsense’ and refuted that any recommendation had 
been made by her to party officers (RTE News, 15 February 2018).  However, 
speculation continued to focus on the exact nature of those internal 
Figure 21:  Page 
from the draft 
‘Agreement’ 
Source: EamonnMallie.com
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developments within the DUP.  On 16 February Nigel Dodds attempted 
to set the record straight and he claimed that, ‘the Sinn Féin propaganda 
machine is in full flow’, that Arlene Foster had been right to call time on the 
Talks and that the DUP wanted devolved government but not at any price 
(Dodds, 16 February 2018).
All the smaller parties could do was voice their frustration at the lack 
of action.  All eyes continued to focus on the DUP and SF but it became 
increasingly clear that there was to be no meeting of minds on how to 
proceed.  This has continued to be the case and with Brexit and continuing 
disagreement over legacy issues and the Irish language evidence would 
suggest that the restoration of the devolved institutions could be some time 
away.
2. BREXIT
While there are already thousands of academic articles, books and reports 
about the topic of Brexit, the problem all the academic authors and political 
commentators face is the high level of uncertainty about the final outcome 
of the UK and EU negotiations.  The information in this current Peace 
Monitoring Report was compiled (to August 2018) during this period of 
negotiations with further crucial summit meetings to occur in the closing 
months of 2018.  An account of the final negotiated position between the UK 
and the EU, together with its full political, social, and economic implications 
for the UK, for Ireland, and especially for NI will have to await a future Peace  
Monitoring Report.  However, given the impact that the Brexit process has 
already had on politics in the region and the level of political disagreement 
it has engendered within and outside NI it is important to review some of 
the major developments since the outcome of the EU referendum on 23 
June 2016.  The future implications of Brexit for the Belfast / Good Friday 
Agreement and the likely impact of Brexit on any future referendum on Irish 
reunification are also considered. 
2.1  Review of the referendum result   
 and support for Brexit
The fourth Peace Monitoring Report (Wilson, 2016) discussed the outcome 
of the Referendum on the EU but it is worth restating the results.  The 
referendum was held on a UK-wide basis, that is, England and Wales, 
Scotland and NI, and the overall result was 51.9 per cent in favour of leaving 
the EU and 48.1 per cent for remaining.  The breakdown of national results is 
shown in Figure 22.
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Figure 22:  Summary of EU Referendum Results in the UK
The results of a survey, conducted around the date of the referendum, 
indicated that within NI 85 per cent of Catholics and 40 per cent of 
Protestants had voted to remain in the EU (Garry, NI Assembly KESS paper, 
2016).
Of the main political parties in the region, only the DUP supported the 
leave campaign and it continues to be a vocal supporter of Brexit.  Since 
the Westminster General Election in June 2017 (CAIN, Westminster General 
Election, 8 June 2017), the DUP’s 10 Members of Parliament have supported 
most of the Conservative party’s Brexit strategy through a confidence and 
supply arrangement.  However, the DUP have set a red line at any outcome 
which would result in NI being treated differently from Britain – so the 
party opposes any special status for the region.  Essentially, the DUP oppose 
any new border down the Irish Sea with people from the region facing 
passport control and other checks at ports and airports (thus anything 
which differentiates NI citizens from residents in Britain).  Following the 
referendum the UUP shifted from its remain stance and stated that Brexit 
should go ahead and supported Theresa May in negotiations in an attempt 
to get the best deal for NI (Belfast Telegraph, 11 May 2017).  Sylvia Hermon, 
independent MP, is currently the only significant unionist representative who 
remains anti-Brexit and has clashed with other unionists in Westminster 
over the issue (BBC NI News; 6 December 2017).  On the Nationalist side, 
both SF and the SDLP continue to oppose most aspects of Brexit and argue 
strongly that NI needs to be given special designated status in order to avoid 
the likelihood of additional border controls between the north and south.  
However, the SDLP has no MPs following the 2017 Westminster election 
and the seven SF MPs do not take part in the proceedings of the House of 
Commons due to the party’s long-standing abstentionist policy. 
Leave Remain Valid Votes
England 53.38% 46.62% 28,455,402
Northern Ireland 44.22% 55.78% 790,149
Scotland 38.00% 62.00% 2,679,513
Wales 52.53% 47.47% 1,626,919
Total 51.89% 48.11% 33,551,983
Source:  CAIN; Referendum results, 23 June 2016
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2.2  Northern Ireland and the border 
 in the Brexit negotiations
On 29 March 2017, Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), was 
invoked in a letter containing notification of the UK government’s intention 
to proceed with leaving the EU (Theresa May, Letter, 29 March 2017).  This 
started the two-year negotiation process, so in the absence of any extensions 
to the timetable, the UK will leave the EU on 29 March 2019 at 11 p.m.  
This happens regardless of whether a deal has been reached or not.  Among 
the suggested principles for the planned discussions was:  ‘v. In particular, 
we must pay attention to the UK’s unique relationship with the Republic 
of Ireland and the importance of the peace process in Northern Ireland’ 
(Theresa May, Letter, 29 March 2017:5).  A British government position paper 
on how to address the unique circumstances of NI and Ireland in light of 
the UK’s withdrawal from the EU (DEXEU, position paper, 16 August 2017) 
dealt with proposals for upholding the Belfast / Good Friday Agreement, 
maintaining the Common Travel Area (CTA) , avoiding a hard border, and 
preserving north-south and east-west cooperation.  It also stressed the 
importance of not doing anything which would ‘jeopardise the peace process 
in Northern Ireland’ (page 4).
The British Prime Minister delivered a speech in Florence, Italy that set out 
plans for a transition period following Brexit during which time trade would 
continue on existing terms and the UK would continue to pay into the EU 
budget (Theresa May, Speech, 22 September 2017).  Theresa May stated 
that all parties to the negotiations had agreed to, ‘protect progress made 
in Northern Ireland over recent years’ and that the UK and the EU, ‘have 
committed to protecting the Belfast Agreement and the Common Travel Area 
and, looking ahead, we have both stated explicitly that we will not accept 
any physical infrastructure at the border’.  Later the UK and the EU agreed 
a transition period up to 31 December 2020 which would allow time for 
businesses and others to prepare for the post-Brexit rules (BBC News item, 
19 March 2018).
In December 2017 a joint report on progress during Phase 1 of negotiations 
stated that the parties had reached agreement in principle on three areas:  
protecting the rights of EU citizens in the UK and UK citizens in the EU; a 
framework for dealing with the NI border; and the UK financial settlement.  
Paragraphs 42 to 56 dealt with Ireland and NI and the commitment to avoid 
a hard border was explicitly set out:
43.  The United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union 
presents a significant and unique challenge in relation to the 
island of Ireland.  The United Kingdom recalls its commitment 
to protecting the operation of the 1998 Agreement, including 
its subsequent implementation agreements and arrangements, 
and to the effective operation of each of the institutions and 
bodies established under them. The United Kingdom also recalls 
its commitment to the avoidance of a hard border, including any 
physical infrastructure or related checks and controls. 
Negotiators of the EU and the UK, Joint Report, (8 December 2017).
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The joint report also set out a backstop arrangement should an overall EU-
UK deal not be possible:
49.  The United Kingdom remains committed to protecting 
North-South cooperation and to its guarantee of avoiding a hard 
border.  Any future arrangements must be compatible with these 
overarching requirements.  The United Kingdom’s intention is to 
achieve these objectives through the overall EU-UK relationship.  
Should this not be possible, the United Kingdom will propose 
specific solutions to address the unique circumstances of the island 
of Ireland.  In the absence of agreed solutions, the United Kingdom 
will maintain full alignment with those rules of the Internal Market 
and the Customs Union which, now or in the future, support North-
South cooperation, the all-island economy and the protection of the 
1998 Agreement. 
Joint Report, (8 December 2017)
 
The DUP reaction to the draft of the proposed agreement and their complete 
opposition to NI being treated differently from the rest of the UK led to a 
halt in the UK / EU talks (BBC NI News item, 5 December 2017).  However, 
Theresa May accepted the phase 1 agreement at the end of the same week 
(BBC News item, 8 December 2017).
Although the first phase of talks between the UK and the EU resulted in an 
agreement in December 2017 which recognised the difficulties that Brexit 
was causing between Ireland north and south, later British statements 
seemed to indicate a rowing back on what had been agreed.  In a speech 
setting out the UK government’s preferences for the future trading 
relationship between the UK and the EU, Theresa May continued to rule out a 
hard border in Ireland but she insisted that, ‘it would also be unacceptable to 
break up the United Kingdom’s own common market by creating a customs 
and regulatory border down the Irish Sea’ (Theresa May, Speech, 2 March 
2018).
A Draft Agreement was produced by the European Commission Task Force 
(TF50) and sent to the UK on 15 March 2018.  The document contained a 
Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland which was comprised of 16 Articles, the 
key one being:
Article 3 
Establishment of a common regulatory area  
A common regulatory area comprising the Union and the United 
Kingdom in respect of Northern Ireland is hereby established.  
The common regulatory area shall constitute an area without 
internal borders in which the free movement of goods is ensured 
and North-South cooperation protected in accordance with this 
Chapter. 
TF50 (2018) 33/2 – Commission to UK (15 March 2018)
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As part of this arrangement the Protocol stated that NI, ‘shall be considered 
to be part of the customs territory of the Union’ (Article 4; Para 2).
Following a negotiation round (16-19 March) a version of the Draft 
Agreement was published highlighting the progress made (with sections 
coloured according to whether or not agreement had been reached).  There 
was a note on page 1 which stated:
With respect to the DRAFT PROTOCOL ON IRELAND/NORTHERN 
IRELAND, the negotiators agree that a legally operative version of 
the “backstop” solution for the border between Northern Ireland 
and Ireland, in line with paragraph 49 of the Joint Report, should 
be agreed as part of the legal text of the Withdrawal Agreement, to 
apply unless and until another solution is found.
The negotiators have reached agreement on some elements of the 
draft Protocol.  They further agree that the full set of issues related 
to avoiding a hard border covered in the draft reflect those that 
need to be addressed in any solution.  There is as yet no agreement 
on the right operational approach, but the negotiators agree to 
engage urgently in the process of examination of all relevant matters 
announced on 14 March and now under way. 
TF50 (2018) 35 – Commission to EU27, (19 March 2018)
 
The implications of the proposed backstop were that NI would stay in the EU 
customs union, stay in large parts of the single market, and be part of the EU 
VAT system.   
 
The following day the British Prime Minster, Theresa May, travelled to NI to 
deliver a speech which firmly rejected the version of the backstop drawn up 
by the EU:
Under their proposal, Northern Ireland would be represented in 
trade negotiations and in the World Trade Organisation on tariffs by 
the European Commission, not its own national government.  The 
economic and constitutional dislocation of a formal ‘third country’ 
customs border within our own country is something I will never 
accept and I believe no British Prime Minister could ever accept. 
Theresa May, Speech in Belfast, (20 July 2018)
 
The British cabinet’s agreed position on negotiations with the EU came 
following a 12-hour meeting of the full cabinet at Chequers on 6 July 2018.  
A three-page statement set out the UK’s vision for the future relationship 
with the EU (Gov.UK, statement, 6 July 2018).  The meeting was an attempt 
by Theresa May to unite her deeply divided cabinet around a common 
approach.  However, two days later the Brexit Secretary, David Davis, resigned 
from the cabinet due to disagreement on the policy and tactics adopted 
by the Prime Minister’s Office (The Guardian, 9 July 2018).  The next day 
the Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, also resigned claiming that the UK 
was headed ‘for the status of a colony’ under May’s Brexit plans (Johnson, 
Resignation letter, 9 July 2018).
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The British government’s detailed position was published in a White Paper 
(Cm 9593) (Gov.UK, white paper, 12 July 2018).  It covered economic 
partnership; security partnership; cross-cutting and other cooperation; and 
institutional arrangements.  The major proposal was for the establishment of 
a free trade area for goods, including agri-food on the grounds that:
This would avoid friction at the border and ensure both sides meet 
their commitments to Northern Ireland and Ireland through the 
overall future relationship.  It would protect the uniquely integrated 
supply chains and ‘just-in-time’ processes that have developed across 
the UK and the EU over the last 40 years, and will remain important 
given our geographical proximity, and the jobs and livelihoods 
dependent on them. 
White Paper, 2018:13
On 16 July 2018 the government accepted four amendments to the Taxation 
(Cross-Border Trade) Bill one of which ruled out a border in the Irish Sea and 
thus have serious implications for the draft Withdrawal Agreement (BBC 
News, 16 July 2018).
One major implication of the continuing disagreement between the UK and 
EU was that both jurisdictions stepped up preparations for a no deal Brexit.  
In the UK the Department for Exiting the EU published a  set of 25 technical 
notices on matters such as farming, importing and exporting, money and tax, 
and medicines and medical equipment (DEXEU, collection, 23 August 2018).  
However, the Brexit Minister stressed that this did not, ‘reflect an increased 
likelihood of a ‘no deal’ outcome’ (Raab, statement, 23 August 2018).
The Brexit negotiations have resulted in strained relations between the UK 
and the Republic of Ireland.  Some of the British pro-Brexit media, some 
Conservative party members, and prominent members of the DUP have been 
highly critical of the Irish government and the Taoiseach, Leo Varadkar, and the 
Foreign Minister, Simon Coveney, in particular.  Accusations have been made 
that the issue of the border, and the peace process, have been used to try to 
thwart the implementation of Brexit (BBC NI News item, 24 November 2017).
2.3  Special Status and  
 EU Citizen Rights
The Irish government, the negotiators for the EU 27, various political 
parties, groups, and individuals, have all argued for some form of special or 
unique status for NI following Brexit, so as to avoid problems related to the 
future UK-EU land border in Ireland and also to protect the Belfast / Good 
Friday Agreement.  As mentioned above, a number of the draft negotiating 
documents produced on behalf of the EU have set out solutions which would 
result in a form of special status for NI.  These proposals have been rejected 
by the British government and the unionist parties in NI.  The final negotiated 
position, and whether or not special arrangements are to be made for NI, 
should be known by the end of 2018.
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The British-Irish Agreement of 1998 (an annex to the Belfast / Good Friday 
Agreement) stated that the two governments:
… recognise the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to 
identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they 
may so choose, and accordingly confirm that their right to hold both 
British and Irish citizenship is accepted by both Governments and would 
not be affected by any future change in the status of Northern Ireland.
British-Irish Agreement, 10 April 2018, Article 1 paragraph vi.
One way in which some people born and living in NI choose to demonstrate 
their identity is by applying for a British or Irish passport (bearing in mind 
that there may be other more prosaic reasons for choosing one passport 
over another).  In both 2016 and 2017 there were significant increases in 
the number of people from NI and GB who applied for an Irish passport, see 
Figure 23.  In 2017 there was an increase in applications from NI of 20 per 
cent and an increase of 28 per cent in applications from GB. 
Figure 23:   Irish passport applications from NI and GB, 2012 to 2017
 
The rise in applications for Irish passports was attributed to Brexit with people 
presumably believing that there would be additional benefits to holding the 
passport of an EU country even while living outside the EU. 
 
SF has been arguing for the fullest range of rights for Irish citizens in NI.  The 
Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, contained within the Draft Withdrawal 
Agreement, states in the preamble that, ‘Irish citizens in Northern Ireland, 
by virtue of their Union citizenship, will continue to enjoy, exercise and have 
Source:  Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Passport Statistics.
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
• Final Figures include all methods of applications including online.
• Figures also include returns. Returns are applications that were re-submitted to the Passport Service.
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access to rights, opportunities and benefits’.  However, Jean-Claude Juncker, 
President of the EC, wrote that:
Following the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European 
Union, Irish citizens in Northern Ireland will no longer reside in 
a Member State.  They will nevertheless continue to enjoy their 
rights as Union citizens under the Treaties.  However, Irish citizens 
in Northern Ireland will no longer benefit from United Kingdom’s 
participation in Union programmes, policies and activities when this 
participation ends following the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from 
the Union. 
President Juncker, answer to written question (E-002232/2018), 26 
June 2018
The phrase Irish citizens in NI crops up in a number of the negotiation 
documents, and in the wider political debate on what should happen after 
Brexit.  It is sometimes unclear if the reference is only to people born in the 
Republic of Ireland whose main residence is now in NI or if it also includes 
people born and resident in NI who have declared themselves to be Irish by 
holding an Irish passport.  The phrase would appear to exclude those people 
born and resident in NI who view themselves as Irish but, for whatever 
reason, do not hold an Irish passport. 
It certainly seems to exclude those people born and resident in NI but who 
consider themselves to be British and may or may not hold a British passport.  
Given the birthright of people in NI to identify themselves as either Irish 
or British, or both, it has been argued that under parity of esteem provision 
in the Belfast / Good Friday Agreement this choice should not ‘result in 
differential or detrimental treatment’ (Daniel Holder, Equality of Citizenship, 
24 April 2018).  In the event of a negotiated withdrawal agreement it will 
remain to be seen if any additional rights for Irish citizens in NI are in fact 
applied to the whole of the NI population regardless of passport held.
There are likely to be additional complications for people born in the Republic 
of Ireland but who are resident in NI or another part of the UK, in relation to 
rights associated with the CTA and The Ireland Act 1949.  These are reciprocal 
rights for UK and Irish nationals and cover right to entry and residency, access 
to social welfare entitlements and benefits, access to health services, etc.  The 
British Government noted that:
In practice, the operation of the CTA and many of the benefits 
enjoyed by Irish and UK nationals have also been provided for in 
instruments setting out EU free movement and associated rights.  
This intermingling of rights can make it difficult to distinguish what 
rights accrue under the CTA as opposed to under EU instruments. 
DEXEU, Northern Ireland and Ireland Position Paper,  
16 August 2017, (paragraph 24)
Given that the EU instruments would not apply after Brexit it will require new 
legislation to ensure a continuation of at least some of these rights.  
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Across the UK, there has been co-operation between groups in favour of the 
closest possible links with the EU.  Their focus is on avoiding a hard Brexit and 
urging that public opinion be taken into consideration through a referendum 
on the final UK / EU deal (Independent, 1 February 2018).  While the number 
of people signing on-line petitions and taking part in marches and rallies would 
seem to indicate a significant level of support for a second referendum, there 
is strong opposition from Brexiteers and from the government and some other 
politicians who argue that the result of the referendum should be respected.
2.4  Brexit and support      
   for a united Ireland
The debate around Brexit has moved the issue of holding a border poll further 
up the political agenda.  The former DUP leader, Peter Robinson caused some 
controversy by arguing that unionism should begin preparations so as to be 
ready for a border poll (Belfast Telegraph, 3 August 2018).  Prior to the Brexit 
referendum it seemed likely that a significant minority of Nationalists would 
be prepared to accept the status quo of NI remaining in the UK.  However, the 
loss of European citizenship, together with the potential implications for the 
border, appears to have reduced the number who would wish for NI to remain 
within the UK.
In May 2018 Lucid Talk carried out a NI Tracker Poll on behalf of YouGov 
and the BBC (BBC NI News, 8 June 2018).  Respondents were asked if the 
referendum result had changed their mind on the constitutional position of 
NI.  While two-thirds of respondents said they had not changed their mind, 
among those who had almost all were people who previously supported NI 
staying in the UK but ‘may / would now support NI joining the Republic of 
Ireland’ (see Figure 24).
The same LucidTalk tracker poll asked people how they would vote if there 
was a referendum on the border.  45 per cent said they would vote for NI 
to remain in the UK, 42 per cent said they would vote for unification, and 
almost 13 per cent were undecided.  These results were in line with a Lord 
Ashcroft poll in June 2018, which found that 49 per cent of respondents 
were in favour of NI staying in the UK, 44 per cent in favour of unification, 
and 7 per cent don’t know (Lord Ashcroft Polls, Brexit, 19 June 2018;).  
However, there were two other sources of information on the topic that 
showed different outcomes.  An Ipsos MORI NI survey conducted on behalf 
of Queen’s University Belfast between February and March 2018, found 
50.3 per cent in favour of NI remaining in the UK, 21.1 per cent in favour of 
unification, 9.7 said they would not vote, and 18.9 per cent were don’t knows 
(QUB, Brexitni, May 2018).  The NI Life and Times Survey carried out for ARK 
between September 2017 and February 2018, also asked about a border 
referendum and found 55 per cent in favour of NI remaining in the UK, 22 
per cent in favour of unification, 12 per cent said they would not vote, and 
10 per cent said they don’t know (ARK, NILT, June 2018).
Although all four surveys published results around the same time, the QUB 
and ARK surveys show markedly lower support for a united Ireland than the 
LucidTalk and Lord Ashcroft polls.  The variations in results have been put 
down to the different methodologies used, with QUB and ARK surveys based 
on face-to-face interviews and LucidTalk and Lord Ashcroft Polls using an on-
line research approach (Bill White, 25 July 2018).
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YES - I used to support NI joining the Republic of 
Ireland, but I may/would now support NI remaining in 
the UK
0.8%
YES - I used to support NI staying in the UK, but I 
may/ would now support NI joining the Republic of 
Ireland
28.0%
NO - The EU Referendum result hasn’t changed my 
view - I still support NI staying in the UK 40.6%
NO - The EU Referendum result hasn’t changed my 
view - I still support NI joining the Republic of Ireland
26.9%
Don’t Know/Not Sure 3.7%
0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 60.0%
Figure 24:  Has the UK’s decision to leave the EU, i.e. Brexit, changed your mind on the constitutional position of 
Northern Ireland? (all respondents)
Source:  LucidTalk Tracker Poll, May 2018 (BBC NI News, 6 June 2018)
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Under the Belfast / Good Friday Agreement the Secretary of State can order 
the holding of a border referendum if, ‘at any time it appears likely to him 
(sic) that a majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern 
Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a 
united Ireland’ (The Agreement, 10 April 2018, Schedule 1).  It is not clear 
how much evidence, in which format, and over what period of time, would be 
required to convince a British Secretary of State that the threshold had been 
reached.  The view of the Prime Minister on a border poll was apparently 
revealed when The Times newspaper published an alleged disagreement 
between Theresa May and Jacob Rees-Mogg at a meeting of Conservative 
Party MPs.  Rees-Mogg told May that he had ‘no doubt’ that people in NI 
would vote to remain in the UK.  May is reported to have responded: ‘I would 
not be as confident as you.  That’s not a risk I’m prepared to take’ (The Times, 
15 May 2018).
2.5  Likelihood of violence caused by 
changes at the open border
If, as a result of Brexit, the UK leaves the single market and the customs 
union and there is no new customs agreement between the UK and the EU, 
then there is a possibility that some form of monitoring of traffic flows will 
take place close to the border between NI and Ireland.  Some people have 
said that a return to a hard border could lead to violence (see for example 
the warning by Lady Sylvia Hermon in the House of Commons on 26 April 
2018, and George Mitchell on 3 March 2018).  Would potential changes to 
the border result in violence and, if so, how likely is it to spark a return to 
wide-scale communal conflict?There is no doubt, as has been pointed out 
by the DUP and supporters of Brexit, that the current border in Ireland is a 
political, social, and economic reality.  Two sovereign states exist on either 
side of it.  Two different currencies are used.  Social, political, and economic 
policy is different.  However, due to the CTA between the UK and the 
Republic of Ireland, and the EU customs union and single market, the free 
movement of people, goods and services is allowed across the border.  In its 
current form it is termed a frictionless border.  Many people in NI view the 
ending of the hard border as an important outcome of the peace process.  
Any change to the free movement of people across the border would 
undoubtedly cause resentment.
Until 1 January 1993 when the single market came into effect between 
European Community states, border custom checks, of varying degrees of 
strictness, operated along the border between NI and the Republic of Ireland.  
Most of the approved roads (where goods and cars were supposed to cross 
the border) had Irish custom points, stations, or posts on them where custom 
officials could check for relevant goods being transported across the border.  
As part of the security response to the conflict in the region, the British Army 
established large military checkpoints close to the main crossing points on 
the border, during most of the period of Operation Banner (the operational 
name for British Army deployment in NI from August 1969 to July 2007).  
The British Army also used explosives to blow up unapproved roads, 
demolished border bridges over streams and rivers, and set concrete, metal 
and wire barricades on many of these local roads.  British Army observation 
towers were installed on hilltops close to the border, mainly in south Armagh.  
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All of this infrastructure and the security and customs checks that went with 
it, is what people refer to as the hard border.  All the political parties in NI, 
Ireland, and Britain have said that they do not wish to see a return to this 
type of hard border of the past.
The land border is approximately 500 kilometres (310 miles) long, has 208 
border crossings (The Irish Times, 26 April 2018), and it has been estimated 
that 177,000 lorries, 208,000 light vans and 1.85 million cars cross the 
border every month (BBC NI News, 6 February 2017).  In addition, around 
30,000 people cross the border daily (presumably by car, bus, train, pushbike, 
on foot, etc.).  There are significant numbers of people who live on one 
side of the border and work on the other.  Many others cross the border for 
social or family reasons and a lesser number own property or businesses on 
both sides of the border.  So the question arises as to how immigration is 
controlled with such an open border:
Given that immigration control was a major objective of the Brexit 
campaign, however, it is difficult to see how the two neighbours 
can avoid imposing border checks and limiting the number of 
crossing points; the Republic’s obligations to other EU members will 
trump old special bilateral arrangements. ... At the same time, any 
hardening of the border between the two Irish jurisdictions would 
diminish the quality of life of people in the borderlands, bring 
economic pain, and be seen as a reversal of a critical achievement 
of the peace process. 
Guelke, Britain After Brexit, 2017:51
The re-imposition of any physical infrastructure at the border is likely 
to be the focus of public protest and direct action.  Bertie Ahern, former 
Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister) and an architect of the Belfast / Good Friday 
Agreement, was clear about his opinion of any new infrastructure at the 
border:  ‘There is not going to be a physical border across Ireland because if 
you tried to put it there you wouldn’t have to wait for terrorism to take it 
down, people would just physically pull it down - the ordinary people’ (BBC 
News, 10 April 2018).
Researchers at Queen’s University Belfast conducted a survey and a 
deliberative forum to find out what people thought of Brexit (Garry. et 
al., Report, May 2018).  The research found that, ‘there is substantial and 
intense opposition to possible North-South border checks between Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland and to East-West border checks between 
Northern Ireland and Great Britain’, and it also found, ‘strong expectations 
that protests against either North-South or East-West border checks would 
quickly deteriorate into violence’ (Garry, et al., Report, May 2018)  The 
research presented respondents with a range of possible border checks and 
asked how they would respond to each.  Figure 25 gives a breakdown of the 
percentage of respondents indicating that particular checks would be ‘almost 
impossible to accept’.  Respondents were asked follow-up questions related 
to support for various forms of protest at the border.  There was a high level 
of support (60%) among all respondents for peaceful protests and petitions, 
but this dropped to 15 per cent when the protest involved blocking traffic 
and was only 5 per cent when it involved vandalising border technology 
(Garry, et al., 2018:6).
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There has been a long history of political opposition to the existence of 
the border and also various republican paramilitary campaigns involving 
attacks against the physical infrastructure at the border and on the security 
personnel who protected the border (CAIN, Violence at the border, 2018).  
Those in favour of Brexit have labelled as scare mongering any discussion 
which has raised the possibility of violence by dissident republican 
paramilitary groups.  However, George Hamilton, the Chief Constable of 
the PSNI, has expressed concern at the risk of violence at the border:  ‘The 
last thing we would want is any infrastructure around the border because 
there is something symbolic about it and it becomes a target for violent 
dissident republicans’ (The Guardian, 7 February 2018).  There is hardly any 
doubt that dissident republicans would seek some way to exploit any popular 
resentment against, and protest at, a more visible border.  However, it is 
unclear if this would lead to wide-scale violence. 
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Figure 25:  Opposition to various forms of border checks, percentage of respondents saying it would be ‘almost 
impossible to accept’
Source: Garry, et al., 2018:20
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3.   INSTITUTIONS – ASSEMBLY;    
 NORTH-SOUTH; AND EAST-WEST
The absence of the devolved administration at Stormont has had an impact 
across the various departments and the structures established by the Belfast / 
Good Friday Agreement.
3.1  The Executive and the Assembly
The resignation of Martin McGuinness meant that Arlene Foster also 
ceased to hold office in The Executive Office (TEO).  At the meeting of 
the NI Assembly on 16 January 2017 the DUP nominated Arlene Foster 
as First Minister however SF refused to nominate anyone for the deputy 
First Minister post.  In the absence of these two posts no other members 
could be appointed to the Executive.  Following the NI Assembly election 
the Assembly met on 13th March 2017 to allow MLAs to sign the Roll of 
Membership, and thus be entitled to receive salary and expenses.  No other 
business has been conducted by the Assembly between then and the date 
of writing.  As discussed in section 1.1 above, there have been a number of 
rounds of political talks to restore devolved administration in NI but these 
efforts have failed to date (August 2018).  NI reached the milestone of 541 
days without an administration on 25 August 2018.  So, since that date 
NI has passed the record set by Belgium for the longest period without an 
elected government in a European democracy, when Flemish and Walloon 
representatives failed to reach agreement between 13 June 2010 and 6 
December 2011 (BBC NI News, 9 August 2018).
3.2  The Departments
In addition to the absence of The Executive Office and departmental 
ministers the business of administration has been undertaken by senior civil 
servants and, on a few occasions, by the Secretary of State for NI acting at 
Westminster.  The work of civil servants within the departments continues as 
can be seen by the daily list of announcements on the various departmental 
websites but problems have arisen in relation to major decisions that would 
normally require a minister to sign off (BBC NI News, 6 August 2018).  As 
the list of outstanding issues has grown longer, some decisions have been 
made by permanent secretaries of the relevant departments.  However, it has 
sometimes been unclear on what basis some decisions are made and other 
issues are left unresolved (BBC NI News, 6 August 2018).  There have also 
been some high-profile legal appeals against particular decisions questioning 
the right of civil servants to make decisions without ministerial approval.
The NI Executive had not agreed a budget for 2017-18 before the Assembly 
was dissolved.  In the absence of a Budget Act, the Permanent Secretary of 
the Department of Finance (DoF) used a power under Section 59 of the 
Northern Ireland Act 1998 to release funds to departments (Department of 
Finance, 28 March 2017).  Initially this power allowed for up to 75 per cent of 
the previous year’s budget to be approved but by July 2017 the limit, under 
the legislation, increased to 95 per cent.  
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At the same time the Head of the Civil Service stated that while it was the 
job of the service to continue to deliver public services, civil servants would 
not be able to ‘launch any new programmes, projects or policies which 
would require Ministerial or Executive endorsement’ (McKibbin, DoF, 28 
March 2017).  The DoF also took decisions about reallocations of funds to 
particular departments with the largest allocation of £40 million going to 
the Department of Health (DoF, 11 October 2017), a process which normally 
would be decided by the full Executive.  In setting the public sector pay 
policy for 2017-18 the Permanent Secretary acknowledged that this would 
normally be the responsibility of the Finance Minister but that the action 
was in the public interest (Widdis, DoF, 13 December 2017).  As mentioned 
in Section 1.1 a NI Budget Act was passed on 16 November 2017.  The SDLP 
argued that the setting of the budget at Westminster represented direct rule 
and blamed both Sinn Féin and the DUP for the outcome (BBC NI News, 
13 November 2017).  The details of the budget spending plan for 2018-19 
were released in the form of a written statement to the British Parliament 
(Bradley, HCWS527, 8 March 2018).  The budget included £410 million 
from the £1 billion investment package secured by the DUP as part of its 
confidence and supply agreement (see Section 6.4) with the Conservative 
administration (Belfast Telegraph, 8 March 2018).  The NI Budget Act 2018 
was passed in July (Parliament, UKPGA, 19 July 2018).
The extent of uncertainty over whether or not senior civil servants could 
take important decisions in the absence of a minister, was demonstrated 
most clearly in relation to a proposed waste incinerator facility at Hightown 
Quarry in County Antrim.  An application by Arc21 for planning permission 
for the facility was turned down in September 2015 by the then minister 
at the Department for Infrastructure (DfI) (BBC NI News, 24 September 
2015).  Two years later, in the absence of a minister, a senior civil servant 
granted planning approval for the facility arguing that there were public 
interest considerations (BBC NI News, 15 September 2017).  A campaign 
group launched a legal challenge to the decision and in May 2018 the 
High Court in Belfast ruled that the civil servant had no power to approve 
the planning application.  The DfI appealed the decision but lost when the 
Court of Appeal ruled that:  ‘It would be contrary to the letter and spirit of 
the (Good Friday) Agreement and the 1998 (Northern Ireland) Act for such 
decisions to be made by departments in the absence of a minister,’ (Judiciary 
NI, Decision, 6 July 2018).  Politicians and members of the construction 
sector commented on the wide-ranging implications for major infrastructure 
projects that were about to proceed or were in the planning process (BBC 
NI News, 6 July 2018).  Other infrastructure decisions awaiting approval in 
the DfI included the proposed new GAA stadium at Casement Park in west 
Belfast, the Dalriadan gold mine near Greencastle, County Tyrone, a gas-fired 
power station and a cruise ship terminal both in Belfast.  In January 2018 civil 
servants at the DfI gave approval for the northern work on a (cross-border) 
north-south electricity interconnector.  However the planning approval for 
the work on the southern side of the border was the subject of an appeal at 
the Supreme Court in Dublin (The Independent, 29 June 2018).
There are also examples of delays in policy making and/or implementation 
which have been attributed to the absence of ministers.  As discussed 
in Dimension Three at the Department of Health (DoH) there has 
been limited progress on the implementation of health reforms set out 
in the Bengoa Report.  Other areas that were likely to face delays were 
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the reconfiguration of stroke services, the distribution of Emergency 
Departments in hospitals, and the reform of adult social care policy.  A pay 
rise for NHS staff announced in March 2018 was also held up because it was 
judged to be a devolved matter (BBC NI News, 21 March 2018).
Public appointments is another area which has been impacted.  The 
Department of Justice (DoJ) has faced problems in appointing people to 
watchdog roles due to the absence of a minister (BBC NI News, 13 May 
2018).  The UK government has stated that it is considering further action 
to address the issue of vacancies on a number of public bodies (The Belfast 
Telegraph, 28 June 2018).  The completion of a draft bill to reform NI’s 
domestic violence laws would require a minister and a working Assembly.  
However, the department did act in April 2018 to begin a review of the 
way in which serious sexual offences were dealt with by the criminal justice 
system in NI (BBC NI News, 18 April 2018). 
The Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs (DAERA) 
indicated that there were several areas where decisions could not be taken 
without a minister in place.  These included the allocation of additional 
funding to deal with a massive illegal waste dump (BBC NI News, 27 October 
2017) and the approval of a new policy to eradicate bovine TB (BBC NI News, 
30 November 2017).
The Department for Communities (DfC) said that a number of 
appointments to public bodies could not be made without ministerial 
approval and it would also require a minister for progress to be made in the 
affordable warmth scheme and to reduce the maximum stake on fixed-
odds betting terminals (as happened in England and Wales in May 2018).  
However, the DfC did act to make additional ring-fenced funding available 
to the Arts Council of NI to increase the money made available to both the 
Ulster Orchestra and the Metropolitan Arts Centre (MAC) in Belfast (BBC 
NI News, 11 April 2018).  At the same time the Arts Council cut the annual 
funding to 43 arts organisations as a result of a 4.7 per cent reduction in the 
funding available for 2018/19.
University tuition fees for NI students studying in the region for 2018-19 
were £4,160 per year, compared to £9,250 per year if they decided to study 
in England or Scotland (and £9,000 in Wales) (NIdirect, 7 August 2018).  Both 
Queen’s University Belfast and Ulster University have argued for higher 
fees in the past to achieve more sustainable university funding (e.g., The 
Irish News, 25 September 2017) however civil servants at the Department 
for the Economy (DfE) were reluctant to change the fees structure until a 
minister was appointed.
While senior civil servants at the Department of Education (DoE) have 
taken a number of decisions around school closures and mergers (BBC 
NI News, 1 February 2018) and some special schemes, there were other 
decisions that appeared unlikely to be taken in the absence of a minister.  
These included decisions related to the closure or merger of special needs 
schools in Belfast and the ending of free school transport (BBC NI News, 13 
January 2017).
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3.3  Direct Rule?
Political commentators have stated that since the fall of the Executive, 
‘Northern Irish politics has operated in a curious and confusing limbo’ with 
the last and current Secretary of State both ‘pathologically unwilling to 
reintroduce direct rule from Westminster’ (Maguire, New Statesman, 15 May 
2018).  The region has been ruled directly by a British government in 33 of 
the 45 years since 1972 (BBC NI News, 15 February 2018), with direct rule 
last being used between October 2002 and May 2007.  As noted above, there 
has been fairly continuous debate about the role of the civil service and the 
extent of its powers in the absence of ministers, but there has also been 
debate about the role of the Westminster parliament in legislating on NI 
issues.
On 27 March 2018 four NI Bills came before the House of Lords:  Budget 
(Anticipation and Adjustments); Regional Rates and Energy; Same Sex 
Marriage (Private Members Bill); and Assembly Members Pay.  Addressing the 
House Lord Hain, who had been NI Secretary of State between May 2005 
and June 2007, stated:  ‘The measures in these Bills should never have had 
to come to us in the first place.  They represent direct rule in all but name’ 
(Belfast Telegraph, 27 March 2018).  The three government Bills received their 
second and third readings without a vote and passed into law.  On 11th May 
2018 the same sex marriage bill was blocked by a backbench Conservative 
MP.  The bill could be brought back to the House of Commons in October 
2018.
In the middle of July 2018 there were media reports that the NIO had 
advertised internally among the NI Civil Service for 15 policy advisors and 
10 senior policy advisors to join the Secretary of State’s team in Belfast 
(News Letter, 11 July 2018).  There was speculation that such a boost to the 
NIO might be part of preparations for full direct rule with a former shadow 
Secretary of State, Owen Smith, stating that NI was moving towards ‘direct 
rule by stealth’ (The Irish News, 11 July 2018).
3.4  Other institutions
The collapse of the Executive and the Assembly has had implications for 
other institutions.  Under the terms of the Belfast / Good Friday Agreement, 
the North South Ministerial Council (NSMC) and the NI Assembly are 
‘mutually inter-dependent’ (The Agreement, Strand Two, Paragraph 13, ) 
so when the Executive and the Assembly failed to be re-established the 
workings of the NSMC ended.  The last two NSMC joint communiqués 
planned for continuing discussions at NSMC sectoral level and also between 
relevant ministers and officials, to identify possible impacts, risks and 
opportunities that might arise from Brexit (NSMC, Publications) – none of 
this planned co-operation has taken place within the content of the NSMC.  
The British-Irish Council (BIC) was established under the 1998 Agreement 
to ‘promote the harmonious and mutually beneficial development of the 
totality of relationships among the peoples of these islands’ (The Agreement, 
Strand Three, Paragraph 1, ).  The BIC includes representatives of the British 
and Irish governments, devolved administrations in NI, Scotland and Wales, 
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and representatives of the Isle of Man and Channel Islands.  As the BIC was 
part of a direct Agreement between the two governments, it has continued 
to meet after the stalemate at Stormont but with no First Minister or deputy 
First Minister to attend on behalf of NI.  Of the 30 summit meetings held 
since 1999 only one was described as an Extraordinary Summit which was 
held on 22 July 2016 to discuss the outcome of the referendum on the 
UK’s membership of the EU.  At this meeting the BIC discussed some of 
the priority areas relating to Brexit including:  the economy and trade, the 
Common Travel Area, relations with the EU, and the status of all citizens 
affected by the change (British-Irish Council, 22 July 2016).
The British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIC) was designed 
to replace both the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council and the 
Intergovernmental Conference which were established as a result of the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement in November 1985.  The intention of the Conference 
was to ‘promote bilateral co-operation at all levels on all matters of mutual 
interest within the competence of both Governments’ (The Agreement, 
Strand Three, BIIC, Paragraph 2).  The Agreement specified that, ‘there will 
be regular and frequent meetings of the Conference concerned with non-
devolved Northern Ireland matters, on which the Irish Government may put 
forward views and proposals’ (Paragraph 5).  Summit level meetings involving 
the Prime Minister and Taoiseach were to happen as required.  Of the 18 
meetings of the BIIC between December 1999 and February 2007, two were 
summit meetings.  At this point the meetings ended.  Although it was never 
officially explained why the meetings had ended, it appears to have been 
related to the resumption of devolved government in NI on 8 May 2007.  As 
the list of non-devolved matters (made up of reserved and excepted matters) 
is quite long, there was scope for the BIIC meetings to continue after 
devolution.  Following the political stalemate at Stormont questions began 
to be raised about the BIIC.  SF and the SDLP called for a meeting of the 
BIIC in the absence of agreement to restore power-sharing administration at 
Stormont.  The Taoiseach told the Dáil that he would be seeking a meeting 
of the BIIC in early 2018.  These developments were criticised by the DUP 
and the UUP.  Arlene Foster, then leader of the DUP, dismissed the BIIC as a 
‘talking shop’ (Belfast Telegraph, 2 July 2018).  The BIIC eventually met at the 
Cabinet Office in London on 25 July 2018 and the issues discussed included 
legacy, security co-operation, east-west matters, and political stability (BIIC, 
Joint Communiqué, 25 July 2018).
The British-Irish Interparliamentary Body (BIIB) was established in 
1990, prior to the Belfast / Good Friday Agreement.  It was intended as a 
link between the British Houses of Parliament and the Irish Houses of the 
Oireachtas.  The Agreement of 1998 encouraged the elected institutions of 
the British-Irish Council to develop interparliamentary links and suggested 
building on the existing BIIB.  In 2001 the membership of the BIIB was 
extended to include the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly, the NI 
Assembly, the High Court of Tynwald and the States of Guernsey and Jersey.  
In 2008 the name was change to the British-Irish Parliamentary Assembly 
(BIPA).  The BIIB and BIPA have met in plenary session on 56 occasions up 
to 11 June 2018.  In the sessions since the referendum on EU membership, 
the topic of Brexit and its impact on the Irish border have been an important 
feature of the discussions.
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3.5  Political Issues and logjams
Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) Scheme
The catalyst for the collapse of the Executive and Assembly was a little 
known policy initiative that had then been in operation for some time.  Back 
in 2011 the Executive was looking at how the ways in which businesses 
generated heat could be changed to ensure that NI met environmental 
targets.  One of the options was to encourage businesses and commercial 
organisations to move away from fossil fuels to renewable sources.  In 2012 
the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment (DETI), later to be 
renamed the Department for the Economy (DfE), at Stormont introduced the 
Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) scheme.
The rationale for RHI seemed to make perfect sense with a similar scheme 
operating in Great Britain.  For those who signed up to take part, financial 
support was to be provided over a long period to cover the cost of the new 
heating systems being installed as well as for the fuel used to power the 
biomass boilers - this was mostly done through the burning of wood pellets.  
People who signed up for the scheme were to be guaranteed for a span of 
twenty years a fixed sum of money, or tariff, per kilowatt of energy produced.  
In order to offer an incentive the tariff that recipients were to receive was set 
at a figure that was much higher than the cost of buying the wood pellets.
Initially there was a slow uptake for RHI and up until 2015 there was an 
under-spend in that part of the DETI budget which was to pay for the 
scheme.  DETI then focussed on increasing the numbers signing up and whilst 
this met with some success the problem then arose that in order to keep RHI 
within its budget the existing tariff being paid would have to be reduced.  As 
plans got underway to do this there was then a dramatic spike in applications 
to join the scheme but crucially these were in situ before the new, lower 
tariff would come into operation.  All of this meant that the cost of RHI was 
about to rise significantly and threaten to adversely affect the DETI budget 
as a whole.
It was only a matter of time before the financial implications of RHI came to 
the fore.  In January 2016 a whistle-blower approached the OFMdFM, then 
led by Arlene Foster and Martin McGuinness, with allegations that RHI was 
being exploited.  These included claims that large factory premises that had 
never been heated before were now being done so with the aim of running 
the boilers 24/7 in order to earn up to £1.5 million over 20 years.  As well 
there was an accusation that a farmer was planning to claim up to £1 million 
for heating an empty shed.  Soon new terms (e.g., cash for ash, and burn 
to earn) were to enter the political dictionary in NI to describe what was 
happening under the scheme (BBC NI News, 7 November 2017).
Further controversy arose in July 2016 when the Auditor General for NI 
produced a damning report on RHI.  Amongst the conclusions was that the 
extra costs for RHI would amount to some £140 million for the next five 
years and remain significant up until 2036.  As well given the fact that the 
overspend far exceeded the amount that the British Treasury was prepared 
to pay to support the scheme then that money would have to come 
out of the NI block grant.  It also highlighted some of the ways in which 
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controls had been placed on the scheme in Great Britain which had not 
been mirrored in NI (Comptroller and Auditor General for NI, Report, July 
2016).  The political implications of RHI began to come to the fore with the 
start of the new Assembly term in September 2016.  During the autumn 
the Assembly’s Public Accounts Committee (PAC) began to investigate the 
scheme and amidst further revelations came evidence that a whistle-blower 
had approached Arlene Foster, then the DUP DETI Minister, in October 2013 
to inform her of alleged malpractices under RHI (NI Assembly, Hansard, 9 
November 2016).
Amid growing controversy which has been well documented (e.g., BBC 
NI News, 8-15 December 2016) Arlene Foster came under pressure 
from opposition parties in the Assembly to step aside until a thorough 
investigation on the matter had been carried out.  For a time SF refused to 
join these demands and instead the party’s position was set out by Conor 
Murphy MLA, who stated:
Confidence in the entire institution has been dented very badly.  We 
have to find out who was responsible and then hold people to account.  
We will have to wait and see what Arlene Foster says on Monday [19 
December 2016] - people asked her to answer questions in the assembly 
and that is what she has agreed to do. 
BBC NI News, 16 December 2016.
The First Minister’s statement to the Assembly did little to answer her critics 
and SF joined the calls for a formal investigation into the RHI scheme (BBC 
NI News, 30 December 2016).  The unfolding crisis deepened further on 
9 January when Martin McGuinness resigned as deputy First Minister and 
directly accused Foster of failing to address his party’s concerns over RHI.  
With a fresh Assembly election looming Executive Ministers took steps to 
deal with the immediate fallout from the scheme.  Simon Hamilton, the DUP 
Minister for the Economy, managed to push through legislation which sought 
to reduce the existing subsidy rate for those who had signed up for the 
scheme (NI Assembly, Hansard, 23 January 2017) and Máirtín Ó Muilleoir, 
the SF Minister of Finance, confirmed the details of a public Inquiry into 
the RHI.  This would be led by the retired Lord Justice of Appeal Sir Patrick 
Coghlin (NI Assembly, Hansard, 24 January 2017).
Since the inquiry began in November 2017 Sir Patrick Coghlin and his panel 
have heard evidence from a wide range of individuals and organisations 
relating to RHI.  This has ranged from technical and economic consultants, 
other bodies or organisations involved with the scheme, as well as civil 
servants, former Executive Ministers and their special advisers.  At the time 
of writing (August 2018) the Inquiry is still continuing and the latest reports 
suggest that the oral hearings will continue until at least the autumn of 
2018.  In addition it was also now being suggested by the Department of 
Finance that the initial cost of the Inquiry set at £5 million had risen and 
that the final bill could be in the region of £6.7 million (BBC NI News, 11 July 
2018).
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The Politics of Language
At first glance the immediate cause of the political crisis that erupted in 
January 2017 was the fall-out from the controversy that had erupted over 
the RHI scheme.  However relations between the two largest parties in the 
Executive, the DUP and SF, had been strained for some time over an array of 
different policy areas.  One of the main examples of this was the frequent 
clashes that had occurred over a range of cultural issues most notably over 
the Irish language.  The roots of the problem in this area lay both with past 
and more recent developments.  Professor Jonathan Tonge, in an article for 
The Belfast Telegraph on 15 February 2018 discussed how, in order to achieve 
progress in previous talks processes a measure of ambiguity had been created, 
including in relation to the Irish language.  The St Andrews Agreement (2006) 
set out provisions for the British government to introduce an Irish Language Act 
at Westminster, largely based on legislation operating in Wales and the Republic 
of Ireland, and then to work with the new NI Executive ‘to enhance and protect 
the development of the language’ (British and Irish Governments,  Agreement 
at St Andrews, 13 October 2016).  Yet when it came to transforming St Andrews 
into law the Northern Ireland Act (2006) made no specific commitment and 
instead stated that ‘The Executive ... shall adopt a strategy setting out how it 
proposes to enhance and protect the development of the Irish language’ (Gov.
uk, NI (St Andrews Agreement) Act 2006, 22 November 2016).  It is however 
important to remember that on the language issue there was nothing unique 
in such a development given that there were other areas where the terms of 
the St Andrews Agreement were not subsequently reflected in the legislation 
that followed.  In a sense this reflects the difficulty that often occurs when it 
comes to translating political agreements into legal text.
Initially that level of vagueness was reasonably successful and allowed the 
DUP and SF to work together in the same Executive but as time moved on, as 
previous reports have pointed out, the seeds of discord between the two had 
also been sown.  For SF the belief remained that there was a commitment for the 
Assembly to legislate for the Irish language act at some point.  However for the 
DUP that was not the case and it was the party’s belief that it had not signed up 
to any such a move.  Consequently this led to frequent skirmishes over this issue.  
Towards the end of 2016 as relations between the two parties deteriorated in the 
face of the RHI scheme, a further dispute over the Irish language only added to 
the growing tension.  On 23 December 2016 the Department of Communities 
announced it had decided to withdraw £50,000 of funding from the Líofa 
Gaeltacht Bursary Scheme, which gave support to allow up to 100 people a year 
to attend Irish language classes in the Donegal Gaeltacht each summer.  Both 
SF and Irish language activists reacted furiously (The Irish News, 24 December 
2016) criticising the department’s move and accusing its DUP minister, Paul 
Givan, of having taken a purely vindictive decision.  This was a charge Givan was 
to deny from the outset and early in 2017 he revealed that the funding would be 
restored to the scheme (The Irish Times, 12 January 2017).  However, this move 
came too late as the language issue had now become embroiled within the wider 
political row being waged between the DUP and SF.
In resigning from his position as deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness cited 
the RHI controversy as one of the reasons for his decision.  But he also pointedly 
referred back to Givan’s original decision on the Líofa scheme back in December 
2016 as a further example of the lack of respect that the DUP were showing 
to the Irish language.  He stated that ‘There will be no return to the status quo 
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except on terms that are acceptable to Sinn Féin’ (BBC NI News, 9 January 2017).  
NI faced into a second assembly election within a year with  polling day set 
for 2 March 2017.  During a bitter campaign both parties once again outlined 
their respective positions – for SF its manifesto  contained a commitment on 
delivering an Irish language act (SF, Manifesto, 15 February 2017) whilst the DUP 
vowed to resist such a measure (DUP, Manifesto, 20 February 2017).
In the aftermath of the assembly election, with the DUP and SF, remaining 
the largest two parties it initially seemed both were indicating that they were 
at least interested in trying to find a resolution to the Irish language issue.  In 
May and June DUP delegations met with a number of Irish language groups.  
At its meeting with Conradh na Gaeilge on 23 June the party repeated its 
line that, ‘We want to see mutual respect for all languages and cultures ... 
but not one elevated above all others’ (BBC NI News, 23 June 2017).  A few 
weeks earlier Michelle O’Neill, then SF northern leader, had also attempted to 
portray a more positive approach.  During an interview with The View, on BBC 
One NI, she stressed the ‘importance of respecting all cultures including the 
Ulster Scots, the Orange and British cultural identity’ (BBC NI News,12 May 
2017).  Unfortunately in spite of these optimistic signals the reality was that 
the language issue remained a constant stumbling block during the various 
rounds of political negotiations that were to take place over the rest of 2017 
and into 2018.  This can clearly be seen in the aftermath of the collapse of the 
latest round of talks in February 2018.  The draft document that Mallie and 
Rowan say was exchanged between the DUP and SF appears to suggest that 
the parties had come close to ending the political deadlock with an overall 
agreement which would have included measures to deal with the language 
issue (Eamonn Mallie, Draft, 20 February 2018).  Under a heading Respecting 
Languages and Culture, was a paragraph that indicated that three separate 
pieces of legislation would be brought before the NI Assembly.  These were to 
be an Irish (Respecting Language and Diversity) Bill, an Ulster Scots (Respecting 
Language and Diversity) Bill, and a Respecting Language and Diversity Bill.  
Crucially however the entire paragraph in the document dealing with language 
was enclosed in square brackets which indicated that this part of the text had 
yet to be signed off on and agreed to by both parties (Draft Agreement Text, 
page 5).  This was to prove an important point in the public row that broke out 
between the DUP and SF after 14 February.  For the DUP it enabled them to 
claim that it had still not agreed to any Irish language act (Foster, Statement, 
14 February 2018).  The SF position was outlined by Mary Lou McDonald, 
who made clear her belief that a deal had been done (Mary Lou McDonald, 
Statement, 15 February 2018).
In the short-term with no indication that a fresh round of negotiations are 
about to take place it is hard to see how progress can be made in this area.  
An opinion poll by Lucid Talk in February 2018 indicated just how polarised 
opinion had become with support for DUP voters for the party’s opposition 
to an Irish language act rising from 67 per cent in September 2017 to 79 per 
cent in February 2018.  On the opposing side Lucid Talk figures combined SF, 
SDLP, People Before Profit (PBP) voters together and this found support for 
the legislation had also risen from 68 per cent in September 2017 to 76 per 
cent in February 2018 (The Irish News, 6 March 2018).  In the period since 
February 2018 there has been no indication of any new approach or thinking 
that could possibly resolve the impasse around language.  Undoubtedly if 
devolved government is to be restored in NI, the problem will have to be 
solved but what the solution will be is certainly open to debate.
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Petition of Concern (PoC)
The Belfast / Good Friday Agreement (1998), the basis for devolved 
government in NI, contained a number of safeguards that sought to uphold 
the principles of consociationalism upon which it was based.  One example 
of this was the provision of a Petition of Concern (PoC) in relation to the 
workings of the Assembly.  Under this mechanism at least 30 MLAs could ask 
that a decision taken by the Assembly be the subject of cross-community 
support.  In other words the matter at hand would not only have to be 
backed by a weighted 60 per cent majority in the Assembly but also by at 
least 40 per cent of those designated as Unionist and Nationalist.
As McCulloch (2017) points out NI is not unique in terms of having a 
consociational power sharing arrangement that contains a PoC.  But as he 
also concludes difficulties have arisen on two fronts with how the procedure 
has operated in recent times.  Firstly, down through the years there has been 
a marked increase in the frequency in which a PoC has been scheduled.  This 
can be noted in Figure 26.
Figure 26:  Use of the Petition of Concern, 1998-2016
In September 2016 TheDetail.tv website produced a detailed study looking 
specifically at the use of a PoC for the Assembly term which lasted from 
2011-2016 (Figure 27).  For instance it broke down the headline figure of 
118 to show how often individual parties had used the mechanism, with the 
DUP emerging as the leaders in that regard having employed it some  
86 times.
 
Figure 27:  Petitions of Concern by Party, 2011-2016
Source:  McCulloch, 3 April 2017
Time Period Number of 
Petitions of Concern
Number of Issues relating to 
Petitions of Concern
1998-2003 7 n/a
2007-2011 33 21
2011-2016 118 33
Source:  Claire Smyth, TheDetail, 29 September 2016
Party Number Signed *
DUP 86
Sinn Féin 29
SDLP 29
Green Party 4
Party Number Signed *
APNI 3
UUP 2
NI21 2
Independent Unionist 1
* The figures record the number of times each party had an individual member sign a PoC.  
As some PoC were signed by more than one party, there is some overlap so the total number 
of petitions in this table is more than the number tabled during the 2011-16 mandate.  For 
instance the DUP tabled 82 PoCs on its own and 4 were co-signed by the SDLP and UUP.
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Secondly, as Schwartz (2014) highlights, the PoC was worded in such a way 
which effectively meant that, ‘its subject matter is open-ended’.  This in 
turn has allowed it to be used as a means of ‘trumping decisions that clearly 
have nothing to do with protecting the distinctive interests of either of 
the two communities’ (Schwartz, Seminar, 2014:2).  A number of examples 
during the years 2011-2016 illustrate this.  In March 2013 SF, APNI and 
the GP tabled a PoC relating to a proposed amendment to the Criminal 
Justice Bill which would have led to further restrictions on the availability 
of abortion in NI.  Then in November 2015 the Assembly voted in favour of 
legislating for same sex marriage in NI but the measure was then blocked 
by the DUP using a PoC.  At the height of the RHI controversy in December 
2016 a vote of no confidence in Arlene Foster as First Minister in the 
Assembly was passed by 39 votes to 36.  But this result was then rendered 
meaningless when the DUP again opted to invoke a PoC.
As to the future it is clear that the status quo in relation to the measure 
is unlikely to be sustained.  Both The Stormont House Agreement (2014) 
and A Fresh Start: The Stormont Agreement and Implementation Plan 
(2015) made provisions for its reform.  However a protocol on the matter 
that all parties were to agree to and which would then have been sent 
to the Speaker of the Assembly was never signed off on.  It also appears 
to have been a topic for debate at the failed political talks of 2017-18 
(EamonnMallie.com, Draft, 20 February 2018).
The future for the PoC is still a matter to be determined.  However reform 
is likely to focus on a couple of issues – the required 30 signature threshold 
and some means by which to restrict those areas where the PoC can 
be activated. In one sense however this process has already begun.  The 
reduction in the number of MLAs from 108 down to 90 would, it has 
been suggested, make it harder for one party alone to reach the 30-seat 
signature threshold to table a PoC.  For instance McCulloch indicates ‘if it 
requires more than one party to invoke it’, the ‘frequency and potential 
for abuse’ of PoC’s could be lessened (McCulloch, 2017:18).  In fact all of 
this had already become a reality with the DUP only winning 28 seats at 
the 2017 Assembly election.  Secondly, with regards to the PoC the Fresh 
Start Agreement talked of restricting it so that it could ‘only be tabled in 
exceptional circumstances’.  As yet there is no agreement what these could 
be but both Schwartz (2014) and McCulloch (2017) have outlined what 
these may be, as well as possible mechanisms by which they could be 
decided upon.  These include such things as restricting the criteria for a PoC 
to those relating to equality or human rights matters.  As to whom or what 
should then adjudicate as to the merits of whether a particular issue meets 
these benchmarks the ideas range from allowing the courts to decide or 
creating some sort of a representative body from within the Assembly itself 
to make the call.
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Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry (HIA)
The collapse of the Executive early in 2017 and the subsequent lack of a 
devolved government has led to major ramifications for the governance of 
NI.  One of the most poignant examples of this has been the aftermath of 
the publication in January 2017 of the report by the Historical Institutional 
Abuse inquiry (HIA).  This had been established in September 2011 by the 
Executive to investigate the claims of child abuse in residential institutions 
run by the state, local authorities, churches and the charity Barnardo’s across 
the region from 1922 to 1995.  The inquiry itself got underway in January 
2014 and was chaired by the retired High Court judge Sir Antony Hart.  By 
the time it ended hearing public evidence in July 2016, 246 people had given 
their testimony in public and another 87, who were too ill or too frail to 
attend in person, gave statements which were then read into the record.
The conclusions of the report made for harrowing reading as it outlined the 
scale of the mistreatment as well as physical and sexual abuse of young people 
at a host of institutions across NI.  In addition it also drew attention to the 
fate of those who had been sent to Australia to start new lives but who went 
on instead to endure exploitation and abuse.  Amongst the recommendations 
suggested by Sir Anthony Hart were that a public apology should be issued 
to those who survived the abuse; the building of a memorial at Stormont; 
the appointment of a commissioner to look after the needs of survivors, the 
setting up of specialised care and assistance packages for victims; and finally 
financial compensation for survivors as well as for the relatives of those who 
had already died (HIA, Report Chapters, 2017; and BBC NI News, 20 January 
2017).  But as it had been the NI Executive that had set up the Inquiry, it was 
now its responsibility to implement these recommendations.
Unfortunately the report was to be published at a point when the devolved 
administration was about to enter a long period of suspension.  As a result 
Hart’s proposals could not be implemented much to his frustration and those 
of the survivors.  For instance during 2017 and 2018 BBC NI News followed 
the story of Clint Massey, who had been abused at the Kincora Boys Home as 
a child but who was now dying from lung and brain cancer.  His appeals for 
the local politicians to make progress in order for the Executive to be reformed 
to allow for the compensation scheme to be implemented failed and he died 
in March 2018.  A few weeks after his death attention was focussed on Karen 
Bradley when she was questioned about the situation in relation to HIA.  
During a sitting of the NI Select Committee at Westminster she argued that 
she was powerless to act as the issue was a devolved matter.  Instead it was 
her opinion that the responsibility to put in place any compensation package 
lay with the NI Assembly.  However she did indicate that she was willing 
to look at an alternative plan which David Sterling, the head of the NI Civil 
Service, had been working on (BBC NI News, 20 March 2018).  
Recently the shape of this plan has begun to emerge with two bills being 
drafted for presentation by the end of the 2018 summer.  These would seek 
to establish a Commissioner for Survivors of Institutional Childhood Abuse 
and create a redress board that would allow for financial compensation to be 
paid out to those mentioned by Hart in his report back in 2017.  All of this 
of course is dependent upon the legislation being ready and for some time in 
the future to allow it to pass through the legislative process at Westminster 
(NIDirect, HIA 2017).
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National Assets Management Agency (NAMA)
Much of the focus on the political crisis that emerged in late 2016 and early 
2017 was on matters relating to the fallout from the RHI scheme.  However 
it should be remembered that even in the lead up to that event, relations 
between the DUP and SF had already been strained by other issues.  One 
example of this was the arguments around the alleged financial irregularities 
relating to the work of the National Assets Management Agency (NAMA) in NI.
The origins of NAMA lie in the impact of the world financial crisis of 2008 
on the economy of the Republic of Ireland.  In particular the Irish banking 
system had been left badly exposed due to its decision to engage in excessive 
lending to the property sector.  To try to address the problems being faced 
by the banks in Ireland the Irish government moved to establish NAMA in 
2009.  In essence it became a bad bank that was given responsibility for 
trying to recover some of the value of the problematic loans that Irish banks 
had granted.  As part of this work NAMA was to pay out some £1.1 billion 
to Irish banks for loans they had made for land and property in NI that had 
once been valued at £4.5 billion.  NAMA’s attempt to drum up international 
interest in order to sell its NI portfolio was given the title Project Eagle and 
by April 2014 a sale had been agreed to a New York investment, Cerebus, 
for £1.24 billion.  However in July 2014 Mick Wallace, an Independent TD, 
used the parliamentary privilege of the Dáil, to claim that a Belfast law firm, 
Tughans, had placed £7 million in an Isle of Man bank account for a politician 
in NI to reward him for his part in the Project Eagle sale.
These allegations prompted a police investigation led by the UK National 
Crime Agency (NCA).  In addition the Finance Committee of the NI Assembly 
also decided to open up its own inquiry which was established in such a 
way that it would not impede the one being carried out by the NCA.  Whilst 
this did limit the work of the Finance Committee it did still produce further 
revelations.  These related to evidence given, again under parliamentary 
privilege, by the loyalist blogger Jamie Bryson in September 2016.  During 
his evidence to a sitting of the Finance Committee he indicated that five 
individuals including Peter Robinson, then First Minster and leader of the 
DUP, had been in line to receive a payment upon the completion of the deal 
relating to NAMA’s NI portfolio.  All five men rebutted these allegations and 
Peter Robinson also went on to deny that Martin McGuinness, then deputy 
First Minister, had not been informed about the deal disposing of NAMA’s 
assets in NI (NI Assembly, Hansard, 14 October 2015).  However interest in 
matters relating to NAMA then tended to fade from view.
Events took a further twist in August 2016.  The Irish News and the Nolan 
programme on BBC NI Radio revealed leaked twitter messages from Daithi 
McKay, then SF Chairman of the Assembly Finance Committee, together with 
another member of SF, that seemed to indicate that they had tried to coach 
Jamie Bryson before his appearance at the Committee in September 2015.  
Bryson denied the claims and even though McKay stated that he had acted 
individually and without consent from anyone else in SF the row rumbled on 
(BBC NI News, 18 August 2016).  Later McKay stood down from the Assembly 
and resigned from the party.  As well as the role of McKay questions also 
began to be raised about his party colleague Máirtín Ó Muilleoir, who had 
now become Minister of Finance, but had previously served as a member of 
the Finance Committee.  In particular there were calls for him to step aside 
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as a Minister because he had been directly referenced in one of the Twitter 
messages.  This he refused to do claiming that he had no knowledge of the 
‘inappropriate communications’ (BBC NI News, 22 August 2016).
At present the political furore may have died down but the criminal 
investigation into NAMA continues.  In May 2018 reports emerged that the 
NCA were investigating up to nine people in connection with the NAMA 
NI deal and that it was recommending that two people should face charges 
(BBC NI News, 22 May 2018).
4.   LOCAL GOVERNMENT     
 FOLLOWING RE-ORGANISATION
The fourth Peace Monitoring Report (Wilson, 2016) outlined the reform 
of local administration in the region and gave an overview of the socio-
economic demographics of the (then) new 11 Councils.  Along with the 
re-organisation, the councils were given new responsibilities most notably 
planning and economic development.  As local councils are independent of 
central government they have continued to operate in the absence of the 
NI Executive and Assembly.  Six of the councils have unionist majorities, 
four have nationalist majorities, and in one council (Belfast) no party has an 
overall majority.
Democratic Audit UK – an independent research unit at the London School of 
Economics – carried out a review of how democratic local government is in 
NI.  The last local elections were in 2014 and the audit found that the system 
of proportional representation had resulted in a broad correspondence 
between the total share of the vote for the major parties and the total 
number of seats secured (Democratic Audit UK, Audit 2017, 20 June 2017).  
The audit also highlighted the high level of participation in local government 
elections (51% in 2014).  However, the level of co-opted (appointed rather 
than elected) councillors, which was then at ten per cent across all councils, 
and 18.3 per cent in Belfast, was viewed as a weakness.  Following the 2014 
elections women councillors made up a quarter of elected councillors, a 
figure which had increased less than two per cent from the 2011 election.  
In Belfast one third of councillors were women but in North Down and 
Ards Council women accounted for one sixth of members (Audit 2017: 
5).  The audit also commented on the fact that council decisions have the 
potential to spark controversy and highlighted the December 2012 decision 
by Belfast City Council on flying the Union flag on designated days.  More 
recent council decisions on the issue of bonfires, commemoration, and some 
planning decisions have also caused controversy.
The Local Government Auditor is appointed from the Northern Ireland Audit 
Office (NIAO) staff by the Department of Communities.  The auditor has 
statutory authority to undertake studies and make recommendations about 
the provision of services by local government bodies.  In the 2018 report 
the auditor stated that the 2016-17 financial statements of the district 
councils were ‘properly prepared and that they gave a true and fair view of 
the financial position’ (NIAO, Local Government Auditor’s Report, 2018).  
During this period the councils received income of £839 million (from rates, 
charges, and grants) and ‘spent £878 million on providing services to the 
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public, employed 11,218 staff (equal to 9,834 full time equivalent staff) and 
utilised assets worth more than £2,300 million’ (Report, 2018:7).  Staff costs 
represented 41 per cent (£344 million) of operating expenditure (Report, 
2018:42).  A breakdown of council income and spending is given in Figure 
28.  The average sickness absence rate was 14.95 days (or approximately 6 
per cent of the total working days) across all councils.  The auditor also found 
that the councils met their key performance improvement responsibilities.
Figure 28:  Local government income and expenditure, 2016-17.
All councillors are also required to complete a register of interests.  While 
the auditor found no conflict of interests in the 2016-17 period, there were 
two councils where returns had not been obtained from all the councillors.  
The auditor is also a prescribed person to whom a whistle-blower can make 
protected disclosures.  The number of whistle-blowing concerns reported 
directly to the auditor increased from 15 in 2016-17 to 23 in 2017-18.
The 462 councillors elected to the 11 district councils have to comply with 
the Northern Ireland Local Government Code of Conduct for Councillors.  The 
NI Local Government Commissioner for Standards examines complaints from 
people who believe a councillor has failed to comply with the code.  Details 
are published of any complaints, the alleged breach of code, and the decision 
taken on the breach.  On the Commissioner’s website were listed nine 
councillors who had been the subject of alleged breaches from September 
2016 to August 2018 and two of these were awaiting a decision.  
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financial position' (NIAO, Local Government Auditor's Report, 2018).  During this period 
the councils received income of £839 million (from rates, charges, and grants) and 'spent 
£878 million on providing services to the public, employed 11,218 staff (equal to 9,834 full 
time equivalent staff) and utilised assets worth more than £2,300 million' (Report, 2018:7).  
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Figure 9:  Local government income and expenditure, 2016-17. 
 
Source:  Local Government Auditor's Report 2018. 
 
All councillors are also required to complete a register of interests.  While the auditor found 
no conflict of interests in the 2016-17 period, there were two councils where returns had 
not been obtained from all the councillors.  The auditor is also a prescribed person to 
whom a whistle-blower can make protected disclosures.  The number of whistle-blowing 
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has failed to comply with the code.  Details are published of any complaints, the alleged 
Source:  Local Government Auditor’s Report 2018.
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Among the breaches considered were:  sexual assault and fraud; assault 
and disorderly behaviour; and drink driving convictions.  One councillor was 
disqualified for three years and two other councillors were suspended for 
three and six months.
The NI Local Government Association (NILGA) commissioned a report from 
the independent New Policy Institute (NPI) on the possible extension of 
responsibilities of local government through devolution from Stormont 
(NPI, Report, June 2018).  The report looked at how spending in the region 
was split between local, devolved, and UK government and compared the 
breakdown with Scotland and Wales (see Figure 29).  In the figures for 2015-
16 the local government share was four per cent compared to 27 per cent 
for the other two regions.  The difference in spending by the UK government 
was explained as being due to the devolution of spending on social security 
benefits to the NI Executive.  The report argued that additional powers 
related to some neighbourhood services should be devolved to the 11 
councils.  These services would cover highways and transport, cultural and 
related services, environment and regulation, and planning and development.
On the 1 April 2015 there was a transfer of the bulk of planning functions 
from the Department for Infrastructure to the 11 district councils.  Since 
then councillors sitting on planning committees have made many decisions, 
based on recommendations from professional planning departments, on a 
wide range of applications.  A number of decisions involving large projects 
have proved unpopular and have been contested in court. 
Source:  NPI Report, June 2018; page 5.
Figure 29:  Percentage share of current and capital public expenditure on services 2015/16, by level of 
government, in NI, Scotland, and Wales.
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Figure 10:  Percentage share of current and capital public expenditure on services 
2015/16, by level of government, in NI, Scotland, and Wales. 
 
Source:  NPI Report, June 2018; page 5. 
 
On the 1 April 2015 there was a transfer of the bulk of planning functions from the 
Department for Infrastructure to the 11 district councils.  Since then councillors sitting on 
planning committees have many decisions, based on recommendations from professional 
planning departments, on a wide range of applications.  A number of decisions involving 
large projects have proved unpopular and have been contested in court.  In one example a 
decision by Belfast City Council in favour of a planning application for a large office 
complex next to the Markets area of Belfast was contested by local residents in a case in 
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In one example a decision by Belfast City Council in favour of a planning 
application for a large office complex next to the Markets area of Belfast 
was contested by local residents in a case in the High Court.  The court ruled 
that council planning officials had failed to take into account certain relevant 
matters and thus acted unlawfully.  The planning decision was therefore 
quashed (BBC NI News, 31 May 2018).  However, the option is still open for 
a fresh application to be made to the council’s planning department.  Other 
planning applications that have been the subject of local protest included 
plans for a Southern Regional College campus at Craigavon Lakes and plans 
for the re-use of a former railway station in Derry.
A Northern Ireland Audit Office report in 2016 found that a number of 
councils did not have a conflict of interest policy in place (NIAO, Report, 20 
September 2016).  Sometime later, in April 2018, it was announced that the 
Local Government Commissioner for Standards was investigating if Luke 
Poots, then a DUP councillor on Lisburn and Castlereagh City Council, had a 
conflict of interest when he voted in favour of planning decisions lobbied for 
by his father Edwin Poots, DUP MLA (BBC NI News, 26 April 2018).  Following 
this announcement, Luke Poots reported a BBC journalist to the PSNI for 
harassment (News Letter, 5 July 2018).  On 31st July the police stated that 
there was no evidence to support the allegation of harassment (Belfast 
Telegraph, 31 July 2018).  This investigation was still under consideration at 
the time of writing.
While all the political parties continue to take part in local government, 
there are many disagreements related to council spending and also around 
some of the same issues that impacted on Stormont.  For example, in 
October 2017 the DUP and Sinn Féin were criticised by the Alliance Party 
over plans to re-allocate £4 million of Belfast City Council funding without 
a public bid process (The Irish News, 21 October 2017;).  The plan was to 
use the funding to support nine projects in the east and west of the city in 
an effort to promote tourism in these areas.  The main criticism was over a 
lack of transparency in the decision-making process.  When the matter was 
considered further at a council meeting in February 2018, the two main 
parties rejected a proposal for an open call to allow other projects to bid for 
the funding.
While there is no Stormont petition of concern option within local 
government, there is a call-in procedure which can be used to have council 
decisions re-considered; the decisions being delayed rather than blocked.  
However, there have been some criticisms of the way in which it has 
been used.  The DUP and Sinn Féin supported a plan to award £400,000 
of ratepayers’ money to community groups for bonfire diversion through 
area-based festivals.  However, when the matter was brought before the 
council committee the call-in procedure had been removed from the process 
(BelfastLive, 28 May 2018).  The other parties said this was an abuse of 
the procedure and it was reported that they would ask the NI Audit Office 
to investigate the decision (Belfast Telegraph, 25 May 2018).  In another 
example, in July 2018 the Armagh, Banbridge and Craigavon Council voted 
by 12 votes to 11 to fly the rainbow flag during the Pride events in August 
2018.  However, the DUP – which voted against the motion – used the call-
in procedure which had the effect of delaying the flying of the flag until after 
the event had ended (Belfast Telegraph, 1 August 2018).
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Whatever the outcome of the Brexit negotiations, the decision to leave the 
EU will have implications for local government in NI.  It may be the case 
that those five councils which have part of their boundaries made up by the 
border will feel the impact of Brexit more than the other councils.  An early 
casualty of Brexit came when a joint bid by Belfast City Council, and Derry 
City and Strabane District Council to become the 2023 European Capital 
of Culture was rejected by the European Commission because of the UK’s 
decision to leave the EU (ITV News, 23 November 2017).
5.   DEALING OR NOT      
 DEALING WITH THE PAST
Earlier this year much publicity was given to the fact that 2018 marked 
the 20th anniversary of the Belfast / Good Friday Agreement.  In terms of 
the whole issue of Dealing with the Past this year is also significant.  On 29 
April 1998 Sir Kenneth Bloomfield published his report, We Will Remember 
Them, which set out to explore the possible ways in which NI could begin to 
deal with victims of the Troubles (Bloomfield, Report, April 1998).  Whatever 
about the merits of its content and there has been much debate about 
this, Bloomfield’s work was to be the first of various initiatives that have 
tried to deal with the issue of victims.  In his covering note to Mo Mowlan, 
the Secretary of State who had commissioned him to carry out the work, 
Bloomfield included a warning that continues to carry relevance today:
I have been guided by a simple yardstick:  we have created victims 
through violence, and we have produced violence out of division.  It 
follows, then, that any form of recognition likely to generate division 
rather than to foster reconciliation should be avoided. 
Bloomfield, Report, 1998
Unfortunately when it comes to dealing with the past this has proved 
impossible to achieve.  Given the sensitivity of the topic and the controversy 
it often provokes it is not surprising to find that it has proved to be an 
impossible challenge for politicians and policy makers to overcome.  The 
most recent example of this has been the failure to implement the provisions 
dealing with legacy issues, as set out in the Stormont House Agreement (SHA) 
of December 2014 and then reaffirmed in the Fresh Start Agreement (FSA) 
of December 2015.  These envisaged that the following bodies would be 
established each with a separate remit:
•	 Oral History Archive (OHA):  would ‘provide a central place for people 
from all backgrounds (and from throughout the UK and Ireland) to share 
experiences and narratives related to the Troubles’;
•	 Historical Investigations Unit (HIU):  would ‘take forward investigations 
into outstanding Troubles-related deaths’ and that the work of this HIU 
would be completed in five years;
•	 Independent Commission for Information Retrieval (ICIR):  would be 
‘established by the UK and Irish Governments’, and whilst respecting ‘the 
sovereign integrity of each jurisdiction ... enable victims and survivors to 
seek and privately receive information about the (Troubles-related) deaths 
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of their next of kin’.  It was also envisaged that the task envisaged for the 
ICIR would last no longer than 5 years.
•	 Implementation and Reconciliation Group (IRG):  would ‘oversee themes, 
archives and information recovery’ and that ‘after five years a report on 
themes will be commissioned by the IRG from independent academic 
experts’.
The fundamental problem with these proposals was that they remained 
aspirational and there was no arrangement in place to allow for their 
immediate introduction.  Instead the intention of the British government 
was to propose a public consultation on the proposals before they became 
law in order to try to ensure that they had widespread acceptance across 
NI society.  However it was then to prove difficult to decide when this 
process could get underway.  On the first anniversary of the Fresh Start 
Agreement in November 2016, James Brokenshire was forced to deny that 
he was delaying this and instead stressed that ‘finding a consensus on a 
way forward in dealing with Northern Ireland’s past (was) a priority’, but it 
was also important to ‘build the necessary consensus to take this forward’, 
and that such a ‘process would benefit from a public phase in order to make 
progress on this vital issue’ (Brokenshire, Press Release, 17 November 2016).  
But progress has been stalled by the political instability that followed the 
collapse of the NI Executive and the way in which legacy matters have been 
caught up in discussions around restoration.
With the failure of the talks in February 2018 on 11 May 2018, Karen Bradley 
announced that the long-awaited consultation on the proposals outlined 
in SHA and FSA was open.  In the press release that accompanied the 
announcement she closely repeated the comments of her predecessors in 
November 2016:
In an area as sensitive as the troubled past in Northern Ireland, it 
is important that we recognise and listen to all views.  Any way 
forward will only work if it can command confidence from across the 
community.  Now is the time for everyone with an interest in addressing 
the legacy of Northern Ireland’s troubled past to have their say. 
Bradley, Press Release, 11 May 2018.
The consultation document was entitled ‘Addressing the Legacy of Northern 
Ireland’s Past’ and it had two main components.  Firstly, there was an 
assessment of the current mechanisms for dealing with the past in terms 
of how they currently operated as well as setting out some of the problems 
that had arisen during the course of their work.  Secondly, it set out in detail 
how the new bodies being proposed under SHA and FSA would work, the 
general principles behind them and a draft of the Northern Ireland (Stormont 
House Agreement) Bill, which would transfer the proposals into law (NIO, 
Consultation Paper, 11 May 2018).
However it is important to point out that the absence of a formal process 
has not prevented an ongoing debate about dealing with the past within the 
NI context.  This has focused on a number of key areas and it is likely these 
will be raised during the present consultation process.
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5.1  Justice and Truth Recovery
To date no acceptable mechanism to allow the completion of the remaining 
investigations into Troubles-related killings has been found.  The current 
proposals envisage that in the future this would be a role which would 
be transferred from the PSNI’s Legacy Investigation Branch (LIB) to the 
Historical Investigations Unit (HIU).  But the exact nature of the role 
that potentially could be given to the HIU was something which alarmed 
unionist politicians in NI as well as opinion within the Conservative Party 
at Westminster.  Of particular concern was the belief that the workload of 
the HIU – estimated to be around 1700 killings – would focus on former 
members of the security forces, particularly the British Army, who had served 
in NI.  These fears were then linked to the fact that since the early 2000s the 
Armed Forces Covenant (AFC) had effectively placed on successive British 
governments a, ‘promise from the nation that those who serve or have 
served, and their families, are treated fairly’ (Gov.uk, Armed Forces Covenant).  
As far back as February 2017 Theresa May had spoken of the need to ensure 
that, ‘investigative bodies responsible for looking at deaths during the 
Troubles will operate in a fair, balanced and proportionate manner’ (BBC NI 
News, 22 February 2017).  She returned to that theme in the wake of her 
government’s announcement in May 2018 when she made clear that: 
The situation we have at the moment is that the only people being 
investigated for these issues are those in our armed forces or those who 
served in law enforcement in Northern Ireland ... That is patently unfair.  
Terrorists are not being investigated.  Terrorists should be investigated 
and that is what the government wants to see. 
BBC NI News, 9 May 2018.
This issue was also something that the House of Commons Defence 
Committee had spent some time looking into and in April 2017 it published 
the report Investigations into fatalities in Northern Ireland involving British 
military personnel (HoC Defence Committee, Report, 24 April 2017).  Effectively 
this called for the introduction of a statute of limitations that would halt any 
further investigation or prosecution of any British soldier suspected of being 
involved in a troubles-related killing.  Alongside this would be some form of a 
truth recovery process that would allow any bereaved family to find out more 
information about the circumstances in which their relative had been killed.  
The expectation was that this would make such an arrangement compatible 
with Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights by which the state 
was under an obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of anyone killed 
by agents of the state (BBC NI News, 26 April 2018).  The thinking behind the 
Defence Committee was outlined by its Chair, Dr Julian Lewis MP, during a 
subsequent debate on the report in January 2018:
The Committee was particularly exercised by recent events.  As a result 
of the much more recent campaign in Iraq, soldiers were being brought 
to court, and it appeared that thousands of cases would have to be 
investigated, despite the fact that at the end of long, tortuous and 
expensive processes, the vast majority were found to be without much, 
or indeed any, substance.  The Committee was worried that a similar 
sort of process would now begin retrospectively in relation to the 238 
military-related deaths that occurred during the troubles. 
House of Commons, Hansard, Column 204WH, 25 January 2018.
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Later in the same debate Mark Lancaster MP, then Minister for the Armed 
Forces, indicated that the measure had some support:
... the Government have decided to include within the legacy 
consultation a question on alternative ways of addressing the legacy of 
the past, such as a statute of limitations or amnesty ...  
Ibid, Column 223WH.
Yet when the consultation process was announced in April 2018 this 
was something notable for its absence (The Independent, 11 May 2018,).  
According to the BBC’s political editor Laura Kuenssberg this was a decision 
that some within government circles found unacceptable and had led 
to a cabinet ‘spat’ over the matter (BBC News, 9 May 2018).  Instead as 
alternative all Karen Bradley could offer was to: 
… recognise that there are different views on how to address the legacy 
of the past in Northern Ireland, such as those expressed in the April 2017 
report published by the House of Commons Defence Committee.  For 
that reason, while I believe the Stormont House Agreement institutions 
are the best way forward, this consultation also welcomes views from 
those who might have other ideas, either about how the institutions 
should work, or about alternatives to the institutions themselves. 
NIO, Consultation Paper, 11 May 2018, page 5.
No formal reasons have been forwarded to explain the decision to exclude 
the statute of limitation from the consultation document but there are 
evidently difficulties in doing so including dispute about the need for a 
statute of limitation to protect former members of the security forces from 
being at a disadvantage when it comes to legacy investigations.  During a 
debate at Westminster in January 2017 Sir Jeffrey Donaldson suggested that 
up to 90 per cent of investigations being conducted by the PSNI‘s LIB in NI 
were disproportionally directed at ex-service personnel (HoC, Hansard, 10 
January 2017).  The BBC NI news then reported that PSNI figures indicated 
something different.  These suggested that of the 1,188 killings making up 
the caseload of the LIB 530 had been carried out by republicans, 271 by 
loyalists and 354 by security forces, which represented 30 per cent of the 
total.  A few months later in an interview with the Belfast News Letter Barra 
McGrory, then Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) for NI cited evidence 
from his office that over the previous six years it had prosecuted seven 
republicans, three loyalists and three soldiers (The Newsletter, 1 July 2017).
There were also other factors requiring consideration.  For instance during 
evidence to the Defence Select Committee legal opinion suggested that 
potentially a statute of limitation restricted to former members of the 
security forces could fall foul of Human Rights legislation.  The advice 
was that the only way to avoid this was instead to opt for a measure that 
could be introduced across the board in NI to include ex-paramilitaries.  In 
essence such a development would lead to a situation whereby a general 
amnesty was the ultimate result.  All of this was further developed by a 
report from academics at Queen’s University Belfast and Ulster University 
in association with the Committee for the Administration of Justice (CAJ) 
(McEvoy, et al., Model Bill Team, 2018).  It was later to emerge that this was 
a scenario that the British government was keen to avoid.  In June 2018 an 
internal briefing document from the NIO and prepared for Karen Bradley was 
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inadvertently leaked to the media.  This contained advice for the Secretary 
of State when speaking to journalists on a range of policy issues.  In terms of 
legacy issues and in particular the question of a statute of limitations it was 
recommended that she say it ‘would need to apply to all those involved in 
Troubles-related incidents, including former terrorists, if the UK is to comply 
with international law’ (Belfast Telegraph, 18 June 2018). The challenges in 
this area are also highlighted by data from the 2017 NILT Survey.  Within the 
module on ‘Attitudes to Armed Forces’ in NI, people were asked about their 
opinion on the prosecution of (former) British Army members for actions 
during the Troubles (see Figure 30).
 
The results indicated that 36 per cent of NILT respondents strongly agreed 
or agreed with the statement that British soldiers should not be prosecuted 
for their actions during the troubles whilst 31 per cent disagreed or strongly 
disagreed.  The figures are much more pronounced however when the results 
are separated out by religion.  Some 61 per cent of Protestants strongly 
agreed or agreed, compared with 10 per cent of Catholics.
In any case it is also highly unlikely that such a move could be sold politically.  
During an interview with the BBC NI’s radio programme Inside Politics on 24 
November 2017, Arlene Foster voiced her concerns.  While stating that she 
understood the reasons why people were promoting the idea, she outlined 
her concerns that it could deprive relatives of those killed during the Troubles 
from having the chance to have justice - ‘We have to be very careful that you 
don’t end up in a situation where you end up giving an amnesty, by the back 
door, to the people who frankly committed some of the most heinous crimes 
anywhere and I could not be party to that’ (iNews, 25 November 2017).  A 
few days previously the Irish Foreign Minister, Simon Coveney, had expressed 
the view that any move to include the issue of a statute of limitation into 
the consultation process had the ‘potential to undermine consultation from 
day one’ (BBC NI News, 23 November 2017).  Similarly after a meeting with 
Theresa May in Downing Street on 21 November 2017, Gerry Adams, then SF 
President, warned that such a move would be seen as ‘an act of bad faith’ by 
the British government (Belfast Telegraph, 21 November 2017).
An intervention was also made on the consultation process by Barra 
McGrory, who had returned to private practice following his decision to step 
down as DPP.  He questioned the merits of the HIU on the grounds that it 
% All % Catholic % Protestant % No religion
Strongly Agree 15 1 30 12
Agree 21 9 31 23
Neither agree or disagree 19 22 13 23
Disagree 18 27 10 19
Strongly disagree 13 22 6 9
Can’t choose 15 18 9 14
Figure 30:  How much do you agree or disagree that, Members of the British Army should not be prosecuted for 
their actions during the Troubles? by religion
Source:  ARK, NI Life and Times Survey, Attitudes to Armed Forces, 2017.
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was ‘convenient politically’ and ignored the fact that, ‘the vast majority of 
these cases (taken on by the HIU) will not end in successful convictions’.  He 
argued that money and resources would be wasted pursuing cases where it 
would be impossible to gain a conviction, ‘time cannot be wound back, so the 
quality of evidence will still be very poor’ (BBC NI News, 18 May 2008).  His 
alternative was to repeat the call that others had made before him that there 
should be a halt to all future prosecutions for troubles-related killings which 
effectively would amount to an amnesty across the board.
5.2  Legacy Inquests
The ongoing political stalemate has also affected other matters relating to 
legacy issues including the failure to deal with the backlog of Troubles-related 
inquests.  In February 2016 the most senior judge in NI, the Lord Chief 
Justice Sir Declan Morgan, had outlined a plan to establish a legacy inquest 
unit to deal with the backlog.  It was envisaged that this work, involving up 
to eighty cases, would take five years to complete and cost in the region 
of £10 million with funding being provided by the Executive.  However this 
proposal was soon to run into problems with the DUP.  In particular the party 
was opposed to it on the grounds that it was largely skewed in favour of one 
category of victims – namely those involved in killings by the security forces 
and therefore contributing to what the party considered to be an unbalanced 
approach to dealing with the past.  Consequently the initiative never 
progressed and Morgan’s disappointment was put on the record twice during 
speeches in September 2016 and 2017 (BBC NI News, 5 September 2017).
This was another issue that had soured relations between the DUP and SF 
and helped to contribute to the collapse of the Executive back in January 
2017.  In giving his reasons for resigning as deputy First Minister Martin 
McGuinness referred specifically to the failure of the DUP to approve funding 
for legacy inquests and warned until it was dealt with alongside other 
matters then it would be impossible for his party to return to government 
(BBC NI News, 9 January 2017).  In the lengthy talks process that dragged 
on throughout 2017 and into 2018 the topic remained a bone of contention 
between the two parties.  Also it appears that both parties were engaged 
in discussion with the British government over various legacy matters.  SF 
was to claim that it had received a commitment from the British side that 
it would immediately release resources to allow for the inquest programme 
first envisaged by the Lord Chief Justice.  This was something that the NIO 
was quick to deny and instead stressed that the government’s discussions 
in all of this were based on the premise that an overall political deal was 
required before any new measures could be followed through (Belfast 
Telegraph, 24 February 2018).  As for the DUP, Arlene Foster confirmed that 
her party were aware of the nature of the discussions between SF and the 
British government but made clear that, ‘No one in the DUP was aware of 
inquest funding being progressed in the absence of an overall agreement 
or a decision to advance all elements of the Stormont House Agreement’ 
(Foster, Statement, 23 February 2018).  In any case it would appear that the 
DUP was also pursuing its own agenda of seeking to ensure that the Armed 
Forces Covenant, currently not in operation in NI due to concerns that it 
could contravene Section 75 of the 1998 Northern Ireland Act, should be 
introduced immediately.
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There was to be a further twist in this issue.  On 8 March 2018 a court 
decided that Arlene Foster’s decision to block funding for the Lord Chief 
Justice’s original plan for legacy inquests had been unlawful and flawed.  
The case had originally been brought by Brigid Hughes, whose husband had 
been innocently caught in a SAS ambush of an IRA unit in Loughall, County 
Armagh back in May 1987, which had resulted in his death.  Her legal team 
had argued that the failure to hold an inquest had been the result of a 
logjam caused by the Secretary of State, the NI Executive, and Arlene Foster, 
as First Minister.  This was followed by a further judgement against her in 
March in which a ruling was given that she was liable for costs in relation to 
the case.  Furthermore in his judgment Sir Paul Girvan, 
… directed the Executive Office, the Department for Justice and the 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to reconsider their duties in 
providing extra resources to the Coroners Service for legacy inquests. 
Belfast Telegraph, 23 March 2018.
As yet there has been no move to implement this request although in May 
2018 it was reported that Arlene Foster was considering an appeal against 
the judgement.  As things stand there is unlikely to be any significant 
development on this front unless it is part of a wider political agreement 
between the DUP and SF.
5.3  A Pension for Victims?
Within the recent consultation document the British government once again 
set out its support for the provisions within the SHA for the NI Executive, 
‘to consult publicly on proposals for a pension for severely physically injured 
victims as a positive step towards much needed progress on this issue’ (NIO, 
Consultation Paper, 11 May 2018;6).  The call for such a measure has been 
in the public domain for some time with a recommendation included in 
proposals that had emerged out of the Haass talks in December 2013 (Haass 
and O’Sullivan, Proposed Agreement, 31 December 2013) and in  a report 
drawn up for the Commission for Victims and Survivors (CVS) (CVS, Final 
Report, April 2014).  The CVS then followed this up with a further paper 
submitted to OFMDFM and The Executive Office that sought to highlight its 
informed advice on the matter – namely that a pension for people severely 
injured during the ‘Troubles’ should be made as soon as possible (CVS, Advice 
Paper, June 2014).  From the outset it was apparent that this was not going 
to be an easy task.  Whilst McGuinness broadly welcomed the proposals 
Robinson was much more circumspect.  He warned that, ‘Agreeing what the 
detail of it should be is something entirely different ... I will not be putting 
my hand to any proposal that is going to reward those that have been 
engaged in terrorism ... So definitions become important in that context’ 
(BBC NI News, 8 May 2014).  As Robinson had indicated the problem for 
many within the unionist community was around this question of definition.  
The only relevant piece of legislation currently on the statute book dealing 
with this – the Victims and Survivors (Northern Ireland) Order 2006 passed 
at Westminster – was unacceptable for unionists in that it had defined the 
terms victim and survivors as:
(a) someone who is or has been physically or psychologically injured as a 
result of or in consequence of a conflict–related incident; (b) someone who 
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provides a substantial amount of care on a regular basis for an individual 
mentioned in paragraph (a); or (c) someone who has been bereaved as a 
result of or in consequence of a conflict–related incident. 
NI Statutory Instrument, 2006 No.2953, 14 November 2006.
There has been deadlock on the issue with no consensus as to who should 
be eligible for such a pension.  Organisations such as the WAVE Trauma 
Centre have continued to campaign on the issue and in November 2016 
made a fresh call for the measure to be introduced via the NI Assembly.  If 
that was not possible then it called for an alternative course namely that the 
authorities at Westminster should step in (ITV news, 22 November 2016).  
But the position of the British government has remained constant - that 
the issue is a question for a devolved government in NI to deal with.  For 
instance a recent briefing note for Karen Bradley, which found its way into 
the public domain, reiterated the belief that ‘Work on a pension is properly 
for the Executive to take forward.  It is one of the many reasons why it is 
important to have an Executive restored’ (Belfast Telegraph, 18 June 2018).
It will be interesting to see if this position holds into the future.  For instance 
the DUP MP Emma Little Pengelly in May 2018 announced her intention to 
introduce a Private Members Bill in the House of Commons entitled, Victims 
of Terrorism (Pensions and Other Support) Bill.  This included provisions for a, 
‘comprehensive review of support for UK victims of terrorism, including the 
proposal of bringing forward a special pension for those severely injured as a 
result of a terrorist attack’ (Emma Little Pengelly, Statement, 2 May 2018).  
The response of the government will also be important as a Private Members 
Bill is unlikely to become law unless it has government backing during its 
passage through parliament.
5.4  Moving forwards or standing still?
At this stage the unanswered question is what will be the outcome of this 
latest consultation process.  Just over a decade ago the British government 
set out on a similar path.  On that occasion the method adopted was to 
establish an independent Consultative Group under the co-chairmanship 
of the Right Reverend Lord Robin Eames and Mr Denis Bradley to look at 
dealing with the past. In its final report it lists having received 290 written 
submissions and 2086 standardised letters; met with 141 individuals and 
groups across the UK and the Republic of Ireland; and organised seven 
public meetings across NI with over 500 people attending these.  The 
group’s final report was published in January 2009 and made a series 
of recommendations.  However some of these were to provoke some 
controversy and none of its proposals were ever implemented and it was 
effectively binned.
Amongst the difficulties encountered by the group led by Eames and Bradley 
was something that should act as a warning that could easily apply to the 
current consultation process namely that:
One of the Group’s main challenges has been consulting a society 
which, despite the significant achievements made towards peace and 
stable government, remains divided along age old lines deeply rooted 
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in the past. 
Consultative Group on the Past, Report, 23 January 2009, page 24.
During the period covered by this Monitoring report there are numerous 
examples of how a single event or incident can illustrate the delicate and 
divisive nature of the debate surrounding dealing with the past.  The Barry 
McElduff incident of 6 January 2018 is one such example.  A video clip 
appeared on social media containing images of McElduff, then SF MP for 
West Tyrone.  The video clip showed McElduff walking around a shop in his 
constituency with a loaf of bread on his head and posing the question as 
to where he could find the bread.  The name on the packaging of the bread 
was Kingsmill, which had sinister connections with the NI conflict.  On 5 
January 1976 ten Protestant workmen were killed in a gun attack on their 
minibus at Kingsmill Road, near Bessbrook, County Armagh.  The attack was 
claimed by the Republican Action Force (RAF) however it is widely believed 
that this was a cover name used by the IRA.  Although McElduff apologised 
immediately and claimed he was unaware of the potential sensitivities 
around the date of his actions he was widely condemned across the political 
spectrum.  Even Declan Kearney, then SF Chairman, described his actions as 
being ‘indefensible and inexcusable’ and later SF moved to suspend McElduff 
from all party activities for three months.  But it was to be the response of 
those directly affected by the aftermath of the attack back in 1976 which 
had the greater impact with Alan Black, the only person to survive Kingsmill, 
describing his actions as being ‘designed to cause maximum hurt’ and 
‘depraved’ (BBC NI News, 6-8 January 2018).
6 PARTY POLITICS AND ELECTIONS
6.1  The 2017 assembly election results
The NI Assembly election in March 2017 returned members to a smaller 
Assembly.  The Assembly Members (Reduction of Numbers) Act (Northern 
Ireland) 2016 reduced the isize of the Assembly from 108 members to 90 
meaning that the 18 NI constituencies would return five seats each instead 
of the previous six.  Given all of this it was widely expected that the main 
parties would have to endure some electoral discomfort.  Turnout was 
significantly up, rising by almost 10 per cent from 54.91 per cent in 2016 to 
64.78 per cent in 2017.  The results of the election are set out in Figure 31. 
Figure 31:  Results of the Northern Ireland Assembly Election, 2 March 2017
 2017 < change > 2016
Electorate 1,254,709 -26,886 1,281,595
Number of Votes Cast (Turnout / Poll) 812,783 +109,039 703,744
Percentage Turnout / Poll: 64.78% +9.87 54.91%
Number of Invalid / Spoilt Votes: 9,468 +38 9,430
Number of Valid Votes Cast: 803,315 +109,001 694,314
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Figure 31:  continued
The election resulted in the DUP and SF both reaffirmed in their electoral 
dominance.  But the big shock to emerge was the apparent damage done to 
the morale and prestige of unionism within NI.  Of the eighteen seats that 
had disappeared sixteen were lost by unionist parties (10 for the DUP and 
6 for the UUP) with SF and PBP losing one each.  In addition SF had come 
close to becoming the largest party in NI with its 27 seats just one behind 
the DUP total of 28, whilst in terms of first-preference votes the SF total 
of 224,225 was just 1,168 behind the DUP’s 225,413.  Thus SF had come 
very close to being in a position for the first time to nominate one of its 
MLAs to the position of First Minister.  Those MLAs likely to be designated as 
unionist would only amount to a total of 40.  Consequently for the first time 
since 1921 an elected body encompassing the whole of NI would not have 
a unionist majority.  With a Petition of Concern (PoC) requiring 30 MLAs to 
sign, it was clear that no one party could put down a PoC on its own.  One 
further interesting figure to emerge from the newly elected Assembly was 
that when it came to Brexit there were now at least 49 MLAs representing 
parties who had campaigned back in June 2016 for the UK to remain a 
member of the EU.
Source:  CAIN, Result of the Assembly Election (NI) Thursday 2 March 2017
Party No. 1st Preference Votes
% Votes Change 
% Votes
No. 
Seats
Change 
No. Seats
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 225,413 28.06% -1.12% 28 -10
Sinn Féin (SF) 224,245 27.91% 3.89% 27 -1
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 103,314 12.86% 0.29% 10 -6
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 95,958 11.95% -0.06% 12 -
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI) 72,717 9.05% 2.07% 8 -
Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) 20,523 2.55% -0.87% 1 -
Green Party (GP) 18,527 2.31% -0.39% 2 -
Independent candidates (Ind) 14,407 1.79% -1.94% 1 -
People Before Profit (PBP) 14,100 1.76% -0.22% 1 -1
Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) 5,590 0.70% -0.16% 0 -
Conservative Party (CP) 2,399 0.30% -0.07% 0 -
Cross Community Labour Alternative (CCLA) 2,009 0.25% -0.05% 0 -
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) 1,579 0.20% -1.26% 0 -
Citizens Independent Social Thought Alliance 
(CISTA) 1,273 0.16% n.a. 0 -
Workers Party (WP) 1,261 0.16% 0.07% 0 -
Total 803,315 100.00% 90 -18
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6.2  The 2017 Westminster election
Theresa May’s surprise announcement that she intended to hold a general 
election on 8 June 2017 was to have major consequences for NI.  With 
opinion polls suggesting that the Labour Party, under the leadership of 
Jeremy Corbyn, trailed the Conservative Party by a considerable margin, 
many commentators felt that Theresa May called the election in the belief 
that she could increase her party’s majority at Westminster.  There was 
also the suggestion that Theresa May wanted to secure her own electoral 
mandate as leader of the Conservative Party.
During the early part of the election campaign in NI there was speculation 
about possible electoral pacts within unionism and nationalism.  The DUP 
and UUP indicated an interest in a formal pact but while it was not possible 
for them to agree an overall pact they did agree to stand aside in certain 
constituencies.  The DUP did not contest Fermanagh South Tyrone so as to 
give a clear run to the UUP, and the UUP reciprocated in north Belfast.  The 
SDLP rejected an appeal by SF to stand aside in the same two constituencies 
(BBC NI News, 8 May 2017).
In terms of the campaign what followed in NI was mainly a familiar picture.  
Whilst it was by no means a re-run of the Assembly election a few weeks 
previously – with questions around the Union, Brexit and the austerity 
measures of the previous conservative government being debated – the two 
largest parties focused on familiar grounds.  In particular both the DUP and 
SF urged voters to once again strengthen their respective electoral positions.  
For instance Arlene Foster spoke of securing a strong mandate for her party 
in order to ensure the restoration of devolved government (Belfast Telegraph, 
8 May 2017).  Michelle O’Neill followed suit, criticising the DUP for failing to 
respond to her party’s demands over the Irish language as well as equality 
and legacy issues.  She was therefore asking for the electors to make it 
another ‘ground breaking election’ for her party (Belfast Telegraph, 23 May 
2017).  The results of the election are set out in Figure 32.
Figure 32:  Results of the Westminster General Election in NI, 8 June 2017
 2017 < change > 2016
Electorate 1,242,698 +5,942 1,236,756
Number of Votes Cast 
(Turnout / Poll)
815,260 +92,388 722,872
Percentage Turnout / Poll: 65.60% +7.15 58.45%
Number of Invalid / Spoilt 
Votes:
3,077 -1,692 4,769
Number of Valid Votes 
Cast:
812,183 +94,080 718,103
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Figure 32:  continued
Party / Independent Candidate Seats Valid 
Votes
%share
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 10 292,316 35.99
Sinn Féin (SF) 7 238,915 29.42
Social Democratic and Labour Party 
(SDLP)
0 95,419 11.75
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 0 83,280 10.25
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland 
(APNI)
0 64,553 7.95
Independent unionist 1 16,148 1.99
Green Party (GP) 0 7,452 0.92
People Before Profit Alliance (PBPA) 0 5,509 0.68
Conservative Party (CP) 0 3,895 0.48
Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) 0 3,282 0.40
The Workers Party (WP) 0 708 0.09
Citizens Independent Social Thought 
Alliance
0 393 0.05
Independents 0 313 0.04
Total 18 812,183 100.00
There was an increase in turnout which largely mirrored that of the Assembly 
election in March 2017.  On this occasion turnout rose from 58.45 per cent in 
2015 to 65.60 per cent in 2017.  As shown in Figure 32 the DUP won10 seats, 
SF 7 and the remaining NI seat was held by the Independent unionist candidate.  
For the largest two parties these gains were to be made at the expense of the 
SDLP and the UUP.  Elsewhere the APNI was unable to win back Belfast East 
and instead the seat was retained by the DUP.  For the DUP the results were 
greeted as a great triumph in the wake of the disappointment of the Assembly 
elections just three months previously.  In a sense the party had heeded an old 
piece of political advice – when you’re in a hole, stop digging.  It had rallied 
behind its leader Arlene Foster and sought to take advantage of the unexpected 
opportunity presented by Theresa May to lead the unionist fightback against 
SF.  The DUP added 108,000 votes to its tally from 2015 and polled 35.99 per 
cent of the vote.  The other big winner was to be SF.  The party’s total vote rose 
by almost 63,000.  SF candidates were returned in Fermanagh & South Tyrone 
which was won from the UUP, whilst South Down and Foyle were gained from 
the SDLP, leaving SF with seven MPs.  In Foyle the unexpected and narrow 
victory for the SF candidate – of just 200 votes – was accompanied by claims 
over voting irregularities particularly over postal votes.  The matter was brought 
to the Electoral Office which in turn referred seven cases to the PSNI for 
investigation (Electoral Commission, Report, December 2017).
Where there are victors there are also losers and in this instance it was 
the UUP and SDLP who suffered with both losing all their Westminster 
representatives.  The UUP lost its two seats and saw its share of the vote 
drop by just over 31,000 from 114,935 in 2015 to 83,280 in 2017.  
Source:  CAIN, Results of the Westminster General Election (NI) 8 June 2017.
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The SDLP share of the vote dropped by around 4,000 from 99,809 in 2015 
to 95,419 in 2017 but the real damage was the loss of three seats.  As for 
the other parties there was not much to cheer.  The only person to derail the 
DUP - SF hegemony was the sitting Independent unionist MP Sylvia Hermon 
in North Down (Figure 32; and ARK, NI Westminster Elections 2017).
In Britain the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn performed much better than 
predicted resulting in a hung parliament where the Conservatives were the 
largest party but had failed to secure an overall majority – Conservatives 318 
seats (-13), Labour 262 (+30), Scottish Nationalist Party 35 (-21), Liberal 
Democrats 12 (+4), DUP 10 (+2), SF 7 (+3), Plaid Cymru 4 (+1), Green 
Party 1 (-), Others 1 (BBC News, 9 May 2017).  This position left the DUP in 
effect holding the balance of power and Arlene Foster made clear she was 
willing ‘to enter discussions with the Conservatives to explore how it may be 
possible to bring stability to our nation at this time of great challenge’ (The 
Irish Times, Electoral Supplement, 10 June 2017).  In contrast the loss of the 
three SDLP MPs, coupled with the abstentionist policy of the seven SF MPs, 
now meant that for the first time in over half a century there would be no 
nationalist representatives in the House of Commons from NI.
6.3 The Confidence and      
 Supply Agreement
Given the indecisive nature of the election result, Theresa May, as the leader 
of the party with the biggest number of seats in the new parliament, was 
then given the opportunity to form a government.  On that front she had 
two main choices - to attempt to form a minority administration or seek 
some sort of an arrangement with another party thereby providing her with 
a working parliamentary majority.  Almost immediately the first option was 
ruled out and it soon became clear that her preference was to work towards 
a deal with the DUP.  The 318 Conservative MPs combined with the 10 DUP 
MPs would make up more than half the MPs in the House of Commons.  
The outcome of discussions between Theresa May and the DUP was not a 
coalition government but a so-called confidence and supply agreement.  In 
essence this sort of understanding means that the smaller party would agree 
to support the larger party in key parliamentary votes such as a finance bill 
or a confidence vote but at the same time not be tied into supporting it on a 
range of other issues.  Eventually on 26 June 2017 the two parties agreed on 
this arrangement and published two papers outlining the nature of the deal 
that had been agreed to (Gov.UK, Agreement, 26 June 2017).
In summary these documents set out the basis by which this particular 
confidence and supply agreement would work.  Whilst it was agreed that this 
deal would last for the five-year term of the government, provision was also 
made for it to be reviewed annually at the end of each parliamentary year.  
In addition a coordinating committee would be established with members 
from both parties to oversee how the agreement operated in practice.  
Elsewhere the language used stressed the common ground shared between 
the two parties in terms of them both being pro-Union as well as pro-Brexit 
and their commitment to guaranteeing the future prosperity and security of 
the UK as a whole.  From the DUP’s perspective they undertook to support 
the Conservative government on any parliamentary vote relating to the 
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Queens’s speech, motions of confidence, Brexit, the Budget and any other 
important finance bills.  But it was also made clear that the party was not 
guaranteed to support the government on every other matter.  In return for 
these commitments the DUP was able to secure an extra £1 billion spending 
for NI over the years 2018 and 2019.  Allied to this the DUP were able to 
gain guarantees from the government on a number of policy issues such as a 
commitment that state pensions would rise by at least 2.5 per cent per year, 
agriculture spending in NI would be maintained at the same level during the 
lifetime of the current parliament, and that there would be no further cuts to 
UK defence spending (BBC NI News, 26 June 2017).
For the DUP this arrangement has given it a profile across the rest of the UK 
it had never experienced before.  This can be seen on a number of levels.  In 
November 2017 Nigel Dodds MP, the party’s deputy leader, was presented 
with an award from The Spectator magazine as Negotiator of the Year.  This 
recognised his role in putting in place the arrangement that allowed the DUP 
to support Theresa May’s government in return for the £1billion financial 
package for NI (Belfast Telegraph, 2 November 2017).  The first tranche of 
that money was finally delivered in March 2018 when Karen Bradley, in the 
absence of an Executive, announced the budget allocation for NI for 2018-
19.  This amounted to some £410 million with this sum being divided into:
£200 million extra for capital spending on key infrastructure projects 
£100 million for the long-term transformation of the health service 
£80 million to help relieve health and education pressures 
£30 million to support programmes addressing issues of mental 
health and severe deprivation 
NIO, Written Ministerial Statement: Northern Ireland Finances,   
8 March 2018.
There is also the political influence that the arrangement has provided 
the DUP with at Westminster.  This has been most noticeable around the 
Brexit issue.  In December 2017, during talks between the EC and the British 
government about moving to the next stage of Brexit, negotiations broke 
down.  One of the key problems identified was the fact that the DUP were 
unwilling to accept apparent concessions made by Theresa May in relation to 
the Irish border issue (The Irish Times, 4 December 2017).  Then in June 2018 
Theresa May’s government narrowly survived a number of key parliamentary 
votes relating to Brexit legislation which would not have been possible 
without the support of the DUP (BBC News, 17 July 2018).
For others across the UK the prospect of the DUP holding such a position 
of power at Westminster was not something to be welcomed.  In the days 
following the election result there were reports of the DUP website crashing 
as people across the UK rushed to find out more about the party (Daily 
Telegraph, 13 June 2017).  This was an outlook that some found troublesome 
and in particular the DUP’s social conservatism was then used as a means to 
attack the path Theresa May had chosen to take.
As for the situation in NI, the deal between the Conservatives and the DUP 
did little to improve the atmosphere with some warning that finding a way 
out of the political impasse would be more difficult as the new arrangement 
cast doubt on the ability of the British government to be seen as a neutral 
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mediator (The Guardian, 26 June 2017).  The unease that the agreement 
would have a negative impact on the political scene in NI gathered during 
the summer of 2018 and focused on the issues of abortion and same-sex 
marriage.  In both these areas it was being argued that the lack of change 
was being further hindered by the lack of a functioning assembly and that 
the Westminster government should step in and legislate for reform.  In May 
a Labour MP, Connor McGinn, moved to introduce a private members bill in 
the House of Commons to bring NI in line with the rest of the UK and the 
Republic Of Ireland, by allowing for same-sex marriage.  However from an 
early stage it was clear that the measure was doomed without the support of 
the government.  With regards to abortion, pressure for reform of NI law was 
given additional impetus by a ruling of the Supreme Court in June 2018 on 
whether NI’s abortion laws were incompatible with human rights legislation.  
A majority of the Supreme Court judges expressed a view that the current 
situation in NI is incompatible with the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR).  While they did not go so far as to make a formal declaration 
of incompatibility, a move that would probably have forced a law change, 
this was essentially a legal technicality in that a majority of judges ruled that 
the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission did not have the authority 
to take the case (The Supreme Court, Judgment, 7 June 2018).  Following the 
ruling Labour MP Stella Creasy requested an Emergency Debate on abortion 
in NI which took place on 7 June 2018.  During the debate she stated that:
The Secretary of State has the power to direct Northern Irish 
Departments to take such action that is required under international 
obligations.  Human rights are an international obligation. 
House of Commons Hansard, 7 June 2018, Vol.642, Column 454.
However, on both same sex marriage and abortion reform it became clear 
that the UK government was reluctant to move, seemingly on the grounds 
that both were devolved matters for the NI Assembly.  This was illustrated 
by a leaked briefing document prepared for Karen Bradley which provided 
her with a set of answers to possible questions ahead of an event at which 
the media was to be present in June 2018.  On abortion the advice given – 
which also could have been easily applied to same sex-marriage – was that 
she should state:
The Government believes this is a matter for the people of Northern 
Ireland and Northern Ireland politicians. 
Abortion is an extremely sensitive issue, and we recognise the strongly 
held views on all sides of the debate in Northern Ireland. 
The Government thinks it is absolutely essential that a devolved 
government in Northern Ireland is restored, so that democratically 
elected, democratically accountable politicians can debate fundamental 
changes to policy on abortion, and the people of Northern Ireland have a 
direct say in the process. 
Our key priority is to redouble our efforts to restore power-sharing, so 
that the people of Northern Ireland can decide what is right for Northern 
Ireland, rather than Westminster speaking on their behalf. 
The Irish Times, 17 June 2018.
All of this may just be the political reality of the time but it also raises 
the valid question of what the response would be if Theresa May and her 
government were not reliant upon the DUP.
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DIMENSION TWO 
The sense of safety
1. OVERALL CRIME RATES
1.1  The state of the rule of law
The Northern Ireland Crime Survey (NICS) has recorded public experiences of 
crime since 2005 and allows comparison with the Crime Survey for England 
and Wales (CSEW).  These surveys provide a benchmark of the rule of law.  
Crime statistics from the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) are also 
important indicators, although these will be affected by differential reporting 
for a number of reasons including the need to report for insurance purposes, 
or feeling that something is too trivial to report.
The 2016-17 NICS again confirms the downward trend of conflict-related 
crimes reported in previous Peace Monitoring Reports.  The figures are the 
lowest recorded since 1998 (see Figure 33).  However, violent crime and 
personal crime have risen slightly over the past two years.
In the survey, 8.7 per cent of respondents in Northern Ireland (NI) said they 
had been victims of crime during the preceding year.  This is considerably 
lower than the 13.9 per cent reported in the Crime Survey for England and 
Wales (CWES) or the 13.4 per cent recorded in the Scottish Crime and 
Justice Survey (SCJS).  
Violent crime shows the steepest social gradient (Williamson and Pickett, 
2009) and whereas only 1.7 per cent of adults in NI experienced a violent 
Source:  Northern Ireland Crime Survey (NICS) 2018
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Figure 1:  Households or adults who were victims of crime once or more in Northern 
Ireland, by year 1998 to 2016-17 
 
Source:  Northern Ireland Crime Survey (NICS) 2018 
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respondents whose annual household income was less than £10,000, 4.2 per cent of 
single parents and 3.9 per cent for residents in Derry and Strabane.   
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Figure 33:   Households or adults who were victims of crime once or more in Northern Ireland, by year 1998 to 2016-17
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crime in the survey period (compared to 4.4 per cent in 1998), this was true 
for 4.9 per cent of people aged 16-29 years, 2.3 per cent for respondents 
whose annual household income was less than £10,000, 4.2 per cent of 
single parents and 3.9 per cent for residents in Derry and Strabane. 
The impact of violent crime on children and young people was noted by 
McAlister et al (2013, p.1) in their qualitative research:
In “post-conflict” Northern Ireland, children and youth 
disproportionately experience paramilitary style attacks and 
routine sectarian violence.  The violence of poverty and restricted 
opportunities within communities debilitated by three decades of 
conflict is masked by a discourse of social, economic and political 
progress.  …  It [this paper] discusses the prominence of violence 
– sectarian, racist, political, “everyday,” domestic, “informal” – in 
young people’s accounts and the impacts on their safety, sense of 
belonging, identity formation, use of space and emotional well-
being. 
International research also shows high rates of violence against young people 
as Barron (2018) in her blog notes 
We know that violence remains a harsh and pervasive reality in 
children’s lives. In 2017, the Ending Violence in Childhood: Global 
Report by the Know Violence Initiative highlighted that, in the 
previous 12 months, at least three in four children had experienced 
violence.
All too often, this has devastating consequences – with estimates 
that, globally, a child dies every five minutes as a direct result of 
violence.
The 2016-17 NCIS and CSEW show that crime incident rates per 10,000 are 
lower in NI than in England and Wales.  This is true across all categories of 
crime (see Figure 34). 
 
 
Crime Category Northern Ireland England/Wales
Vandalism 341 478
Vehicle vandalism 170 326
Vehicle-related theft 176 322
All personal crime 403 514
All household crime 911 1,423
 
 
If reporting crime to the police is an indicator of a feeling of safety then NI 
feels safer than England and Wales. The proportion of comparable crimes 
reported to the police in NI in 2016-17 is 45 per cent compared to 41 per 
cent in England and Wales.  Too trivial/ no loss/ police would not/ could not 
have done anything was the most common reason for not reporting a crime 
to the police in 2016-17 in NI.
Figure 34:   Comparing Northern Ireland with England /Wales for crime incident rates  
per 10,000 households/ adults by crime type 
Source:  Northern Ireland Crime Survey 2016-17 and 
Crime Survey of England and Wales 2016-17
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The NICS survey findings mirror the PSNI statistics, where recorded crime 
has shown an overall downwards trend over the last fifteen years. It reached 
a peak of 138,132 in 2002-03 and has since fallen to 98,014 in 2016-17, 
the lowest level recorded since 1998-99 (the first year for which crime data 
comparable under the revised Home Office Counting Rules is available). The 
level of crime recorded in 2017-18 (98,301 offences) shows a slight increase 
of 0.3 per cent on the previous year. This represents 53 crimes per 1,000 
population in 2017-18, compared with 81 crimes per 1,000 population when 
crime was at its highest level in 2002-03. 
1.2  Changing patterns of crime
The fall in crime is largely explained by the reduction in car theft.  This is 
partly due to better vehicle security systems (see Figure 35).
Crime in NI is lower than in England and Wales across most crime categories, 
with the exception of ‘wounding’, ‘assault with minor injury’, ‘stealth theft 
from the person’ and ‘other vandalism’ (see Figure 36).  The differences 
between the regions for these categories are small.  Common assault, with or 
without injury, is lower than in England and Wales.
Source: Northern Ireland Crime Survey (NICS)
Figure 35:  Change in NICS victimisation (prevalence) rates for offences between 1998 and 2016-17
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1.2  Changing patterns of crime 
The fall in crime is largely explained by the reduction in car theft.  This is partly due to 
better vehicle security systems (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3:  Change in NICS victimisation (prevalence) rates for offences between 1998 and 
2016-17 
 
Source: Northern Ireland Crime Survey (NICS) 
 
Crime in NI is lower than in England and Wales across most crime categories, with the 
exception of ‘wounding’, ‘assault with minor injury’, ‘stealth theft from the person’ and 
‘other vandalism’ (see Figure 4).  The differences between the regions for these categories 
are small.  Common assault, with or without injury, is lower than in England and Wales. 
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The OECD Better Life Index 2017 takes homicide rates as one of the 
indicators of personal security / safety (OECD).  That is, deaths due to assault 
measured by age-standardised rate per 100,000 population.  This shows that 
rates in the UK are joint lowest with Japan at 0.2 (see Figure 37).  The highest 
rate for OECD countries is recorded in the United States at 5.5.  The highest 
rate for Non-OECD countries is Brazil at 26.7.
Source: Northern Ireland Crime Survey 2016-17 and Crime Survey of England and Wales 2016-17
Figure 36:  Households or adults who were victims of crime once or more in Northern Ireland  
and in England and Wales, by crime type (%)
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Source: Northern Ireland Crime Survey 2016-17 and Crime Survey of England and Wales 
2016-17 
 
The OECD Better Life Index 2017 takes homicide rates as one of the indicators of 
personal security / safety (OECD).  That is, deaths due to assault measured by age-
standardised rate per 100,000 population.  This shows that rates in the United Kingdom 
are joint lowest with Japan at 0.2 (see Figure 5).  The highest rate for OECD countries is 
recorded in the United States at 5.5.  The highest rate for Non-OECD countries is Brazil at 
26.7. 
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Looking back to the pre-Agreement period of the ‘Troubles’, the number of 
politically motivated murders and injury was a feature of everyday news.  
Total homicide figures for NI have declined from 75 in 1998-99 to 17 in 
2016-17 (see Figure 38).
Source: OECD 2015
Figure 37:  Number of deaths from assault per 100,000 population (standardised rates) OECD 2015
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Source:  OECD.stat  (Data retrieved 17 Jul 2018) 
 
Looking back to the pre-Agreement period of the ‘Troubles’, the number of politically 
motivated murders and injury was a feature of everyday news.  Total homicide figures for 
NI have declined from 75 in 1998-99 to 17 in 2016-17 (see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6:  Homicides in Northern Ireland, 1998-99 to 2016-17 
Year Murder Manslaughter Infanticide Corporate 
Manslaughter1 
Homicide 
1998/992 71 4 0 - 75 
1999/00 29 5 0 - 34 
2000/01 45 4 0 - 49 
2001/02 49 3 0 - 52 
2002/03 42 3 0 - 45 
2003/04 26 6 1 - 33 
2004/05 34 6 1 - 41 
2005/06 25 3 1 - 29 
2006/07 23 1 0 - 24 
2007/08 25 5 0 - 30 
2008/09 24 2 0 0 26 
2009/10 18 4 0 0 22 
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Figure 38:  Number of homicides in Northern Ireland, 1998-99 to 2016-17
 
The most recent comparable data for Europe comes from Eurostat 2015.  
Almost 5,000 victims of intentional homicide were recorded by the police in 
the European Union (EU) in 2015.  Among the EU Member States for which the 
data are available, police in France recorded the highest number of intentional 
homicide victims in 2015 in absolute terms (1017 people or 21 per cent of 
all intentional homicide victims recorded in the EU), followed at a distance by 
Germany (682 or 14 per cent), Poland (530 or 11 per cent) and Italy (469 or 10 
per cent).  However, relative to population size, these countries do not have the 
highest numbers in the EU.  Relative to its population, Lithuania recorded the 
highest figure, with 5.89 intentional homicide victims per 100 000 inhabitants, 
ahead of Latvia (3.37), Estonia (3.19), Bulgaria (1.79) and Cyprus (1.77) (see 
Figure 39).  The lowest number of intentional homicide victims, relative to 
population, was recorded in Austria (0.51 intentional homicide victims per 100 
000 inhabitants), the Netherlands (0.62), Spain (0.65), the Czech Republic (0.75) 
and Italy (0.77).
Year Murder Manslaughter Infanticide Corporate Manslaughter1 Homicide
1998/992 71 4 0 - 75
1999/00 29 5 0 - 34
2000/01 45 4 0 - 49
2001/02 49 3 0 - 52
2002/03 42 3 0 - 45
2003/04 26 6 1 - 33
2004/05 34 6 1 - 41
2005/06 25 3 1 - 29
2006/07 23 1 0 - 24
2007/08 25 5 0 - 30
2008/09 24 2 0 0 26
2009/10 18 4 0 0 22
2010/11 20 8 0 0 28
2011/12 16 6 0 2 24
2012/13 17 3 0 0 20
2013/14 17 3 0 1 21
2014/15 17 4 0 4 25
2015/16 21 0 0 0 21
2016/17 12 5 0 0 17
 
1  
Corporate manslaughter – Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (came into force 
6 April 2008)
2  
The number of murders in 1998-99 includes the 29 persons killed in the Omagh bomb which occurred 
on 15 August 1998.
Source:  PSNI
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Figure 39:  Intentional homicides in European states per 100,000, 2015
Of note, the PSNI statistics show there were 28 victims resulting from 
paramilitary style shootings in 2016-17, double the number recorded in 
the previous year.  There was also an increase in the number of casualties of 
paramilitary style assaults, from 58 last year to 66 over the same period this year 
(PSNI, Press release, 17 May 2017).  This will be discussed further in the section 
on paramilitaries.
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2.  HATE CRIME 
On a sunny Sunday afternoon on 1st July 2018, a car with two males, a woman and a two-
month-old baby were stopped at traffic lights at Bridge Street in Portadown.  Without 
warning a gang of eight men carried out a vicious attack on the car, breaking the 
windscreen and assaulting the two male occupants.  The male passenger was dragged 
from the car and received serious injuries.  The BBC News website reported the incident 
on 2nd July but gave no clue as to the motivation for the attack (BBC NI News, 2 July 
2018).  A PSNI Twitter statement (also on 2nd July) appealed for information from the 
general public but again made no mention of possible motivation (PSNI, Tweet, 2 July 
2018). 
It was not until The Irish News published a news item about this attack that a potential 
explanation was forthcoming (The Irish News, 4 July 2018:2).  According to the paper, 
loyalists in the Edenderry area of Portadown had been collecting bonfire material.  A week 
before the attack, someone had prematurely set the bonfire material alight (it is possible 
that the PSNI have recorded this incident as a sectarian hate crime).  Following the arson 
incident, threats against nationalist residents in Portadown were posted on social media by 
a number of loyalists.  It appears that the attack on the car was carried out in retaliation for 
the bonfire incident.  The passenger in the car was identified as a Catholic because of the 
football jersey he was wearing. 
Beginning on Saturday 7 July 2018, there were six nights of rioting and disturbances by 
young people in the Bogside area of Derry and the apparent involvement of some 
Dissident Republican paramilitaries on at least one of the nights when shots were fired at 
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On a sunny Sunday afternoon on 1st July 2018, a car with two males, a 
woman and a two-month-old baby were stopped at traffic lights at Bridge 
Street in Portadown.  Without warning a gang of eight men carried out a 
vicious attack on the car, breaking the windscreen and assaulting the two 
male occupants.  The male passenger was dragged from the car and received 
serious injuries.  The BBC News website reported the incident on 2nd July but 
gave no clue as to the motivation for the attack (BBC NI News, 2 July 2018).  
A PSNI Twitter statement (also on 2nd July) appealed for information from 
the general public but again made no mention of possible motivation (PSNI, 
Tweet, 2 July 2018).
It was not until The Irish News published a news item about this attack that 
a potential explanation was forthcoming (The Irish News, 4 July 2018:2).  
According to the paper, loyalists in the Edenderry area of Portadown had 
been collecting bonfire material.  A week before the attack, someone had 
prematurely set the bonfire material alight (it is possible that the PSNI 
have recorded this incident as a sectarian hate crime).  Following the arson 
incident, threats against nationalist residents in Portadown were posted 
on social media by a number of loyalists.  It appears that the attack on the 
car was carried out in retaliation for the bonfire incident.  The passenger in 
the car was identified as a Catholic because of the football jersey he was 
wearing.
Beginning on Saturday 7th July 2018, there were six nights of rioting and 
disturbances by young people in the Bogside area of Derry and the apparent 
involvement of some Dissident Republican paramilitaries on at least one of 
the nights when shots were fired at police (BBC NI News, 8 July 2018).  The 
disturbances began when a group of nationalist youths left Lecky Road in the 
Bogside and went to the peace line dividing The Fountain estate and Bishop 
Street Without and threw three petrol bombs over the metal security fence, 
one of which exploded.  Once the police armoured vehicles arrived on the 
scene, they became the focus of the rioting.  Bottles and stones were thrown 
into The Fountain on the following evening and a nearby building providing 
sheltered accommodation for elderly people was on the front line as petrol 
bombs were thrown at police positioned between the building and the City 
Walls (BBC NI News, 10 July 2018).
The attack on The Fountain estate, a Protestant area on the west bank of 
the Foyle River, by Catholic / Nationalist youths was clearly a sectarian hate 
crime.  The news of the attack led to a rally on Monday 9th July 2018 when 
100 people walked along the same route taken by the rioters to demonstrate 
their condemnation of the attacks and their support for the residents of The 
Fountain.  There was a further rally on Friday 13th July when hundreds of 
people, including senior political representatives from Sinn Féin and the SDLP, 
gathered at the top of Fahan Street which was the location of most of the 
rioting directed against the police.
The above descriptions represent only a few examples of the stories behind 
the statistics on hate crimes experienced in NI.  The following sections 
provide the statistical analysis of the most recent figures together with some 
of the longer trends.
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2.1  Hate crime trends
The PSNI monitors six strands of hate-motivated incidents and crime:  
Race, Homophobia (sexual orientation), Sectarianism, Faith / religion (non-
sectarian), Disability and Transphobia (PSNI, Hate Motivation Definitions, 
2018).  The Hate Motivation Definitions used by the PSNI goes on to state:  
‘A racial group can be defined as a group of persons defined by reference 
to race, colour, nationality or ethnic or national origins (this includes UK 
National origins i.e. Scottish, English, Welsh and Irish) and references to a 
person’s racial group refer to any racial group into which he/she falls’ (ibid., 
2018).  Presumably this definition of race, which contains national origins, 
therefore includes people from the Republic of Ireland.
Even though NI has experienced sectarian hate crime for decades this was 
not formally recorded until 2005, while recording racist crimes began in 1996 
and homophobic crime in 2000 (Jarman, 2012).  In NI the PSNI statistics 
do not record the perceived religion of the victims of sectarian hate crime, 
despite the fact that their perceived religion was the main motivation for the 
crime.
The PSNI figures show that, in the period from 2005-06 to 2016-17, 
sectarian crime accounted for the largest number of crimes recorded in any 
of the hate motivation strands. Racist hate crimes are next most common 
(see Figure 40).  However after rising figures between 2012-13 and 2014-
15 the current trend in both categories is downwards.  There is only a small 
difference between the number of sectarian and racist crimes recorded in 
2016-17.  In an article in 2017 Henry McDonald reported that between July 
2016 and June 2017 racially motivated incidents now exceed sectarian ones 
(1,062 compared to 938) (The Guardian, 12 November 2017).
Figure 40:  Number of crimes with a hate motivation, 2004-05 to 2016-17
Source:  PSNI
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The overall PSNI figures for 2016-17 indicate that the victims of hate crimes are primarily 
white (52 per cent; see Figure 9).  Of the 321 racist crimes against white people in 2016-
17, 31 per cent were against people from UK / Ireland, 25 per cent against people from 
Poland and 10 per cent against those from Lithuania.  There is a difference in who is a 
victim of racist hate crimes between 2007-08 and a decade later with the percentage of 
those who are white dropping from 65 per cent to 52 per cent, those who are Asian 
dropping from 19 per cent to 12 per cent, and a rise in crimes against those who are black 
from 6 per cent to 17 per cent.  The largest identifiable group of black people being 
attacked are Nigerians, followed by Somalians. 
 
Figure 9:  Ethnicity of victims of racist crimes, 2007-08 and 2016-17 
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The overall PSNI figures for 2016-17 indicate that the victims of hate crimes 
are primarily white (52 per cent; see Figure 41).  Of the 321 racist crimes 
against white people in 2016-17, 31 per cent were against people from UK 
/ Ireland, 25 per cent against people from Poland and 10 per cent against 
those from Lithuania.  There is a difference in who is a victim of racist hate 
crimes between 2007-08 and a decade later with the percentage of those 
who are white dropping from 65 per cent to 52 per cent, those who are Asian 
dropping from 19 per cent to 12 per cent, and a rise in crimes against those 
who are black from 6 per cent to 17 per cent.  The largest identifiable group 
of black people being attacked are Nigerians, followed by Somalians. 
The PSNI categorise the type of hate crime into:  violence against the person; 
criminal damage, theft, and all other offences.  For the sectarian, racist, and 
homophobic strands of hate crime, violence against the person is the most 
common type of crime (see Figure 42).  However, violence against the person 
is significantly higher in homophobic hate crime.
 
Source:  PSNI, Hate Motivation Statistics
Source:  PSNI
Figure 42: The distribution of homophobic, racist and sectarian hate crimes (percentage), 2016-17
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hate crime, violence against the p rs n is the most common type of crime (see Figure 10).  
However, violence against the person is significantly hi her in homophobic hate crime. 
 
Figure 10:  The distribution of homophobic, racist and sectarian hate crimes 2016-17 
 
Source:  PSNI 
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the first report to attempt to count sectarian crime on symbolic premises, Jarman noted 
‘There have been an average of five attacks a month on churches, chapels, Orange Halls, 
GAA and AOH clubs every year since 1994’ (Jarman, 2005:3).  The annual figures from 
2007-08, show a peak average number of attacks per month in 2009-10 at 11.  The 
number of such attacks had been diminishing since then to an average of 1 attack per 
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Figure 11:  Attacks on symbolic premises, 2007-08 to 2017-18 
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2011
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2012
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2015
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2016
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2017
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Church or chapel 19 37 24 23 12 14 17 11 5 7 4 
GAA or Ancient 
Order of 
Hibernians hall 
6 10 15 8 6 * * 5 * * * 
Orange or 
Apprentice Boys 
hall 
63 61 72 58 34 27 40 17 17 31 11 
School 6 13 15 * 4 * * 5 *  * 
TOTAL 94 121 126 89 56 41 38 38 22 38 15 
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Figure 41: Ethnicity of victims of racist crimes (percentage), 2007-08 and 2016-17
%
The sense of safety
99
Attacks on religious or cultural premises have been significant due to their 
symbolism.  In the first report to attempt to count sectarian crime on 
symbolic premises, Jarman noted ‘There have been an average of five attacks 
a month on churches, chapels, Orange Halls, GAA and AOH clubs every year 
since 1994’ (Jarman, 2005:3).  The annual figures from 2007-08, show a peak 
average number of attacks per month in 2009-10 at 11.  The number of 
such attacks have been diminishing since then to an average of 1 attack per 
month in 2017-18 (see Figure 43).
Figure 43:   Number of attacks on symbolic premises, 2007-08 to 2017-18
 
 
2.2  Hate crime and intolerance
The 2016 Peace Monitoring Report expressed concern at the increases in all 
hate crime categories between 2011-12 and 2015-16 (see Figure 44) and 
referred to the flags controversy that commenced in December 2012 as a 
possible contributing factor.  The figures for 2016-17 show a major drop in 
most of the hate motivated crime categories.  The exception is faith / religion 
motivated hate crime.  The numbers here are low but there is an increasing 
trend.  The drop in the other categories is worthy of note.
Figure 44:   Number of crimes with a hate motivation, 2004/05 to 2016/17
 
Type of symbolic premises
20
07
-0
8
20
08
-0
9
20
09
-1
0
20
10
-1
1
20
11
-1
2
20
12
-1
3
20
13
-1
4
20
14
-1
5
20
15
-1
6
20
16
-1
7
20
17
-1
8
Church or chapel 19 37 24 23 12 14 17 11 5 7 4
GAA or Ancient Order of 
Hibernians hall 6 10 15 8 6 * * 5 * * *
Orange or Apprentice Boys hall 63 61 72 58 34 27 40 17 17 31 11
School 6 13 15 * 4 * * 5 * *
TOTAL 94 121 126 89 56 41 38 38 22 38 15
Average per month (8) (10) (11) (7) (5) (3) (3) (3) (2) (3) (1)
20
04
/0
5
20
05
/0
6
20
06
/0
7
20
07
/0
8
20
08
/0
9
20
09
/1
0
20
10
/1
1
20
11
/1
2
20
12
/1
3
20
13
/1
4
20
14
/1
5
20
15
/1
6
20
16
/1
7
Racist crimes 633 746 861 757 771 711 531 458 470 691 920 853 660
Homophobic crimes 151 148 117 114 134 112 137 120 149 179 209 210 162
Sectarian crimes - 1,469 1,217 1,056 1,017 1,264 995 885 888 961 1,043 1,001 694
Faith/Religion crimes - 78 120 62 35 15 17 6 14 13 27 19 26
Disability crimes - 38 26 42 28 40 29 15 35 66 74 74 60
Transphobic crimes - - 14 4 2 4 8 3 6 8 8 12 12
Source:  PSNI, Hate Motivation Statistics
Source: PSNI, Trends in Hate Motivated Incidents and Crimes, 12 January 2018:6.
Dimension Two
100
Evidence from the 2017 NI Life and Times (NILT) survey is not so positive.  
On viewing the results of the 2017 survey, the Northern Ireland Programme 
Director for Amnesty International argued that the levels of racism ‘should 
shock us to our core’ (Amnesty International UK, 13 June 2018).  The 2017 
survey findings show that more than half of those surveyed would not 
willingly accept a Muslim (52 per cent) or an Irish Traveller (56 per cent) as 
a relative by way of marriage to a close member of their family.  Forty seven 
per cent of people surveyed think there is more racial prejudice in NI now 
than there was five years ago, with only 13 per cent believing that racial 
prejudice has decreased over the period.
The 2011 Census figures indicate that 88.84 per cent of the NI population 
(1,810,863) was born in NI.  4.56 per cent was born in England, Scotland and 
Wales; 2.09 per cent was born in the Republic of Ireland; 2.51 per cent was 
born in EU member countries; and 1.99 per cent was born elsewhere in the 
world (Wikipedia).  One manifestation of intolerance towards new arrivals in 
the region has been the campaign in particular areas against the allocation of 
houses to ethnic minorities.  Graffiti calling on agencies and private landlords 
to let housing to ‘locals only’ or ‘locals first’ has appeared on houses and walls 
for a number of years (e.g., Alamy, 29 July 2014; BBC NI News, 29 August 
2017; Belfast Telegraph, 5 May 2018).  Houses that have been occupied 
by families from ethnic minorities are also subject to attack and often the 
family is forced to leave (BBC NI News, 3 November 2017; Nolan, The Detail, 
17 May 2018).  This racial intimidation is included in the overall figures for 
housing intimidation in NI which saw the Housing Executive accept 2,060 
reports of families being intimidated from their homes in a five-year period 
to 2016-17 (Campbell, The Detail, 6 November 2017).
In the statistical spreadsheet that the PSNI publishes to accompany the 
annual bulletin on hate-motivated incidents and crimes, there are separate 
breakdowns by ethnicity and nationality of the victim (PSNI, Hate Motivation 
Statistics, 30 August 2018).  In the ethnicity table, of the 622 racist crimes 
with a person victim in 2016/17, Asians accounted for 73, Black 107, Mixed/
Other was 58, White was 321, and there were 63 where the ethnicity was 
missing (ibid.).  The same 622 racist crimes were also broken down by 
nationality, with 23 individual countries listed, as well as the category UK 
and Ireland, and a final category for all other nationalities.  Of the countries 
listed, for example, 89 crimes were committed against people from Poland 
and 36 against people from Lithuania.  The largest category was that of UK 
and Ireland which accounted for 145 crimes in 2016-17 (ibid.).  However, 
there is no disaggregation of this figure available, so it is not possible to say 
how many people from Britain were the subject of a hate crime because they 
were British, and how many people from the Republic of Ireland were the 
subject of a hate crime because they were Irish.
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3.  DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND  
 SEXUAL CRIME
3.1  Domestic violence
The fourth Peace Monitoring Report included significant detail (Wilson, 
2016:34-35) on domestic abuse and noted the high levels being recorded by 
the police.  This is despite evidence from the Northern Ireland Crime Survey 
(NICS) that the police were, ‘only made aware of just over a third of all worst 
cases of domestic partner abuse (36.6% in NICS 2015/16)’ (Campbell & 
Rice, 2017:12).  The PSNI uses the definition of domestic abuse that relates 
to ‘ threatening, controlling, coercive behaviour, violence or abuse inflicted 
on anyone by a current or former intimate partner or family member’ (PSNI, 
Domestic Abuse Statistics, 30 August 2018).  Both incidents and crimes are 
recorded with the distinction being that some domestic abuse incidents ‘may 
not be of the level of severity that would result in a crime being recorded’ 
(ibid.).  The latest figures show a total of 29,166 incidents recorded in 2016-
17, the highest level recorded since the series commences and an increase of 
2.7 per cent (774 incidents) from the previous year (see Figure 45).  However 
there was a slight decrease in the number of crimes with a domestic abuse 
motivation 13,933 compared to 14,073 but was still the second highest level 
seen since 2004-05.
Figure 45:  Trends in domestic abuse incidents and crimes, 2004-05 to 2016-17
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Note:  Crimes are included in the incident count and the two should not be added together
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This continued increase in incidents and high number of crimes with a 
domestic abuse motivation still remains below that found in England 
and Wales where the comparable rates for all crime classifications with a 
domestic abuse motivation are six in 1000 in NI and eight in 1000 in England 
and Wales.
Doyle and McWilliams’ (2018) report on intimate partner violence (IPV) in 
conflict and post-conflict societies looks at insights and lessons from NI.  It 
is based on qualitative interviews with more than 100 women conducted in 
1992 and followed up in 2016.  They note:
The demobilisation of paramilitary groups (non-state armed 
groups) has had positive outcomes for victims of IPV in Northern 
Ireland.  The 2016 study found that perpetrators of IPV were no 
longer able to draw readily on paramilitary connections (real or 
fictitious) to control their intimate partners as they were in 1992. 
(Doyle and McWilliams, 2018:5)
The report found a significant increase in access to policing for participants 
between the 1992 and 2016 studies. It also noted that the use of firearms in 
IPV incidents was a main finding of the 1992 study but only two participants 
reported their use in 2016.  Finally in one of their recommendations they 
state:
The findings show that the decommissioning of illegally held 
firearms and regulation of legally held ones, alongside the process 
of demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR), have 
significant implications for women experiencing IPV.  These 
should be considered in political settlement negotiations and 
resource allocations because, to date, these processes have 
predominantly focused on other issues.  The findings show how a 
more representative, transparent, accountable police service has a 
positive impact on responses to IPV, which also has relevance for 
police reform in other societies emerging from conflict. (Doyle and 
McWilliams, 2018:8)
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3.2  Sexual crime
The number of rape offences has shown an increasing trend since 2000-01, 
with the level recorded in 2016-17 three and a half times that recorded in 
2000-01 (see Figure 46).  Victim Support NI note, ‘These figures only tell 
part of the story, as research has shown up to 60 per cent of crimes go 
unreported’ (Belfast Live, 30 March 2018).
 
 
A recent journalistic report by Kathryn Torney records a further increase in 
reported rape:  ‘almost 1,000 rapes were reported to the PSNI in the past 12 
months – an increase of 18 per cent on the previous year’ (The Detail, 4 April 
2018).  An article by Shauna Corr, based on Freedom of Information requests, 
noted that of 820 allegations of rape reported to the police in 2016-17, only 
15 people were convicted of the crime by the courts (Belfast Live, 30 March 
2018).  This is a fall in conviction rates from a high of 70 recorded in 2008-09 
when 404 rapes were reported.
In the previous Peace Monitoring Report (Wilson, 2016) it was noted that 
some of the increase in reporting is likely to be an effect of heightened 
awareness of rape following the exposure of the former BBC TV celebrity 
Jimmy Saville as having engaged in repeated sexual assault on girls.  In the 
past year there has been a very public rape trial in NI which may have had an 
impact on the figures reported by Torney (2018).  Two Ulster rugby players 
were accused of rape of a 19-year old, a charge they both denied.  The case 
was the subject of intense media coverage and social media commentary.  
After nine weeks of trial, the accused were found not guilty.  The jury of eight 
men and three women deliberated for three hours and 45 minutes before 
delivering their unanimous verdicts.  Before discharging the 11-person jury, 
Judge Patricia Smyth told them:  ‘This has probably been the most difficult 
trial that any jury in NI has ever been asked to adjudicate on’ (BBC NI News, 
Source:  PSNI
Figure 46:  Incidence of reported rape and attempted rape in Northern Ireland by year
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Torney (2018) not s that the PSNI confirmed that while the trial was running there was an 
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to the same period in 2017. 
Much of the public debate during the trial focussed on legal procedures rather than the 
rising numbers of reported rape.  These rising trends are also evident in other countries, 
as Eurostat figures confirm.  Relative to the population of each Member State, Sweden 
recorded the highest number, with 178 violent sexual crimes per 100 000 inhabitants, 
ahead of Scotland (163), NI (156), England & Wales (113) and Belgium (91).  For rapes, 
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28 March 2018).  Torney (2018) notes that the PSNI confirmed that while 
the trial was running there was an additional 20 referrals of rape and sexual 
assault in January and February 2018 compared to the same period in 2017.
Much of the public debate during the trial focussed on legal procedures 
rather than the rising numbers of reported rape.  These rising trends are 
also evident in other countries, as Eurostat figures confirm.  Relative to the 
population of each Member State, Sweden recorded the highest number, 
with 178 violent sexual crimes per 100 000 inhabitants, ahead of Scotland 
(163), NI (156), England & Wales (113) and Belgium (91).  For rapes, the 
highest rates were recorded in England & Wales (62 rapes per 100 000 
inhabitants) and in Sweden (57) (Eurostat, 23 November 2017).  The official 
figures do not necessarily reflect the actual number of violent sexual crimes.  
Rather they show the extent to which such crimes are reported to, and 
recorded by, the police.  Therefore the variation between countries is also 
influenced by general awareness and attitudes to sexual violence offences.
 
4.  OUTCOMES OF CRIMES     
 RECORDED BY POLICE
Detection rates continue to be low for all types of crime.  The PSNI record 
‘outcome’ rates for crimes and in 2016-17 there were 98,076 offences 
recorded and 27,751 offences detected giving an outcome rate of 28.3 per 
cent, a fall of 0.4 percentage points when compared with 2015-16 (see 
Figure 47).  However, at 28.3 per cent, the outcome rate is the fourth highest 
since 2007-08.
Figure 47:  Outcome rates for all crimes, 2007-08 to 2016-17
Source:  PSNI, Police Recorded Crime Statistics
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Figure 16:  Outcome rates for sectarian crimes compared with all crimes, 2016-17 
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The outcome rates for sectarian crime are particularly low when compared to 
all crimes and are low compared to all other types of hate motivated crime 
apart from faith/ religion crimes (see Figure 48).  A Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism report found an average outcome rate for hate crimes for police 
forces in England and Wales in 2015-16 of 27 per cent (Report, 2016).
Looking at outcome rates for all hate crime (see Figure 49) reveals that they 
are considerably lower for hate crimes with a sectarian motivation or a faith/
religion motivation.  In the fourth Peace Monitoring Report, (Wilson 2016) 
notes that this is a matter of serious concern, and begs the question as to 
why these rates are so much lower, and are these being pursued by the PSNI?
Source:  PSNI
Source:  PSNI
Figure 48:  Outcome rates for sectarian crimes compared with all crimes, 2016-17
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5.  THE PARAMILITARIES
5.1  Overview
The terrorist threat level to PSNI remains at “severe”. 
PSNI, Annual Report and Accounts, 2017:66
The current threat level for Northern Ireland-related terrorism in 
Northern Ireland is SEVERE.  The current threat level for Northern 
Ireland-related terrorism in Britain is MODERATE. 
MI5, Threat Levels, (retrieved 3 July 2018)
 
The five categories of threat used by MI5 and the PSNI are designed to 
give an indication of the likelihood of a terrorist attack:  ‘LOW means an 
attack is unlikely … MODERATE means an attack is possible, but not likely … 
SUBSTANTIAL means an attack is a strong possibility … SEVERE means an 
attack is highly likely … CRITICAL means an attack is expected imminently’ 
(MI5, Threat Levels).
The threat level in NI has remained unchanged at severe since threat levels 
were first published in 2010.  The threat in Great Britain from NI-related 
terrorism has varied between substantial and moderate since 2010 (MI5, 
Threat Levels, retrieved 3 July 2018).
The British Home Office publishes a list of proscribed organisations 
which the Home Secretary believes are concerned in terrorism.  That is, 
the organisation:  commits or participates in acts of terrorism; prepares 
for terrorism; promotes or encourages terrorism (including the unlawful 
glorification of terrorism); or is otherwise concerned in terrorism.  There 
are currently 74 international organisations which are proscribed under the 
Terrorism Act 2000 and a further 14 organisations in NI that were proscribed 
under previous legislation (Home Office, Proscribed Terrorist Organisations, 22 
December 2017).
A number of paramilitary groups, both Loyalist and Republican, still exist in 
NI.  The last assessment report, drafted by the PSNI and MI5, concluded that, 
‘All the main paramilitary groups operating during the period of the Troubles 
remain in existence’ (PSNI & MI5, 2015).  However the same report stated 
that the most serious threat in the region came from dissident Republican 
groups.
In the past, in addition to the violent intra-state and inter-community 
conflict in the form of shootings and bombings, paramilitary groups have 
engaged in summary justice, in the form of assaults and shootings, against 
what they label anti-social elements.  The paramilitary groups have also 
engaged in illegal activities designed to raise funds.  During the early years 
of the conflict, the IRA for example, robbed banks to obtain money to allow 
it to purchase weapons (Coogan, 1987:421).  Later it used a wide range 
of methods (including protection payments, smuggling, fuel laundering, 
eliciting voluntary contributions) to ensure a flow of funds to support 
the organisation and its ‘armed struggle’.  With the substantial reduction 
of, or in some cases the complete cessation of conflict-related activities, 
the remaining purely criminal activities have become a larger part of the 
apparent rationale of certain groups.  
List of Proscribed 
Organisations in Northern 
Ireland
• Continuity Army Council
• Cumann na mBan  
• Fianna na hEireann 
• Orange Volunteers 
• Red Hand Commando  
• Red Hand Defenders 
• Irish National Liberation Army 
• Irish People’s Liberation 
Organisation  
• Irish Republican Army  
• Loyalist Volunteer Force  
• Saor Eire 
• Ulster Defence Association 
• Ulster Freedom Fighters 
• Ulster Volunteer Force
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This has led some commentators to suggest that organisations and people 
should stop referring to paramilitary groups as such, and instead label them 
as criminal gangs.
Paramilitary killings
The latest troubles-related killing occurred on 13th February 2018 when two 
men entered Raymond Johnston’s home in Poleglass, Belfast and shot him 
dead with a shotgun.  Within two days the PSNI indicated that they believed 
that dissident Republicans may have been involved.  On 20th June 2018 the 
PSNI stated that Johnston had been killed by the dissident Republican group 
Arm na Poblachta (Army of the Republic).  The existence of this particular 
group was confirmed by the PSNI in August 2017 (ITV News; 29 August 
2017).  The motive for the killing remains unclear.
Figure 50 shows the number of security situation (conflict-related) deaths 
in NI from 1998 to 2017 according to figures compiled by the PSNI.  The 
Belfast / Good Friday Agreement was signed on 10th April 1998.  The figure 
of 55 deaths in 1998 includes the 29 people who were killed in the Real IRA 
bomb in Omagh on 15th August 1998.  There were two other killings in the 
remainder of 1998 and seven in 1999.  Killings returned to double figures 
from 2000 to 2003, but since 2004 the number of deaths has remained in 
single figures. 
Figure 50:  Deaths due to the security situation (NI only), 1998 to 2017
Source:  PSNI, Security situation statistics, 2018
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Research by Paul Nolan into paramilitary killings since the Belfast / Good Friday 
Agreement was published jointly by The Detail website (23 April 2018) and The Irish Times 
(23 April 2018).  Nolan's analysis showed that 39.7 per cent of the victims were Catholic 
civilians.  38 Catholics were killed by republican paramilitaries and 22 killed by loyalists.  
Loyalist paramilitaries made up 26.3 per cent of the deaths whereas during the earlier 
period of the conflict (1969-98) they only accounted for 4 per cent of deaths.  Of the 41 
loyalist paramilitaries killed, Nolan stated that, 'Every single one of them has been killed by 
other loyalist paramilitaries' (BBC NI News, 23 April 2018).  Security force personnel 
accounted for 5.5 per cent of the deaths since the Agreement, compared to 27.8 per cent 
in the period prior to the Agreement. 
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Beyond the killings, paramilitaries have continued to engage in shootings and bombings 
against the security forces, and also carried out paramilitary assaults against individuals in 
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Research by Paul Nolan into paramilitary killings since the Belfast / Good 
Friday Agreement was published jointly by The Detail website (23 April 2018) 
and The Irish Times (23 April 2018).  Nolan’s analysis showed that 39.7 per 
cent of the victims were Catholic civilians.  38 Catholics were killed by 
republican paramilitaries and 22 killed by loyalists.  Loyalist paramilitaries 
made up 26.3 per cent of the deaths whereas during the earlier period of 
the conflict (1969-98) they only accounted for 4 per cent of deaths.  Of the 
41 loyalist paramilitaries killed, Nolan stated that, ‘Every single one of them 
has been killed by other loyalist paramilitaries’ (BBC NI News, 23 April 2018).  
Security force personnel accounted for 5.5 per cent of the deaths since the 
Agreement, compared to 27.8 per cent in the period prior to the Agreement.
Paramilitary attacks
Beyond the killings, paramilitaries have continued to engage in shootings 
and bombings against the security forces, and also carried out paramilitary 
assaults against individuals in the form of shootings and beatings.  Figure 51 
shows the total number of incidents in each category for the past four years.  
Compared to the height of the conflict, the levels are comparatively low.  
One aspect of the security response is the amount of paramilitary materiel 
that is uncovered by police operations.  Information on firearms, ammunition, 
and explosives discovered during searches are also included in Figure 51.  
Finds of materiel are significantly lower than during the earlier period of the 
conflict but an individual cache of, say, ammunition can cause a spike in the 
level of the figures.
2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18
Shooting incidents 73 36 61 50
Bombing incidents 36 52 29 18
Causalities of paramilitary shootings 36 14 28 22
Causalities of paramilitary assaults 58 58 66 65
Firearms found 58 66 45 40
Rounds of ammunition found 4,569 4,418 2,635 5,758
Explosives found (kg) 22.9 2.4 75.1 0.4
Figure 51:  Key statistics about the security situation (NI only), 2014/15 to 2017/18
Source:  PSNI, Police Recorded Security Situation Statistics
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Figures 52 and 53 below show the level of shootings and bombings in NI as 
recorded by the police, for the years 1998 to 2017.  The yearly data indicates 
that there was a significant level of violence in the years immediately after 
the signing of the Agreement in 1998.  While the data shows a decline in the 
number of shootings from 2001 to 2005 (see Figure 52), which is almost 
matched by the decline in bombings (see Figure 53), there was another 
marked reduction between 2005 and 2006 in both shootings and bombings.  
These figures would mirror the reduction in IRA violence that culminated in 
the IRA statement on the ending of the Armed Campaign on 28 July 2005, 
and the completion of IRA Decommissioning on 26 September 2005.
Figure 53:  Bombings related to the security situation (NI only), 1998 to 2017
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Another aspect of paramilitary activity that has continued to the present day, are shootings 
and assaults carried out against individuals who, it is often alleged by the paramilitaries, 
have been engaged in anti-social behaviour.  Figures 22 and 23 show an upsurge in 
shootings and assaults since 2009, and assaults rose each year from 2013 to 2017.  Most 
of the shootings have been carried out by republican paramilitary groups, while loyalists 
have carried out more beatings.  Two of the security-related deaths in 2016 appear to be 
the result of shootings, when people shot in the legs subsequently died. 
 
Figure 22:  Casualties of paramilitary shootings, 1998 to 2017 
Source:  PSNI, Police Recorded Security Situation Statistics
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Figure 52:  Shootings related to the security situation (NI only),1998 to 2017
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Another aspect of paramilitary activity that has continued to the present 
day, are shootings and assaults carried out against individuals who, it is often 
alleged by the paramilitaries, have been engaged in anti-social behaviour.  
Figures 54 and 55 show an upsurge in shootings and assaults since 2009, and 
assaults rose each year from 2013 to 2017.  Most of the shootings have been 
carried out by republican paramilitary groups, while loyalists have carried out 
more beatings.  Two of the security-related deaths in 2016 appear to be the 
result of shootings, when people shot in the legs subsequently died.
Figure 54:  Casualties of paramilitary shootings, 1998 to 2017
 
 
 
Figure 55:  Casualties of paramilitary assaults, 1998 to 2017
Source:  PSNI, Police Recorded Security Situation Statistics
Source:  PSNI, Police Recorded Security Situation Statistics
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Figure 23:  Casualties of paramilitary assaults, 1998 to 2017 
 
Source:  PSNI, Police Recorded Security Statistics in Northern Ireland, 2018 
 
5.2  Dissident republican and main-stream paramilitaries 
The term dissident republican has been used to categorise those who opposed the peace 
process that was supported by Sinn Féin and the Provisional IRA.  Some dissident 
republicans are supporters of, or members of, dissident republican paramilitary groups 
including the new IRA, Óglaigh na hÉireann and the Continuity IRA.  Dissident republican 
paramilitaries were believed to be responsible for five killings in 2016 and one killing in 
2018. 
On 30 October 2017 the PSNI were called to Pantridge Road, west Belfast following 
notification of a bomb having been left in the area.  This was the beginning of a three-day 
operation by police and British Army Technical Officers to locate and deal with an 
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5.2  Dissident republican and 
 main-stream paramilitaries
The term dissident republican has been used to categorise those who 
opposed the peace process that was supported by Sinn Féin and the 
Provisional IRA.  Some dissident republicans are supporters of, or members 
of, dissident republican paramilitary groups including the new IRA, Óglaigh 
na hÉireann and the Continuity IRA.  Dissident republican paramilitaries were 
believed to be responsible for five killings in 2016 and one killing in 2018.
On 30th October 2017 the PSNI were called to Pantridge Road, west Belfast 
following notification of a bomb having been left in the area.  This was the 
beginning of a three-day operation by police and British Army Technical 
Officers to locate and deal with an improvised explosive device at the side 
of the road (Belfast Telegraph, 1 November 2017).  Responsibility for the 
device was claimed by a group calling itself Arm na Poblachta (Army of the 
Republic).  The existence of this group was confirmed by the PSNI in August 
2017 following an investigation by UTV into dissident republican activity 
(ITV News, 29 August 2018).  The then Assistant Chief Constable of the PSNI 
stated that dissident groups are fluid and change regularly because of the 
disruption caused by the investigative efforts of the PSNI and MI5, and also 
because of personality clashes within the groups (ibid.).
In addition to the attack on PSNI officers in Derry (mentioned above), it is 
widely believed that dissident republicans were responsible for attacks on 
Gerry Adams, TD for Louth and former Sinn Féin President, and Bobby Storey 
a senior member of Sinn Féin (TheJournal.ie, 14 July 2018).  Two improvised 
explosive devices were thrown at the homes of the two men.  The explosions 
caused no injuries but one car was damaged.  In a statement after the attack, 
Adams asked those responsible to meet with him to explain why they carried 
out the attack.  A rally was organised by Sinn Féin on Monday 16th July in 
Andersonstown, west Belfast, and hundreds of people turned out to show 
support for the two men (Belfast Telegraph, 16 July 2018).
5.3  Loyalist paramilitaries
Loyalist paramilitaries were responsible for one killing in 2016, and two 
killings in 2017 that were believed to be part of a loyalist feud.
On 9th April 2018 a joint statement, entitled Loyalist Declaration of 
Transformation, was issued on behalf of the Red Hand Commando (RHC), 
Ulster Defence Association (UDA), and Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF).  In the 
statement the groups gave a commitment that, ‘We fully support the rule 
of law in all areas of life and emphatically condemn all forms of criminal 
activity’ (RHC, UDA, UVF, Declaration, 9 April 2018).  The statement went on:  
‘We further declare that any engagement in criminal acts by any individuals 
within our organisations will be regarded as placing those persons outside the 
memberships. This has been collectively agreed. We cannot allow criminals 
to hinder transformation and the ground on which such people stand is now 
shrinking’ (ibid.).  
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The statement was the result of lengthy discussions that involved three 
former Protestant church leaders:  Alan Harper, Harold Good, and Norman 
Hamilton.  It was issued 20 years after the signing of the Agreement, and 
seven months after the Paramilitary Crime Task Force became operational 
with the objective of targeting criminal activity by all paramilitary groups in 
the region.  This was the first joint statement by loyalist paramilitary groups 
since the ceasefire statement in 1994 (CLMC, Statement, 13 October 1994).
The PSNI Chief Constable, George Hamilton, went on BBC Radio Ulster the 
following day to comment on the Loyalist Declaration.  He said that some 
loyalist factions were inactive, while others were involved in crime:
East Belfast UVF for example is pretty much just a mid-range 
organised crime gang that is wreaking havoc on communities, fear 
on communities in terms of the criminality that they’re involved 
in … There are other areas as well, the UDA side, they’re struggling 
clearly too with north Down UDA and we’ve seen that in recent 
weeks - threats issued against journalists and so on. 
BBC NI News, 10 April 2018.
On 11 July 2018 the PSNI released a statement:  ‘Police have received 
information from the community which indicates that the East Belfast UVF 
intend to orchestrate and participate in serious disorder in East Belfast this 
evening directed against my officers’ (PSNI, News, 2018).  Later that day 
there were serious disturbances in east Belfast and Newtownards as 13 cars 
and a bus were hijacked or stolen and set alight.  A suspected pipe bomb 
exploded close to police.  Roads near the Ulster Hospital were blocked as 
were a number of other main roads.  Passengers were prevented from leaving 
Belfast City Airport for a time (BBC NI News, 12 July 2018).  The violence 
appeared to be orchestrated by loyalist paramilitaries and was in response 
to a High Court ruling that the Department for Infrastructure had to take 
immediate steps to reduce the size of a planned bonfire at Bloomfield 
walkway in east Belfast (Belfast Telegraph, 10 July 2018).  Before the bonfire 
material could be removed it was set alight.  Following concerns at the 
position of a second bonfire, next to a listed building at Cluan Place in east 
Belfast, the PSNI secured the site and contractors removed the material.  The 
contractors were believed to be from outside NI, and wore masks to hide 
their identity and drove vehicles with the number plates removed (BBC NI 
News, 11 July 2018).
5.4  Stormont Executive policy    
 response
On 17 November 2015, The Stormont Agreement and Implementation 
Plan (A Fresh Start) specified that a three-person panel would be appointed 
to report on recommendations for a strategy to disband paramilitary 
groups (GOV.UK, 17 November 2015; Section 4.1).  The Fresh Start Panel 
completed its report in May 2016 (published 7 June) which contained 
43 recommendations (Fresh Start Panel, 7 June 2016:33-38).  The 
recommendations were classified into four sections:  Promoting Lawfulness; 
Support for Transition; Tackling Criminality; and Addressing Systemic Issues. 
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Within two months of receiving the report, the NI Executive published 
an Executive Action Plan which detailed its response to the 43 
recommendations (NIE, 19 July 2016:7-21).  The Executive Action Plan 
set out an objective to establish a Cross Departmental Programme Board 
(CDPB) to drive forward the commitments made in A Fresh Start and the 
action plan.  The Board was chaired by Department of Justice (DoJ), with 
representatives from The Executive Office, Department of Finance and 
Department for Communities.  However, in late 2016 a high-level strategic 
Tackling Paramilitarism Programme Board (TPPB) was established with 
the CDPB acting as an advisory group to that board.  Membership of the 
TPPB was elevated to senior officials from the Executive Office and NIO, 
and representatives of the First Minister and deputy First Minister.  The 
TPPB was co-chaired by Anthony Harbinson who gave a public report on its 
work (Committee for Justice, Hansard, 8 December 2016).  Funding for the 
TPPB came from the NI Executive and Westminster Government, with each 
committing £25 million over five years (a total of £50 million).  The total 
funding allocated in 2016-17 was £3,898,000 while the figure for 2017-18 
(up to February 2018) was £6,374,000 (DoJ, February 2018).  
Under the section on Monitoring and Evaluation in the Executive Action Plan, 
it was agreed that a four-member Independent Reporting Commission (IRC) 
would be established by the UK and Irish governments to monitor progress 
on ending paramilitary activity.  The IRC was subsequently established by the 
two governments through an international treaty on 9 September 2016.  The 
launch of the IRC took place on 29 September 2017.
The Paramilitary Crime Taskforce (PCTF) was established as part of 
recommendations made from the Fresh Start Agreement.  The Taskforce 
developed incrementally during 2016-17 and has members from the Police 
Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), National Crime Agency (NCA) and HMRC 
working to stop criminality in the region (BelfastLive, 23 September 2017) 
and (ITV News, 27 September 2017).  PSNI Chief Constable George Hamilton 
stated: 
… our investigations to date have resulted in just under 100 arrests 
and 200 searches with 66 people being charged or reported to the 
PPS. Around £450,000 worth of criminal assets have been seized or 
restrained including over £157,000 in cash, drugs with an estimated 
street value of around £230,000 … 
DoJ, News, 27 September 2017
 
Issue 1 of the Tackling Paramilitarism Programme (TPP) newsletter was 
published in the summer of 2018 and contained a further update of the work 
of the PCTF:
During the 2017/18 financial year, the PCTF conducted 193 
searches; made 47 arrests, of which 44 people were charged or 
reported to the PPS, seized an estimated £58,000 worth of drugs 
and restrained £50,000 worth of cash.  Earlier this year, the team 
successfully obtained the first Freezing Order worth £150,000 and 
the seizure of illicit tobacco products … 
DoJ, TPP Newsletter, Issue 1: Summer 2018:9.
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The collapse of the NI Executive and the absence of the NI Assembly may 
have implications for the delivery of the objectives set out in the Executive 
Action Plan.  Even allowing for the continuing work of departments and 
agencies, and the oversight provided by the TPPB, the element of local 
political oversight is absent from the agreed structure.
6.  POLICING
6.1  Strength and composition
In the 2018 PSNI Annual Report the Chief Constable, George Hamilton, who 
was appointed in June 2014, noted that he had to deliver ‘budget cuts of 
£122 million during my tenure’ (PSNI, Annual Report, 2018:3).  In the 2017-
18 financial year he implemented a budget cut of £17.2 million, while at the 
same time dealing with ‘unfunded pressures, including some legacy related 
costs’ (ibid:3).  He also outlined the impact of the political situation:
The absence of a Northern Ireland Executive has not only  
created financial uncertainty but has left PSNI without a  
properly constituted Policing Board. I want to see a return to a  
fully constituted Policing Board in the months ahead,  
particularly given the scale of the financial and operational 
challenges we currently face. 
(ibid.:3)
Staffing makes up the largest element of the PSNI budget. Hamilton reported 
that police numbers were reduced by 100 during 2017-18.  The reduction in 
the number of police officers is part of a longer trend, mainly associated with 
the reduction in conflict-related violence.  The budget pressures also meant 
that, ‘proactive operations were more limited, activity on legacy work was 
curtailed and investment in new programmes were deferred’ (ibid.:3).
Eurostat (the statistical office of the EU) provides useful comparative 
data for the number of personnel in the criminal justice system of 
European jurisdictions.  One category of data is police officers, and units of 
measurement available are total numbers and number per hundred thousand 
population.  The most recent figures available are for 2016 (although data 
for some countries were missing, including Ireland).  Extracting data from the 
Eurostat database, Figure 56 was compiled to provide details of the number 
of police officers, per 100,000 population, in the constituent countries of the 
UK, Ireland, and some other selected jurisdictions, for the years 2008 and 
2016.  The figures show the historically high level of police officer figures 
in NI and the significant decline in numbers over the eight year period.  
While the terrorist threat level remains at severe, NI is likely to continue to 
experience a higher level of policing than other regions in the UK and Ireland.
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6.2  Religion, gender and ethnicity
We aim to have a workforce representative of the  
community we serve. 
PSNI, Workforce Composition Statistics
Figure 57 contains the PSNI Workforce Composition Statistics for May 2011 
and November 2017.  Against a background of declining numbers of both 
police officers and police staff, there have been small changes in the gender 
balance, with more females among police officers and more men among 
police staff.  There was almost no change in the ethnic makeup of police 
officers but a slight rise in the percentage of people from ethnic backgrounds 
among police staff.  Historically, it has been the community background 
of police officers that has received the greatest comment.  Between 2011 
and 2017 there were slight increases in the percentage of people who were 
perceived to be Catholic but the latest figures remain significantly lower than 
the percentage of Catholics in the NI population.   
Police Officers Police Staff
May 2011 Nov 2017 May 2011 Nov 2017
Perceived Protestant (%) 67.5 67.16 78.1 78.09
Perceived Roman Catholic (%) 30.3 31.50 18.7 19.35
Not Determined (%) 2.2 1.34 3.3 2.56
Female (%) 26.7 29.09 63.9 58.58
Male (%) 73.3 70.91 36.1 41.42
Ethnic Minority (%) 0.5 0.52 0.4 0.63
Total (number) 7156 6756 2512 2383
Figure 56:  Number of police officers per 100,000 population in the UK, Ireland, & other selected jurisdictions, 2008 & 2016
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other selected jurisdictions, for the years 2008 and 2016.  The figures show the historically 
high level of police officer figures in NI and the significant decline in numbers over the 
eight year period.  While the terrorist threat level remains at severe, NI is likely to continue 
to experience a higher level of policing than other regions in the UK and Ireland. 
 
Figure 24:  Number of police officers per 100,000 population in the UK, Ireland, and other 
selected jurisdictions, 2008 and 2016 
 
Source:  Eurostat, Personnel in the criminal justice system, 2018 
Note:  The 2016 figure for Ireland was calculated separately, based on information from An 
Garda Síochána and the Irish Central Statistics Office. 
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Figure 57:  Breakdown of officers and other staff of the PSNI, May 2011 and November 2017
Source:  Eurostat, Personnel in the criminal justice system, 2018
Note:  The 2016 figure for Ireland was calculated separately, based on information from 
An Garda Síochána and the Irish Central Statistics Office.
Source:  PSNI, Workforce Composition Statistics, as at 1 November 2017
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Previous Peace Monitoring Reports have made reference to the reforms 
to policing that were introduced as a result of the Patten Report and in 
particular the recommendation that in the recruitment of police officers 
‘an equal number of Protestants and Catholics should be drawn from 
the pool of qualified candidates’ (referred to as 50:50) (Patten Report, 9 
September 1999, Paragraph 15.10).  The recommendation was that this 
approach should be maintained for at least ten years.  50:50 recruitment 
began on 23 November 2000.  It was the focus of much unionist criticism 
and was eventually ended on 28 March 2011 (BBC NI News, 28 March 
2011).  During the first recruitment drive following the ending of the Patten 
recommendations, 30 per cent of the applications were from Catholics and 
66 per cent were from Protestants (Belfast Telegraph, 20 October 2015).  The 
percentage of Catholic applicants during three recent recruitment drives was 
31 per cent, and of those who made it through to the merit pool, only 19 
per cent were Catholic (BBC NI News, 5 April 2017).  The PSNI indicated that 
it was taking additional measures to try to increase the level of application 
from a Catholic background (Deloitte, 2016).
The impact of the Patten 50:50 recruitment period on the percentage of 
Catholic police officers can clearly been seen in Figure 58.  The figure also 
shows the historic low level of Catholic officers prior to 2000 and the distinct 
levelling out of the percentage representation following the ending of the 
50:50 process.  Following the ending of the Patten policy Catholics made 
up 30.3 per cent of police officers and this figure was 32.1 per cent on 1 
July 2018; an average increase of 0.26 per cent each year over the seven 
year period.  At this rate of change it will take another 50 years for Catholic 
representation to match the Catholic population (as at the 2011 Census).
 
Figure 58:  Percentage of police officers perceived to be Catholic, 1990 - 2017
Source:  CAIN website (based on various reports:  RUC; PSNI; Equality 
Commission; NIO; Hansard; Census)
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6.3  The use of police powers
The Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007 (JSA) deals with a 
range of matters that include powers that are available to police officers 
and members of the security forces as set out in sections 21 to 32 of the 
legislation.  JSA section 21 covers the power to stop and question a person 
to establish identity and movements, and section 24 (schedule 3) covers 
the power to enter and search any premises for munitions and wireless 
apparatus, and stop and search any person reasonably suspected of having 
munitions and wireless apparatus.  An Independent Reviewer, appointed 
by the Secretary of State for NI, monitors the use made of the JSA powers 
contained in sections 21 to 32 of the Act and produces an annual report.  The 
tenth annual report was written by David Seymour in April 2018 and includes 
the statistics on the use of section 21 and 24 powers (Independent Reviewer, 
10th Report, 2018:72).  Figure 59 provides a summary of this information 
for the years 2010-11 to 2016-17.  The figures showed a decline in the use 
of both JSA powers for the three years after 2011-12.  However, in the last 
two years, for which figures are available, there has been an increase in the 
use of section 24 powers.  The Independent Reviewer noted that the PSNI 
had undertaken training of officers to improve their awareness of the various 
JSA powers and their appropriate use, and this might account for the recent 
increase (ibid., 2018:10).
The Independent Reviewer notes that the JSA powers are used more against 
Dissident Republicans (DRs) than against loyalist paramilitaries (ibid., 
2018:17). 
Figure 59:  Number of uses of stop and search powers under the Justice and Security Act, by year 2010-11 to 2016-17
Source:  Independent Reviewer, Table 3A, 10th Report, 2018
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The Independent Reviewer notes that the JSA powers are used more against Dissident 
Republicans (DRs) than against loyalist paramilitaries (ibid., 2018:17).  This assessment 
seems to be based on a geographical breakdown of the use of the powers because no 
record is kept of the commu ity b ckground of those stopped and searched.  The 
explanation for the disparity in the use of JSA powers, 'reflects the fact that DRs have a 
particular modus operandi which the JSA powers are specifically designed to address' 
(ibid., 2018:17).  Various groups, including SF and the Committee on the Administration of 
Justice (CAJ), have called on the PSNI to record and publish the community background 
of those who are stopped and searched (CAJ, Submission, 2016:15). 
Given the high level of reported use of the stop and search powers the question of their 
efficacy arises, and Figure 28 gives the number of persons arrested following the use of 
stop and search powers in 2016-17.  In addition, the overall rate of success following a 
search for munitions and wireless apparatus was 0.1 per cent (Independent Reviewer, 
10th Report, 2018:11).  The report of the Independent Reviewer argues that the very low 
arrest rates are because, 'the JSA powers are essentially preventative in their nature' 
(ibid., 2018:11). 
 
Figure 28:  Number of persons stopped, arrested, and arrest rate, under Justice and 
Security (NI) Act 2007 section 21 and 24 powers, 2016-17 
Power 
Persons 
stopped  
Persons 
arrested  
Arrest rate  
JSA s.21 2034  15  0.7%  
JSA s.24 7502  88  1.2%  
- with authorisation 7319  80  1.1%  
- with reasonable suspicion 183  8  4.4%  
Source:  Independent Reviewer, 10th Report, 2018:11 
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This assessment seems to be based on a geographical breakdown of the 
use of the powers because no record is kept of the community background 
of those stopped and searched.  The explanation for the disparity in the 
use of JSA powers, ‘reflects the fact that DRs have a particular modus 
operandi which the JSA powers are specifically designed to address’ (ibid., 
2018:17).  Various groups, including Sinn Féin and the Committee on the 
Administration of Justice (CAJ), have called on the PSNI to record and publish 
the community background of those who are stopped and searched (CAJ, 
Submission, 2016:15).
Given the high level of reported use of the stop and search powers the 
question of their efficacy arises, and Figure 60 gives the number of persons 
arrested following the use of stop and search powers in 2016-17.  In addition, 
the overall rate of success following a search for munitions and wireless 
apparatus was 0.1 per cent (Independent Reviewer, 10th Report, 2018:11).  
The report of the Independent Reviewer argues that the very low arrest rates 
are because, ‘the JSA powers are essentially preventative in their nature’ 
(ibid., 2018:11). 
 
Power Persons stopped 
Persons 
arrested Arrest rate 
JSA s.21 2034 15 0.7% 
JSA s.24 7502 88 1.2% 
- with authorisation 7319 80 1.1% 
- with reasonable suspicion 183 8 4.4% 
 
 
While the JSA powers cover stop and searches related to the threat from 
terrorism, there are also stop and search powers contained in seven other 
pieces of legislation which seek to deal with everyday / non-terrorism-related 
matters (Independent Reviewer, 7th Report, 2015:19).  The most heavily used 
pieces of legislation are the Police and Criminal Evidence (PACE) (NI) Order 
1983 Article 3, and the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 Section 23 (MDA).  The use 
of non-terrorism-related stop and search powers rose from 20,011 in 2008-
11 to 25,248 in 2016-16 before declining to 22,600 in 2017-18 (PSNI, Stop 
and Search Statistics, 2018:11).  A recent review of the use of everyday stop 
and search powers by the PSNI estimated that the rate in NI, ‘sits at over 
twice the total rate for England and Wales; and 50% greater than Scotland’ 
(Topping and Bradford, 2018:3).
Age-related stop and search figures have been publicly available since 2017 
and in the PSNI report covering the period April 2017 to March 2018, of the 
29,882 persons stopped (under all powers) 14 per cent (4,157 persons) were 
aged 17 years and under and 41 per cent (12,397 persons) were aged 18 to 
25 years.  Males accounted for 89 per cent of the total (26,637) (PSNI, Stop 
and Search Statistics, 2018:6).  
Source:  Independent Reviewer, 10th Report, 2018:11
Figure 60:  Number of persons stopped, arrested, and arrest rate, under Justice and Security (NI) Act 2007 section 21 
and 24 powers, 2016-17
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Of all those stopped 2,116 (7%) were subsequently arrested.  A breakdown 
by area of the number of persons stopped is provided by the PSNI for the 
three police areas and the 11 district council areas and, for example, there 
were 8,083 persons stopped (in 2017-18) in Belfast or 27 per cent of the 
total (ibid., 2018:5).  However, Belfast’s population was 18.2 per cent of 
the NI total (2017 figures) so the number of stops appears to be 8.9 per 
cent higher than might be expected if stops were evenly spread across the 
NI population.  Other areas with higher rates of stops were Derry City & 
Strabane (+3.6%), Armagh City, Banbridge & Craigavon (+2.7%), and Lisburn 
& Castlereagh City (+1.7%).  The other seven district council areas had a 
percentage share of stops lower than their share of population (e.g., Ards & 
North Down at -6.0%).
Concern has been expressed that the use of everyday / non-terrorism-
related stop and search appears to be directed at, ‘young males in socio-
economically deprived areas’ (Topping and Bradford, 2018:6).  The 2017 
Young Life and Times (YLT) survey provided information on the attitudes 
and experiences of 16-year olds in relation to stop and search practice 
(ARK, Research Update 120, May 2018).  Nine per cent of YLT respondents 
had been stopped and searched by the PSNI and 34 per cent said that their 
friends or classmates had been stopped in the same 12-month period (ibid., 
2018:3).  One of the major concerns in relation to the use of stop and search 
is the impact it might be having on relations between the community and 
the police.  Of those YLT respondents who were stopped by the police, 35 per 
cent agreed or strongly agreed that it resulted in more negative attitudes to 
the police in general (ibid., 2018:4).
6.4  PSNI – audit and accountability
One of the ways in which the PSNI is assessed and held to account is 
through the Northern Ireland Policing Board (NIBP).  However, the collapse 
of devolved government in NI has meant that the process to nominate 
political members to the NIPB has stalled and, ‘as such the Board is not 
fully constituted as required by legislation’ (NIPB, Policing Matters, 2017).  
In section 6.1 above we noted that the Chief Constable had stated he was 
anxious to see a fully constituted Policing Board resume operations as soon 
as possible.  The NIPB is supposed to hold eight public meetings each year 
but its last public meeting was on 2 February 2017.  Some of the programme 
of work agreed at that meeting has progressed but the list of issues that 
require actions has grown longer in the absence of the legal authority of a 
fully constituted Board.  Some of the work that feeds into the monitoring 
of the police has continued, for example relevant information has been 
collected via the NI Omnibus Survey.  However, the last Human Rights 
Annual Report was published in March 2016 and was covered in the previous 
Peace Monitoring Report (Wilson, 2016).
In order to assess the level of public satisfaction with the performance of 
the PSNI, the NIPB includes relevant questions in the NI Omnibus Survey 
which is conducted several times each year by the Central Survey Unit 
of the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA).  Despite 
the absence of political members within the NIPB, this survey work has 
continued and the most recent report was published in 2018.  
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There are some slight differences in the range of questions in the 2018 
report, so one of the following tables is based on the 2017 report (and earlier 
reports).  More than three quarters (78 per cent) of respondents felt that the 
PSNI was doing a very / fairly good job in NI as a whole (see Figure 61).  This 
represented a slight increase on the previous year (75 per cent) and a six 
per cent increase over the 2015 figure reported in the last Peace Monitoring 
Report (Wilson, 2016:53).  There are differences in the opinions of Catholic 
and Protestant respondents to the question of performance of the PSNI, with 
more Protestants considering the performance very / fairly good.  The gap 
between Catholics and Protestants on this response was three percentage 
points in 2014 and this rose to 13 points in 2016 before reducing to eight 
points in 2017.
The Omnibus survey also asked how satisfied respondents were that the 
police treated the public fairly (see Figure 62).  In 2018, 74 per cent of 
responders were very / fairly satisfied that the PSNI treats members of 
the public fairly in NI; this was a statistically significant decrease over the 
previous period (78 per cent).  As can be seen in the table there had been a 
gradual increase between 2015 and 2017.  
There remains a marked difference in the satisfaction expressed by Catholics 
and Protestants, with Catholics levels being lower and the gap increasing over 
the four years from four percentage points (2015) to 13 points (2018).
Percentage of respondents
2014 
(January)
2015 
(January)
2016 
(January)
2017 
(January)
Rating C P All C P All C P All C P All
Very/fairly good 70 73 71 67 73 72 68 81 75 76 84 78
Neither good nor poor 20 19 20 21 15 17 18 15 16 15 11 14
Very/fairly poor 8 7 8 11 11 11 11 4 7 9 4 6
Don’t know/refusal 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 0 1 0 1 1
Source:  NI Policing Board, Omnibus Survey, 2017
Note:  ‘C’ – Catholic; ‘P’ – Protestant; Figures in bold denote a statistically 
significant change between survey instances
Figure 61:  Performance of PSNI in Northern Ireland as a whole, by religion, 2014 to 2017
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In May 2018, 86 per cent of respondents stated that they had total, a lot, or 
some confidence in the police’s ability to provide a day-to-day service for 
everyone in NI (see Figure 63).  The equivalent figure had been 90 per cent in 
2017 and had risen in the two previous years.  After rising for three years, the 
percentage of respondents reporting total confidence reduced from 16 per 
cent in 2017 to 13 per cent in 2018.
Percentage of respondents
2015 
(January)
2016 
(April)
2017 
(April)
2018 
(May)
Rating C P All C P All C P All C P All
Total confidence 8 12 11 10 15 12 12 21 16 9 14 13
A lot of confidence 33 34 34 32 39 37 39 45 42 35 41 37
Some confidence 43 36 39 42 36 39 37 27 32 40 32 36
Total/A lot of/Some 84 82 84 84 90 88 88 93 90 84 87 86
Little confidence 11 14 12 10 8 9 9 7 8 11 10 10
No confidence at all 4 4 4 3 2 2 3 1 2 3 2 3
Little/No confidence 15 18 16 13 10 11 12 8 10 14 13 13
Don’t know/refusal 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
Figure 62:  Satisfaction that PSNI treats members of the public fairly in Northern Ireland as a whole, by religion,  
2015 to 2018
Source:  NI Policing Board, Omnibus Survey, 2018
Note:  ‘C’ – Catholic; ‘P’ – Protestant; Figures in bold denote a statistically significant 
change between survey instances
Figure 63:  Confidence in the police’s ability to provide an ordinary day-to-day policing service for all the people of 
Northern Ireland, by religion, 2015 to 2018
Source:  NI Policing Board,  Omnibus Survey, 2018
Note:  ‘C’ – Catholic; ‘P’ – Protestant; Figures in bold denote a statistically 
significant change between survey instances
Percentage of respondents
2015 
(January)
2016 
(April)
2017 
(April)
2018 
(May)
Rating C P All C P All C P All C P All
Very/fairly good 67 71 70 66 77 73 73 85 78 68 81 74
Neither good nor poor 19 15 17 21 16 18 16 10 14 18 12 15
Very/fairly poor 13 12 12 11 8 9 10 5 8 12 7 9
Don’t know/refusal 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 1
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The Department of Justice publishes findings from the NI Crime Survey 
which give statistics about the perceptions of policing.   The most recent 
report is based on the 2016-17 Crime Survey.  Overall confidence in the 
police and police accountability arrangements are based on responses to 
seven questions.  The trend since 2007-08 is displayed in Figure 64 with the 
level varying from 78.3 (in 2010-11) to 82.4 per cent (in 2016-17).
The NI Crime Survey also asks respondents about their confidence in local police.  
A series of questions are asked in relation to six statements before respondents 
give their overall confidence.  These six statements (see legend in Figure 65) 
together with the level of confidence in each are displayed in Figure 65.  All six 
individual strands show statistically significant increases in confidence levels 
compared with 2007-08.  The overall confidence in the local police rose from 
59.7 (2007-08) to 70.9 (2016-17) and this increase of over ten percentage points 
was also statistically significant.
Source: Department of Justice (DoJ), Research and Statistical Bulletin 38/2017
Figure 64:  Overall confidence in the police and police accountability arrangements, 2007-08 to 2016-17
32 
Don’t know/refusal 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Source:  NI Policing Board, Omnibus Survey, 2018 
Note:  'C' – Catholic; 'P' – Protestant; Figures in bold denote a statistically significant 
change between survey instances 
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The NI Crime Survey also asks respondents about their confidence in local police.  A 
series of questions are asked in relation to six statements before respondents give their 
overall confidence.  These six statements (see legend in Figure 33) together with the level 
of confidence in each are displayed in Figure 33.  All six individual strands show 
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Figure 33:  Confidence in the local police based on six statements, 2007-08 to 2016-17 
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The Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI), ‘provides an independent, 
impartial system for the handling of complaints about the conduct of police 
officers’ (PONI, website).  In examining the number of complaints about the PSNI 
that the Ombudsman receives, he points out a number of factors that need to be 
considered when trying to draw conclusions.  These factors include the number 
and nature of police operations conducted, the level of interaction between 
members of the public and police officers, and public awareness of both the 
Ombudsman’s Office and the procedure for making a complaint.  Details of the 
number, and nature, of the complaints made are published by the Ombudsman’s 
office in a range of statistics and reports.  Following a spike in the number of 
complaints against the police in 2013-14, associated with the flags protests 
(mainly in Belfast), the trend in the total number has been down (see Figure 66).
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Figure 65:  Confidence in the local police based on six statements, 2007-08 to 2016-17
Source: Department of Justice (DoJ), Research and Statistical Bulletin 38/2017
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The Ombudsman’s Office also provides figures on the number and type of 
allegations made against police officers.  Each complaint the Ombudsman 
receives is made up of one or more allegations which describe the types of 
behaviours being complained about or the issues that make up the complaint.  
The last report has 11 named categories of types of allegation, plus a catch-
all category of ‘other’ allegations.  The three categories involving the largest 
numbers of allegations were failure in duty, oppressive behaviour, and incivility.  
In 2017-18 these three categories accounted for 76 per cent of the total number 
of allegations.  Figure 67 shows the trends in the number of these three main 
allegations over the period 2010-11 to 2017-18.  While there were downward 
trends in both oppressive behaviour and incivility, the number of allegations 
of failure in duty has remained between 2000 and 2500 for the period under 
consideration.
Source:  Police Ombudsman, Publications
Source:  Police Ombudsman, Publications
Figure 66:  Number of complaints against the PSNI received by the Police Ombudsman’s Office, 2010-11 to 2017-18
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Figure 67:  Breakdown of the number of allegations against the PSNI by the three main categories, 2010-11 to 2017-18
34 
Source:  Police Ombudsman, Publications 
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In 2017-18 these three categories accounted for 76 per cent of the total number of 
allegations.  Figure 35 shows the trends in the number of these three main allegations 
over the period 2010-11 to 2017-18.  While there were downward trends in both 
oppressive behaviour and incivility, the number of allegations of failure in duty has 
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Figure 35:  Breakdown of the number of allegations against the PSNI by the three main 
categories, 2010-11 to 2017-18 
 
Source:  Police Ombudsman, Publications 
 
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) 
independently assesses the efficiency and effectiveness of the PSNI.  The HMICFRS 
published two reports in March 2018 based on assessments carried out in 2017.  The 
overall judgment was that the PSNI was, 'assessed as good in respect of the efficiency 
with which it keeps people safe and reduces crime' (HMICFRS, Police efficiency, 2018:5).  
The report also considered that the PSNI was good at planning for demand in the future 
despite the problems caused by the annual nature of funding and the absence of the NI 
Executive and Assembly.  In the second report on effectiveness the overall judgement was 
the PSNI, 'is good at preventing crime, tackling anti-social behaviour and keeping people 
safe' (HMICFRS, Police effectiveness, 2018:8).  Although the report made no specific 
recommendations it did identify some areas for improvement.  Commenting on the 
publication of the two reports, Matt Parr, HM Inspector of Constabulary, was encouraged 
that the PSNI made good use of its resources and was in a strong position to meet new 
threats.  However, he went on to state that: 
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Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services 
(HMICFRS) independently assesses the efficiency and effectiveness of the PSNI.  
The HMICFRS published two reports in March 2018 based on assessments 
carried out in 2017.  The overall judgment was that the PSNI was, ‘assessed as 
good in respect of the efficiency with which it keeps people safe and reduces 
crime’ (HMICFRS, Police efficiency, 2018:5).  The report also considered that 
the PSNI was good at planning for demand in the future despite the problems 
caused by the annual nature of funding and the absence of the NI Executive and 
Assembly.  In the second report on effectiveness the overall judgement was the 
PSNI, ‘is good at preventing crime, tackling anti-social behaviour and keeping 
people safe’ (HMICFRS, Police effectiveness, 2018:8).  Although the report made 
no specific recommendations it did identify some areas for improvement.  
Commenting on the publication of the two reports, Matt Parr, HM Inspector of 
Constabulary, was encouraged that the PSNI made good use of its resources and 
was in a strong position to meet new threats.  However, he went on to state that:
We found that uniformed officers often lacked the necessary support 
and supervision to effectively investigate volume crimes like burglary. 
We also found very little evidence that the PSNI systematically 
pursued people it issued with arrest warrants for minor crimes. While 
we recognise that the Police Service of Northern Ireland is a high-
performing force, it should investigate all crimes to a consistently high 
standard, regardless of the seriousness of the offence. 
HMICRFS, Press release, 15 March 2018.
7.  PRISONS
7.1  The prison population
The World Prison Population List last published in 2016, and reported in the 
fourth Peace Monitoring Report, showed that NI has a small prison population 
in comparison with the rest of the UK, with 87 prisoners per 100,000 compared 
to 148 for England and Wales or 268 per 100,000 in Lithuania (World Prison 
Population List, 2016).  Latest figures in NI show that for the second year in a 
row the average daily prison population fell; from 1,661 in 2015 to 1,482 in 2016 
(see Figure 68).
Source:  Department of Justice, Prison population
Figure 68:  The daily prison population in Northern Ireland, average by year 2003 to 2016
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Figure 36:  The daily prison population in Northern Ireland, average by year 2003 to 2016 
 
Source:  Department of Justice, Prison population 
 
Figure 37 provides details of the gender of the NI prison population from 2003 to 2016.  
The majority of the prison population are male (96.4 per cent), so any change in the male 
population will be mirrored in the overall population.  The male population fell by 11 per 
cent (177) from 2015 to 2016, whilst the average daily prison population for females 
remained at much the same level; 56 during 2015 compared to 54 during 2016. 
 
Figure 37:  Breakdown of prison population by gender, 2003 to 2016 
Figure 69 provides details of the gender of the NI prison population from 2003 
to 2016.  The majority of the prison population are male (96.4 per cent), so any 
change in the male population will be mirrored in the overall population.  The 
male population fell by 11 per cent (177) from 2015 to 2016, whilst the average 
daily prison population for females remained at much the same level; 56 during 
2015 compared to 54 during 2016.
Figure 69:  Breakdown of prison population by gender, 2003 to 2016
 
For the first time since 2012, total prison receptions increased.  In 2016 there 
were 5,199 receptions compared with 4,757 during 2015 (see Figure 70).  It 
is important to note that while receptions increased the average daily prison 
population decreased during the same period.  This is explained by two main 
factors.  First, more people entered prison and second prisoners stayed on average 
a shorter time.
Figure 70:  Prison receptions by type 2009- 2016
Source:  Department of Justice,  Prison population
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Figure 38:  Prison receptions by type 2009- 2016 
Source:  Department of Justice, Prison population 
 
Information on the average cost of keeping an offender in prison in NI compared to the rest 
of the UK was made available in response to a question to Claire Sugden, then Justice 
Minister, in the NI Assembly in 2016.  Sugden stated:   
While the costs are not directly comparable, the average annual cost of keeping an 
offender in prison in Northern Ireland was £57,643.  The National Offender 
Management Service (NOMS) figure in England and Wales was £35,182, and the 
cost for the Scottish Prison Service was £34,399 in the same year.' 
NI Assembly, Official Report, 29 November 2016 
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Information on the average cost of keeping an offender in prison in NI compared 
to the rest of the UK was made available in response to a question to Claire 
Sugden, then Justice Minister, in the NI Assembly in 2016.  Sugden stated:  
While the costs are not directly comparable, the average annual cost 
of keeping an offender in prison in Northern Ireland was £57,643.  The 
National Offender Management Service (NOMS) figure in England and 
Wales was £35,182, and the cost for the Scottish Prison Service was 
£34,399 in the same year. 
NI Assembly, Official Report, 29 November 2016. 
The reasons given for the significantly higher average cost of keeping an offender 
in prison in NI were a lack of economies of scale due to the small prison 
population in NI and also the extra costs related to keeping paramilitary prisoners 
(ibid.).
 
 
7.2  Prison conditions and reform
The Northern Ireland Prison Service (NIPS) was subject to an independent 
review in 2011.  The findings from this review fed into a significant prison reform 
programme which was launched in 2011 (Department of Justice, 2011).  Butler 
(2017) provided a comprehensive overview of the progress made and challenges 
remaining in her Knowledge Exchange Seminar Series Policy Brief (Butler, KESS, 
18 January 2017).  Achievements include progress in enhancing resettlement, 
rehabilitation and desistance provision.  This has involved facilitating families to 
play a more active role in encouraging and supporting change and in increased 
cooperation and engagement between NIPS and outside agencies.
There have also been improvements in the prison estate to improve the 
experience of prisoners and those working in prisons.  However, there remain 
challenges.  These include the financial situation with budget cuts putting 
strain on the service.  Another issue is the management of those with severe 
and enduring mental health problems.  Butler (2017) also notes that the 
management of those seeking to be held in separated conditions also poses 
ongoing challenges.
The wider political, social and economic conditions giving rise to the 
demand expressed by those entering prison to be held in separated 
conditions means that resolving this issue will require action by more 
than just NIPS and DOJNI.  Indeed, all government departments, 
political parties and the wider public will need to work together to try 
to reduce the influence of paramilitary groups within communities 
and encourage greater political, social and economic integration 
throughout Northern Ireland.  This should help lessen the demand 
expressed by those entering prison to be held in separated conditions 
and, therefore, over time negate the need for a separated regime within 
Northern Ireland prisons. (ibid., 2017:3)
The last Peace Monitoring Report (Wilson, 2016) detailed the shocking inspection 
reports at one prison Maghaberry in County Antrim.  Since then, despite some of 
the improvements noted above, the situation in Maghaberry remains worrying.  
In April 2018 the BBC produced a timeline of reports and inquiries following 
an inspectors report that said Maghaberry Prison is ‘unsafe and unstable’ for 
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prisoners and staff (BBC NI News, 18 April 2018).  Most recently the BBC 
reported that a 22 year old man had died in custody in Maghaberry (BBC NI 
News, 30 August 2018).
8.  SAFETY IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE
8.1  Internal perceptions
Evidence from the Policing Board Omnibus survey continues to show high and 
increasing percentages of people feeling very safe in their local community (see 
Figure 71).  In April 2017, a large majority of respondents (93 per cent) indicated 
that they felt very/fairly safe in their local community, a marginal increase on the 
April 2016 figure (91 percent).  The proportions of Protestant respondents rating 
their local community as ‘Very safe’ saw a statistically significant increase from 
42 per cent in April 2016 to 53 per cent in April 2017. 
Figure 71:  How safe do you feel in your local community?
 
Most recent results from the Life and Times survey are even stronger showing 
very high levels of feeling safe (see Figure 72). 
 
Figure 72:  How safe do you feel living in this area?
Percentage of respondents
2014 
(January)
2015 
(January)
2016 
(April)
2017 
(April)
Rating C P All C P All C P All C P All
Very safe 39 37 38 40 40 40 42 42 42 44 53 49
Fairly safe 53 53 52 51 48 49 46 50 49 47 42 44
Neither safe nor unsafe 4 6 5 5 7 6 5 5 5 5 3 4
Fairly unsafe 4 3 3 2 4 3 5 3 4 3 1 2
Very unsafe 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 2 1 1
All (%) Catholic (%) Protestant (%)
Very safe 74 72 79
Fairly safe 23 25 18
Neither safe nor unsafe 3 2 2
Fairly unsafe 1 0 0
Very unsafe 0 0 0
Can’t choose 0 0 0
Source: NILT, 2017
Source:  NI Policing Board, Omnibus Survey 2017
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8.2  External perceptions
The increased number of visitors to NI noted in the Economy section and 
the increase in Foreign Direct Investment are strong indicators that external 
perceptions of safety are positive.
9.  PEACE WALLS
Previous Peace Monitoring Reports have noted the confusion about the actual 
numbers of peace walls or physical barriers. The Belfast Interface Project’s (BIP) 
latest publication (Belfast Interface Project, 2017) identified a total of 97 barriers 
across Belfast, which is two fewer than they identified in their 2012 publication 
(Belfast Interface Project, 2012).  However they note  ‘But this slight difference 
masks a number of changes that have taken place.  We have recorded six 
barriers that have been removed in the past five years, another two that have 
been partially removed and in three cases the barrier has been ‘reclassified’, as 
no longer serving a function as an interface barrier, due to redevelopment’ (BIP, 
2017:5).  They go on to note that they identified an additional seven barriers or 
forms of defensive architecture that were not included in the previous volume.  
The report also lists 11 barriers in Derry~Londonderry, one in Lurgan and seven 
barriers in Portadown.
Meanwhile, in its most recent update, the Department of Justice note ownership 
of 59 interface structures (DoJ, 2018) across NI in Belfast, Portadown, Lurgan 
and Derry.  In the period 2013-2016, 11 of these were removed, four partially 
removed and two reclassified.  The Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE) is 
responsible for a further 20 structures.  It remains  a complex task to definitively 
count these structures.
In 2012, the Office of the First Minister and deputy First Minister (OFMdFM) 
set a target of removing all walls by 2023, however, limited progress has been 
achieved to date  The Chair of the International Fund for Ireland (IFI), Adrian 
Johnston, recently observed that the work of the IFI’s Peace Walls Programme to 
build the confidence of communities living near peace walls has been hindered 
by the lack of political progress, in the absence of a NI Executive (Belfast 
Telegraph, 23 May 2018).
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DIMENSION THREE 
Wealth, poverty and inequality
1. OVERVIEW
Previous Peace Monitoring Reports have drawn attention to the extent 
and impact of income inequality but also to how the NI interpretation 
of inequality has been less concerned with the gap between the rich and 
the poor and focused predominantly on the relationship between the two 
blocs – Catholic and Protestant. There has been little change in poverty 
rates and in the income inequality gap in NI since the last report and, as this 
dimension shows, there are indications that despite a historically low rate 
of employment this is not projected to change. A range of factors including 
the nature of labour market jobs, inequalities in education attainment and 
qualifications, continuing lower wage levels than other parts of the UK and 
welfare reform changes will see poverty rates rise for some groups.
2. WEALTH
2.1  Wealth and inequality
The 2014 Peace Monitoring Report noted that due to the lack of data there 
could only be limited speculation on social inequality as the measurement 
of wealth disparities. This continues to be the case and it is a significant 
omission that NI is not included in the Wealth and Assets Survey carried out 
in Britain. Internationally, there has been a growing focus on the importance 
of looking at inequality in the distribution of wealth in addition to inequality 
in the distribution of income. Wealth inequality tends to be greater than 
income inequality and wealth can be accumulated and retained over years. 
In many parts of the world, including the UK, significant wealth is very 
unequally shared. Although wealth inequality in Britain fell for much of the 
twentieth century it is almost twice the level of income inequality (D’Arcy 
and Gardiner, 2017). The Belfast Telegraph reported on 5 September 2017 
that there are 12,500 millionaires living in NI — a rise of 8.7 per cent on the 
previous 12 months, ‘bringing the regional share of millionaires to 2 per cent 
of the UK as a whole’.  Barclays Wealth & Investments publishes an annual 
UK Prosperity Map ranking UK regions and cities in terms of their affluence. 
A Prosperity Index score is calculated for each UK city and region.  This is 
based on a range of existing data including median household wealth, GDP 
per capita, unemployment rate, average weekly household expenditure, 
average house price, proportion of pupils with A*-C GCSE grades, mean 
number of paid hours per week, mean gross annual pay, business birth-to-
death ratio and insolvency rate. 
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The report for 2017 (Figure 73) shows NI moving up one place to 4th in the 
UK, with a 3.8 per cent increase in household expenditure and an 8.7 per 
cent growth in millionaires.
Figure 73: UK Prosperity Map - Prosperity Index scores - region
3. INCOME INEQUALITY
3.1  Income Inequality in the UK
O’Connor (2017) notes how OECD countries vary considerably in the extent 
to which their markets generate inequality and in the extent to which their 
welfare systems counteract that inequality. Figure 74 shows the rise in 
income inequality in selected countries since the 1970s as measured by the 
Gini coefficient.  The Gini coefficient is a widely used indicator of income 
inequality.  It summarises inequality in a single number which takes values 
between 0 and 100 per cent. A higher value indicates greater inequality.
London
KEY: Regional ranking in the Prosperity Index
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Figure 74: Gini Coefficient 1974-2014, selected OECD countries 
The UK has among the highest levels of income inequality in the OECD 
as measured by the Gini coefficient (Figure 75)  (OECD, 2018). With a 
coefficient of 35 (compared to that of Iceland at 25, the most equal country) 
the UK is in the top nine most unequal countries.
Figure 75: Income Inequality OECD Countries 
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Figure 1: OECD data on market and post-tax/post-transfer GIni Coefficients 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Gini Coefficient 1974-2014, selected OECD countries 
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The welfare state makes income inequality significantly lower, however the 
UK remains the most unequal EU country according to the OECD analysis. 
While statistics (ONS 2018a) point to a small decline in income inequality 
in the UK in the last 10 years, this has not been sufficient to offset 
the substantial increase in inequality between 1978 and 1991 (Figure 
76).  Inequality in the financial year 2017 at 32.2 per cent, based on the 
Living Costs and Food Survey, is similar to the 2016 figure of 31.6 per 
cent.  Notably, the data also shows the effects of cash benefits and taxes - 
inequality of original income as measured by the Gini coefficient was 48.9 
per cent but reduces to 32.2 per cent for disposable income when the effects 
of cash benefits and taxes are factored in.
Another way of looking at inequality is to compare incomes at different 
points along the income distribution. The P90/P10 ratio compares the 90th 
percentile of the income distribution (the point at which 90 per cent of 
individuals have a lower household income and 10 per cent have a higher 
income) with the 10th percentile (10 per cent have a lower household 
income, 90 per cent a higher income).  In 2016/17 in the UK, a person at the 
90th percentile of the income distribution (a relatively high income) had an 
income 3.9 times higher than someone at the 10th percentile (a relatively 
low income) before housing costs (McGuiness, 2018).  If the share of all 
income going to different groups is examined, data for 2016/17 shows that 
41 per cent of total disposable household income (before housing costs) in 
the UK went to the 20 per cent of individuals with the highest household 
incomes, while 8 per cent went to the bottom 20 per cent (based on the 
Family Resources Survey). 
Page 11 of 27
1.
2.
Private pensions include all non-state pensions whether occupational or personal.
Data downloaded from DWPʼs Stat-Xplore tool in October 2017.
7 . Gradual decline in income inequality over the last decade
The Gini coefficient is a commonly-used measure of income inequality. Gini coefficients can vary between 0 and 
100 and the lower the value, the more equally household income is distributed. Figure 7 shows the effects of 
cash benefits and taxes on reducing inequality, as measured by the Gini. Before taxes and benefits, inequal ty of 
original income was 48.9% in financial year ending (FYE) 2017. After taking account of cash benefits, inequality 
of gross income fell to 35.4%, with a further reduction to 32.2% for disposable income (after the effects of direct 
taxes are taken into account).
Figure 7: Gini coefficients for original, gross and disp sable income using the Livin  Costs and Food 
Survey, financial year ending 2008 to financial year ending 2017
Source: Office for National Statistics
When looking at the change in inequality over the last 10 years, income inequality, as measured by the Gini 
coefficient, has shown a downward trend across all three measures of income. There has been no statistically 
significant change in the Gini for any of the income measures in the last year.
Source: Office for National Statistics (2018a)
Figure 76:  Gini coefficients for original, gross and disposable income using the Living Costs and Food Survey, 
financial year ending 2008 to financial year ending 2017
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Household incomes are also affected by direct and indirect taxes and 
benefits (in cash and kind).  ONS (2018b) analysis shows that in the financial 
year ending 2017, the average income of the richest fifth of households 
before taxes and benefits was £88,800 per year; for the poorest fifth it was 
£7,400.  The poorest fifth of households paid the most, as a proportion of 
their disposable income, on indirect taxes – 29.7 per cent compared with 
14.6 per cent paid by the richest fifth of households.  The average value of 
indirect taxes paid by the poorest 50 per cent of households was estimated 
to have increased by £350 between the financial year 2016 and 2017 after 
accounting for the effects of inflation, mainly due to growth in the average 
amount of Value Added Tax and intermediate taxes that households paid.
3.2 Income differentials in 
 Northern Ireland
Assessing the proportion of households living on 60 per cent of the median 
income  is used to measure inequality of income in NI. The Households 
below Average Income (HBAI) report published by the Department for 
Communities annually presents information on living standards in NI based 
on household income measures.  There has been some rise in household 
incomes in NI since 2011/12 following a substantial fall linked to the 
economic recession from 2008. The 2017 report indicates that median real 
terms household income before housing costs (BHC) increased by 4 per 
cent between 2014/15 and 2015/16 to £436 per week (£22,800 per year). 
The after housing costs (AHC) income also increased by 4 per cent (Figure 
77).  Figure 78 shows changes in real terms income by quintile.  As has 
been the pattern, NI income levels remain lower than in the UK as a whole 
(year 2015/16). Almost three fifths of individuals in NI have a household 
income below the UK median income of £481 per week. Over the same year 
household incomes in NI increased at a higher rate than the UK average - 4 
percentage points compared to 1.  
Figure 77:  Equivalised weekly household income 
Source: Department for Communities (2017)  BHC Before Housing Costs.  
AHC After Housing Costs. 
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There are two main income sources that make up the majority of household 
income in NI - earnings and state support which together account for 
approximately 88 per cent of combined income.  Figure 79 below shows 
the proportion of each income source that makes up the overall gross 
household income, divided into quintiles.  Only a very small proportion of NI 
households derive income from investments.  
Source: Department for Communities (2017)
Source: Department for Communities (2017)
Figure 78: Changes in real terms income by quintile, 2014/15 to 2015/16, NI
Figure 79:  Income sources as a proportion of gross income (BHC) by Quintile (2015/16)
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Households living on lower incomes are less likely to have savings.  Data 
published by the Financial Conduct Authority (2018) reported that fewer 
people in NI had a savings account than elsewhere in the UK (52 per cent 
compared to 59 per cent) and 12 per cent of people in NI had no savings 
or investments.  In 2015/16, 5 per cent of households in NI were in debt 
(defined by the Family Resources Survey as being behind with any household 
bill or credit commitment) but this rises to 11 per cent of households in the 
poorest fifth of the population, compared with less than 1 per cent in the 
richest fifth (Barnard, 2018)
3.3 Earnings
Average earnings in NI are lower than in the UK generally.  The Annual Survey 
of Hours and Earnings at April 2017 puts median gross weekly earnings at 
£501 compared to a UK median of £550. NI is the third lowest of the 12 UK 
regions (Figure 80) and while this represents an improvement on the 2016 
ranking it continues a trend in much lower earnings in NI (Figure 81).  In the 
Republic of Ireland the Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs Survey puts 
average weekly earnings at 723 Euro.  
Source: Office of National Statistics
Figure 80:  Median full-time gross weekly earnings and percentage change from previous year, by region,  
UK, April 2017
savings account than elsewhere in the UK (52 per cent compared to 59 per cent) 
and 12 per cent of people in NI had no savings or inv stments.  In 2015/16, 5 per 
cent of households in NI were in debt (defined by the Family Resources Survey as 
being behind with any household bill or credit commitment) but this rises to 11 per 
cent of households in the poorest fifth of the population, compared with less than 1 
per cent in the richest fifth (Barnard, 2018). 
 
3.3  Earnin  
Average earnings in NI are lower than in the UK generally.  The Annual Survey of 
Hours and Earnings at April 2017 puts median gross weekly earnings at £501 
compared to a UK median of £550. NI is the third lowest of the 12 UK regions 
(Figure 8) and while this represents an improvement on the 2016 ranking it continues 
a trend in much lower earnings in NI (Figure 9).  In the Republic of Ireland the 
Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs Survey puts average weekly earnings at 
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Figure 8:  Median full-time gross weekly earnings and percentage change from 
previous year, by region, UK, April 2017  
 
Source: Office of National Statistics (2017) 
 
Figure 9: Median gross weekly earnings for full-time employees in NI and the 
UK, April 1997 to 2017 
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As shown in Figure 82 (Cribb et al, 2018), employees in NI along with those 
in the Midlands and the North of England are more likely to be in the bottom 
20 per cent of the wage distribution.  
Source: Cribb et al (2018)
Source: Northern Ireland Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (2017)
Figure 81:  Median gross weekly earnings for full-time employees in NI and the UK, April 1997 to 2017
Figure 82:  Fraction of employees aged 25+ in the bottom wage quintile in 2016-17, by region and nation of the UK
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There is a more positive picture with regard to the gender pay gap for full-
time workers with earnings for females 3.4 per cent greater than those for 
full-time males.  There has been an upward trend in the full-time hourly 
rate for females which is not reflected in the UK as a whole, with male 
full-time workers earning 10 per cent more on average than females. The 
highest increase in real average weekly earnings for all full-time employee 
women since 2008 has been in NI (Powell, 2018) and the higher male hourly 
earnings (£1 more than for females) for all employees (full-time and part-
time) is primarily due to a higher proportion of males working full-time 
(Figure 83).
While the overall gap between male and female pay is narrowing in NI there 
are still inequalities. In particular, the gap between male and female earnings 
in specific occupations shows considerable variations. Analysis by the NI 
Assembly Research and Information Service (Scholes and Stennett, 2018) 
shows the gender pay gap to be much greater in the private sector (10.5 per 
cent) than the public sector (3.4 per cent) and that there is variation in the 
gender pay gap between industry sectors and in specific types of occupation 
(see Figure 84).
 
Source: Northern Ireland Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (2017)
Figure 83:  Median gross hourly earnings excluding overtime by gender in NI, April 1997 to 2017
on av rage than femal s. The highest increase in real average weekly earnings for 
all full-time employee women since 2008 has been in NI (Powell, 2018) and the 
higher male hourly earnings (£1 more than for females) for all employees (full-time 
and part-time) is primarily due to a higher proportion of males working full-time. 
(Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11 Median gross hourly earnings excluding overtime by gender in NI, 
April 1997 to 2017 
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Source: Northern Ireland Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (2017) 
 
While the overall gap between male and female pay is narrowing in NI there are still 
inequalities. In particular, the gap between male and female earnings in specific 
occupations shows considerable variations. Analysis by the NI Assembly Research 
and Information Service (Scholes and Stennett, 2018) shows the gender pay gap to 
be much greater in the private sector (10.5 per cent) than the public sector (3.4 per 
c nt) and that there is variation in the gender pay gap between industry sectors and 
in specific types of occupation.   
 
Figure 12: Variation in the Gender Pay Gap across standard occupational 
classifications using median hourly earnings (excluding overtime) for 2017  
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Women earn less than men in all of the nine occupation groups but the pay 
gap is widest for skilled trades, also the group with the smallest number of 
females employed (1 per cent).  In the highest paid occupations men earn 
10.8 per cent more than women. This may go some way in explaining the 
overall Gender Pay Gap as the higher paid will have a greater impact on the 
overall median earnings figures.  Overall, wages in NI are lower relative to the 
UK and are a contributing factor to poverty rates.
Source: Scholes and Stennett (2018)
Figure 84:  Variation in the Gender Pay Gap across standard occupational classifications using median hourly 
 earnings (excluding overtime) for 2017
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4. POVERTY RATES
It is worth starting this section with something of a health warning as 
the Institute for Fiscal Studies reports  that NI is likely to see sharply 
increased rates of poverty, especially child poverty, as welfare ‘reforms’ are 
implemented here (Hood and Walters, 2017).  Recent figures published 
by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation show that 370,000 people in NI live 
in poverty and that poverty rates, at about one in five of the population, 
have changed little in NI over the past decade (Barnard, 2018).  Rates vary 
between different groups with the highest rate of poverty among families 
with children and the lowest among pensioners.  Reflecting the wider UK 
pattern in terms of working age adults living in poverty there has been 
an increase in the number of working-age adults without children in NI in 
poverty (Figure 85).
Trends in the decade up to 2016 show little change in the poverty rate for 
couples with children; couples without children had the lowest poverty rates, 
although these have increased in NI, from 10 per cent in 2003/06 to 13 per 
cent in 2013/16 with a rise in poverty rates among single people without 
children from 20 per cent in 2003/06, to 24 per cent in 2013/16 (Figure 86).
Source: Barnard (2018)
Figure 85:  Proportion of people living in relative poverty (AHC) in NI, by household typeFigure 13: Proportion of people living in relative poverty (AHC) in NI, by 
household type 
 
 
Source: Barnard (2018) 
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Figure 14: Poverty Rates  
Source: Barnard (2018) 
 
When  compared to the rest of the UK the poverty rate in NI is slightly lower than 
England and Wales but higher than Scotland (Figure 15).  However, in the years 
reported on here, some of the cuts contained in the 2012 Welfare Reform Act will not 
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When compared to the rest of the UK the poverty rate in NI is slightly lower 
than England and Wales but higher than Scotland (Figure 87).  However, in 
the years reported on here, some of the cuts contained in the 2012 Welfare 
Reform Act will not have been implemented yet in NI but will have come 
into effect in England, Wales and Scotland.  
Figure 87:  Poverty rates in the UK
Source: Barnard (2018)
Source: Barnard (2018)
Figure 13: Proportion of people living in relative poverty (AHC) in NI, by 
household type 
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When  compared to the rest of the UK the poverty rate in NI is slightly lower than 
England and Wales but higher than Scotland (Figure 15).  However, in the years 
reported on here, some of the cuts contained in the 2012 Welfare Reform Act will not 
Figure 86: Proportion of working-age adults living in relative income poverty (AHC) in 2013/14-2015/16 by 
family type, England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland
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Source: Valadez- Martinez and 
Hirsh (2018) 
As in the UK overall, child poverty in NI has remained at a similar level over 
the last 10 years at 27 per cent in 2003/06 and 25 per cent in 2013/16.  The 
rate is lower than in England or Wales and similar to Scotland (23 per cent) 
(Barnard, 2018).  Figures compiled by Valadez-Martinez and Hirsh (2018), 
and published by the End Child Poverty Coalition, show that in NI, Foyle, 
West Belfast and North Belfast experience the highest levels of child poverty 
with the lowest levels in Lagan Valley, North Down and South Antrim (Figure 
88). Overall rates mask very high levels of poverty in wards within some 
constituencies where the rate was close to or over 50 per cent including in 
the University Ward in East L’Derry Constituency (52.10 per cent); Colin Glen 
in West Belfast (49.19 per cent); Brandywell in Foyle (48.9 per cent) and 
Crumlin in North Belfast (47.09 per cent).  
Throughout the last ten years the group with the highest poverty in NI is 
lone parents.  In 2013/16 40 per cent of lone parents were living in poverty; 
the figure in 2003/06 was 44 per cent (Barnard, 2018).  While poverty in lone 
parent families had fallen since the highs of 20 years ago, and despite the 
increasing number of lone parents in work, recent years have seen increasing 
pressures on the income of lone parents in the UK.  Lone parents have been 
the hardest hit household type by changes introduced as a result of welfare 
reforms and, on average, they are set to lose over 7 per cent of their annual 
income by 2020  due to further reforms implemented under the 2015-2017 
government (Portes and Reed, 2017).  Changes being rolled out in NI are 
projected to impact even more negatively on lone parents here (discussed 
under ‘Welfare Reform’ below). 
5. HOUSING
While housing was somewhat neglected as a social policy issue in recent 
decades, economic disadvantage and inequality in the housing market have 
become the focus of much contemporary housing analysis, not least because 
of the Grenfell tower disaster (Hodkinson, 2018). Poor housing outcomes are 
fundamentally associated with income and wealth inequality.   
Studies have shown that tenure matters and that social housing is the 
safest tenure for more vulnerable households due to more secure tenancies 
and more affordable rents (Tunstall et al, 2013). In NI, as in the Republic of 
Ireland and Britain, housing tenure has changed dramatically over the last 
number of years (Figure 89) with a substantial increase in private renting and 
outright ownership and a sharp drop in the social housing sector (NIHE and 
Housing Association properties) (Mac Flynn and Wilson, 2018; Wallace, 2015).  
In the past two years up to 2017 private housing development has been 
roughly 2.5 times that of NIHE or housing association housing output 
(NISRA, 2017).  
 
Constituency
Percentage 
of Children in 
Poverty (AFC)
Foyle 34.38
Belfast West 33.91
Belfast North 32.50
East L’Derry 27.86
Newry and 
Armagh 27.84
West Tyrone 27.77
Mid Ulster 25.07
Fermanagh 24.27
South Down 24.26
North Antrim 23.41
Upper Bann 23.06
Strangford 21.94
Belfast East 21.90
East Antrim 21.77
Belfast South 20.74
South Antrim 18.70
North Down 18.30
Lagan Valley 17.67
Figure 88:  Children in poverty (%) 
after housing costs (AFC) by  
Northern Ireland Parliamentary 
Constituency
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Figure 89:  Housing Tenure Northern Ireland 2005/06-2015/16
The global financial crisis from 2008 had been preceded by a period of 
extraordinary growth and rising prices in the private sector housing market. 
From then it entered a prolonged decline with a 54.7 per cent fall in house 
prices between 2007 and 2013 (Wallace et al., 2014). The impact of this 
continues with a significant number of mortgaged households in NI in 
negative equity - over three times more mortgaged households were in 
negative equity (11 per cent) compared to the UK average of 3 per cent.  An 
analysis of home ownership and poverty for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
(Wallace et al, 2018) found that across the UK, those with an increased risk 
of being in poverty included households who were in semi-routine or routine 
employment, were self-employed, had a minority ethnic background, were 
young, single, a lone parent, overcrowded, or had experienced relationship 
breakdown. In many respects the picture in NI was similar to that in the 
rest of the UK but the main drivers of the higher poverty rate in NI were: 
a greater proportion of self employed home owners; fewer home-owners 
in professional occupations; and, at the time of the study, a higher rate of 
unemployment. NI had the third highest rate of mortgaged households 
paying over 25 per cent of their net income on housing costs among all 
regions of the UK (30 per cent), with only London and the south of England 
paying more. In the decade from 2005/06 to 2015/16 the number of people 
renting their homes from private landlords almost doubled from 10 per cent 
to 19.2 per cent.  At the same time there was a fall in the number of people 
renting from the NIHE which declined from 13.9 per cent in 2005/06 to 10.8 
per cent in 2015/16. Figure 90 illustrates how the increase in private renting 
has been particularly high among those in lower age groups (18-34 and 34-
49) and while homeownership has declined for all age groups this is most 
evident in the 18-34 group.  
Source: Mac Flynn and Wilson, 2018 
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Recent work by Mac Flynn and Wilson (2018) provides new analysis on 
the affordability of housing in NI and the impact of housing costs on living 
standards.  They found that when measured against the other regions of 
the UK housing costs in NI compare quite favourably. For those in rental 
tenures NI is the most affordable UK region. NI mortgage repayments as a 
percentage of a mortgage owner’s income are also comparatively low. Lower 
housing costs than the rest of the UK may explain some of the lower child 
poverty in NI. However, it is also clear that while affordability may not be 
an issue for the population as a whole, for particular groups housing costs 
are impacting significantly on their living standards.   This is particularly the 
case for low-income households in the private rented sector, who have high 
housing costs and also a high risk of poverty. One in ten households in NI 
spend more than 40 per cent of their net household income on housing costs 
and these are most likely to be those in the private rented sector as shown 
(Figure 91).  The housing costs associated with private renting have also been 
found to increase the relative rate of poverty more substantially for women 
than men (Wallace, 2015). 
Figure 91: Percentage of household income spent on housing costs
All tenures* Social rent Private rent Mortgage
< 25% 67.9 57.7 61.3 79.2
> 25% 32.1 42.3 38.7 20.8
40% > 9.5 10.5 13.8 5.4
Source:  Mac Flynn and Wilson (2018)
Figure 90:  Age cohorts by housing tenure in Northern Ireland, 2005/06 – 2015/16 (%)
Tenure Type Year 18-34 34-49 50-64 65+
Rented from NIHE 05/06 13.1 13.1 13.3 16.4
15/16 10.4 10.1 11.4 11.2
Rented from HA 05/06 1.9 1.5 1.3 6.1
15/16 4.7 2 2.7 3.9
Rented private 05/06 27.6 6.8 5.4 7
15/16 50.2 19.9 7.8 6.6
Owned outright 05/06 7.8 15.2 43.6 68
15/16 3.3 12.8 51.5 75.6
Owned with mortgage 05/06 49.6 63.5 36.4 2.6
15/16 31.4 55.1 26.6 2.7
Source:  Mac Flynn and Wilson (2018)
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A number of important points emerge from Mac Flynn and Wilson’s (2018) 
study.  They conclude that while the evidence suggests that risk of poverty 
after housing costs (AHC) in the social rented sector is being driven by the 
lower incomes of those in this sector, poverty AHC in the private rented 
sector is affected more by the higher housing costs faced by those in this 
sector with the lowest incomes.  Despite having the same median household 
income those with the lowest incomes in the social rented sector have 
a significantly lower risk of poverty after housing costs than those in the 
private rented sector; for those with low income significantly higher housing 
costs in the private rented sector exacerbates the risk of poverty.  As the 
authors identify, this is concerning in the context of the ‘residualisation’ of 
the social rented sector, and the increasing reliance on the private rented 
sector by those with low incomes. 
Housing segregation is central to any analysis of housing in NI and related 
policies and discussions about provision, demand and waiting lists and these 
issues are discussed in Dimension Four.
6.  WELFARE REFORM
Social Security is a devolved matter but the scope for divergence is 
reduced by the dependence on financial subvention from the Westminster 
Government, although there has been some variance with regard to 
regulations (McKeever, 2017).  Earlier welfare reform legislation, replicating 
legislation at Westminster, had been passed by the Assembly but there 
was more substantial political disagreement regarding whether the 2012 
Welfare Reform Act should be implemented in NI. The inability of the parties 
to reach consensus eventually led to an agreement that the Westminster 
government would temporarily assume responsibility for welfare reform and 
the Welfare Reform (NI) Order 2015 was passed.  The reforms set out in the 
2012 Act were underpinned by a strong rights and responsibilities agenda, 
with an increase in conditionality. The intention was that more people would 
be encouraged into work through better financial incentives and a more 
simplified system.  The legislation provided for the introduction of major 
changes to the social security system including: the introduction of Universal 
Credit, a new benefit which would replace six existing benefits and tax 
credits, including in-work tax credits; a new disability benefit, the Personal 
Independence Payment to replace Disability Living Allowance; and a Benefit 
Cap.  In April 2017, new rules came into force limiting the child element of 
Child Tax Credit and Universal Credit awards to two children.  
All of the devolved jurisdictions in the UK took steps to mitigate the welfare 
reform measures.  In NI, these included a system of supplementary payments 
for those experiencing financial disadvantage as a result of some of the 
changes. These mitigations are based on the recommendations of a working 
group led by Professor Eileen Evason and are only in place until March 2020 
(Evason, 2016).
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Evidence suggests that the benefit reforms will suppress the income of low 
income households in NI in the coming years. Research published by The 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (Hood and Walters, 2017) has estimated that the 
freeze on social security benefits, whereby the value of most working age 
benefits are fixed in cash terms, has reduced the value of affected benefits 
by just 1 per cent between 2015/16 and 2017/18 but because of inflation, 
it expects a further real reduction of 5.7 per cent between 2017/18 and 
2018/19, or a real value reduction of benefits of 6.7 per cent by 2019.
Hood and Waters (2017) using Office for Budget Responsibility data project 
an increase in UK child poverty figures of 4 percentage points, largely due to 
benefit reforms. Research on destitution in the UK (Fitzpatrick et al, 2018) 
has highlighted how benefit sanctions are a significant factor contributing 
to destitution.  It also shows the particular vulnerabilities facing disabled 
and sick people.  In the period April 2014-April 2015, 5,779 sanctions 
were imposed on people in receipt of Jobseekers Allowance in NI.  There is 
evidence from Freedom of Information requests (PPR, 2018) that there have 
been sanctions imposed on people in NI receiving Employment and Support 
Allowance but no clear figures are available about how common these are. 
Assessments of the impact of the welfare reforms in Britain where they 
have been in place for longer have identified considerable failings in the 
process of implementation. There is evidence of the reforms’ inability to 
meet the underpinning objectives and of the negative impact on claimants 
and families. In England a report by the National Audit Office (2018) 
concluded that the welfare programme may end up costing more than the 
system it replaces and is unlikely to deliver value for money.  It identifies 
consistent evidence of the difficulties and hardship experienced by claimants 
during the rollout of the reforms and raised doubts about positive impact 
on employment stating that it ‘will never be able to measure whether 
Universal Credit actually leads to 200,000 more people in work because it 
cannot isolate the effect of Universal Credit from other economic factors in 
increasing employment’ (para 16).  
The potential for greater divergence in social security policy in the UK comes 
with the new powers devolved to Scotland in the Scotland Act (2016).   A 
new legislative framework for the Scottish welfare system gives the Scottish 
Government power over a considerable degree of social security policy.   
Social security has been presented as a human right with seven principles 
underpinning the legislation. The Social Security (Scotland) Act received 
Royal Assent in June 2018, inaugurating a government agency which will 
administer 11 current benefits.  The legislation also contains a commitment 
that the private sector will not carry out disability assessments.  
The implementation of welfare reform is now underway in NI with Universal 
Credit scheduled to be rolled out fully by December 2018. In the absence 
of an Assembly there is no political scrutiny of the impact of welfare 
reforms or planning for the end of the current mitigation measures.  A 
Department for Communities commissioned independent review of the 
Personal Independence Payment assessment process (Radar, 2018) found 
that the issues raised in NI were similar to those raised in GB.  It reported a 
fragmented process which impacts negatively on both claimants and those 
who seek to support them and concluded that the assessment process does 
not have the confidence and trust of claimants.  The NI Audit Office is due 
to publish an overview of welfare reform in Autumn 2018 which will include 
analysis of impacts and risks and an assessment of the mitigation measures.  
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As noted by the Social Security Advisory Committee (SSAC) (2017) in its 
report on in-work progression and Universal Credit, the roll out of the welfare 
reform changes coincides with a dramatic growth in part-time and more 
‘flexible’ patterns of working. In-work conditionality means that people who 
are in work and claiming Universal Credit (UC) can have conditions placed 
upon their UC including tailored work search and work preparation.  The 
SSAC report also noted that opportunities for in-work progression are not 
just linked to personal behaviour or attitude, but are affected by a number 
of factors including local labour market conditions, level of educational 
attainment, infrastructure such as public transport and childcare provision 
and other family and caring related responsibilities. 
Projections by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (Cribb et al, 2018) show income 
inequality in the UK increasing over the next four or five years, assuming no 
change in government policy. Forecast growth in real earnings is expected to 
mostly benefit higher-income households, since earnings make up a larger 
share of total income for these households. Cuts in the real value of working-
age benefits are expected to reduce the real incomes of poorer households 
and housing costs are expected to increase for low income households as a 
consequence of rising rents. When the combined planned benefit cuts, and 
other effects, are taken into account the estimates suggest that the income 
of a household at the 10th percentile of the distribution will decrease by 7 
per cent between 2015/16 and 2021/22, after adjusting for inflation.
7. EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT
7.1 Unemployment 
NI Labour Market statistics (NISRA, 2018) show that at May 2018 the NI 
unemployment rate was 3.5 per cent, a decrease of 1.8 percentage points on 
the previous year. This is the joint second lowest rate of the UK regions and 
compares favourably to a UK average rate of 4.2 per cent, an EU figure of 7.1 
per cent and a rate of 5.9 per cent in the Republic of Ireland (NISRA, 2018).  
The long term unemployment rate (percentage of unemployed who have 
been unemployed for 1 year or more), historically high in NI, increased from 
48.3 per cent (July 2017 Labour Force Survey) to 59 per cent over the year 
(Labour Force Survey, July 2018). The UK average rate is 27.1 per cent. 
7.2 Employment
At 69.8 per cent, NI’s employment rate is slightly higher than in the previous 
year and significantly above 2013 rates.  Even so, it is below the UK average 
of 75.7 per cent and continues to be the lowest of the UK regions as shown 
in Figure 92.  In almost every year since the 2008 recession the regions with 
the lowest employment rates have been NI and the North East of England 
(Powell, 2018). 
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Figure 92: Employment rate (NI and UK) 2008-2018 
In all the UK regions men have higher employment rates than women but 
the biggest gap is in NI with an employment rate of 72.3 per cent for men 
(increased by 0.6 percentage points over the year) and a rate for women of 
67.1 per cent (increased by 2.1 percentage points over the year).  Figures 
published by the Department for the Economy in March 2018 show that 
almost all of the economic growth between 2008 and 2016 was accounted 
for by migrant workers.  As the report states (p.2) ‘Uniquely within the UK 
and in comparison to England, Scotland and Wales, NI has been almost 
entirely reliant on employment from the EU (26) migrant for the growth in 
employment levels, particularly between 2013 and 2016’.   Figure 93 shows 
components of change in employment and the contribution made by those 
with a different country of birth between 2008 and 2016. 
Source: NISRA (2018)
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This reliance on migrant workers is most obvious in the manufacturing of 
food products, waste collection, in residential care facilities and in food and 
beverages.  The data shows that from 2004 workers from across the EU have 
been relied on to fill lower skilled and lower wage jobs.  
7.3 Economic inactivity
NI has had a high level of economic inactivity over the past two decades.  
Economically inactive people, for the purpose of statistics, are defined as 
people who are neither in employment nor unemployed on the International 
Labour Organisation measure. It includes all those who are looking after a 
home, long term sick or disabled, students and retired people. With a NI rate 
of 27.5 per cent (July 2018) there is a gap of 7 percentage points between 
NI and the UK average rate (Figure 94) and the rate has been consistently 
higher than elsewhere in the UK over the last 30 years.   
Source: Department for the Economy (2018)
Figure 93: Components of change in employment and the contribution made by those with  
a different country of birth between 2008 and 2016
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Comprehensive analysis of economic inactivity in NI by Ulster University’s 
Economic Policy Centre (Magill and McPeake, 2016) provides useful insight 
into the characteristics of the economically inactivity population and long 
term trends.   More women than men are defined as economically inactive 
(57 per cent of total) and those over 50 make up half of the economically 
inactive population. One third of the economically inactive group are people 
claiming long term sickness benefits. The second largest category are full-
time students (26 per cent of total) with the next largest being people who 
are looking after their family and home.  There is also a relatively small 
number of people who have retired before the age of 65. Importantly the 
Magill and McPeake (2016) analysis shows that if students are excluded the 
inactivity rate of the non-student population has increased since 2012 and 
actually widened the gap between NI and the UK. 
Among the UK regions NI has the largest proportion of economically inactive 
people classed as long term sick or disabled.  This has been a significant 
upward trend over the last 20 years. NI has the second highest recipient 
rate of sickness/ disability benefit recipients amongst advanced economies. 
Poverty and long term sickness and disability are closely linked. Families with 
at least one disabled member make up 33 per cent of those in poverty in 
the UK. A number of factors have been identified as contributing to high and 
growing levels of long term sickness and disability in NI including: the impact 
of benefit changes and tighter eligibility which it is argued resulted in people 
moving from Job Seeker’s Allowance to sickness and disability benefits; 
the impact of structural labour market changes which has made it harder 
for some groups to enter and remain in work and the well documented 
difficulties experienced by disabled people seeking to obtain work.  There has 
been an intense focus on reforming disability benefits and increasing work 
levels in recent decades but substantive improvements have often failed to 
Source: Labour Force Survey (May 2018)
Figure 94: Seasonally adjusted economic inactivity rates (16-64), Jan-Mar 2008 to Jan-Mar 2018
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materialise.  Even allowing for qualification levels it has been shown that 
disabled people face an employment penalty (MacInnes et al, 2014) and are 
more likely to be low paid if in work.  In NI there has been a growing body 
of evidence on how rates of long term sickness and disability are related to 
the conflict.  Tomlinson (2016: 118) based on analysis of Poverty and Social 
Exclusion Survey data suggests that there is clear evidence of the impact of 
years of violent conflict on the population of NI noting that ‘Experience of 
conflict-related events, from witnessing violence to the loss of close friends 
and relatives, is imprinted on a ‘Troubles cohort’, an age group that were 
children and young people at the start of the worst of the violence and 
killing, though other age groups are also affected. High ‘Troubles’ experience 
more than doubles the risk of mental illness and self-reported poor health 
and long-standing illness or disability’. He argues that we should not 
therefore be surprised to find the conflict imprinted on the benefits system 
in the form of high rates of sickness and disability benefit receipt.  
There is no evidence at a UK level that long term sick and disability 
employment rates are improved by reducing the level of benefits, tightening 
eligibility or stronger activation policies.  The issues are complex and need to 
be analysed in the context of continuing limited labour market opportunities.  
There is some evidence that specialist work support programmes can help 
and of the critical role of employers (MacInnes et al, 2014). 
In recent decades there has been a big change in the number of people who 
are economically inactive because they are looking after family/home in 
NI – dropping from a rate of 18 per cent in 1981 to 6 per cent in 2015.  This 
is largely due to the increase in the number of women in paid work.  Yet, it 
continues to be the case that one of the reasons for the higher inactivity rate 
amongst the female working age population is the much higher proportion 
of women who are ‘looking after the family/home’ – 12 per cent of working 
age females compared to just 1 per cent of working age males. The extent 
to which this is a ‘choice’ needs to be considered in the context of local 
labour market conditions and infrastructure supporting women’s ability to 
enter and remain in employment including childcare and public transport.  
For example, NI remains the only region of the UK not to have a childcare 
strategy. Of relevance here also is the general lack of progress with regards to 
women’s equality including the absence of a Gender Equality Strategy, pay 
and occupational segregation.
NI has also seen an upward trend in the under 24 economic inactivity 
rate (when full-time students are excluded).  In 2015/16 there was a 
sharp increase in the number of people in this age group categorized as 
economically inactive because they were looking after family/home.  Within 
the UK and Ireland, we also have the highest number of young people not 
in employment,education or training which at 21 per cent is double the 
2006 rate.  There is a strong link between low educational achievement and 
economic inactivity levels.  Only 11 per cent of young people with a tertiary 
level qualification are not in employment, education or training while the 
figure for those qualified to lower secondary level or below is 33 per cent.  
As discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter, there are significant 
challenges with regards to educational outcomes in NI for some groups of 
young people.
Wealth, poverty and inequality
153
As noted by Magill and McPeake (2016), the increase in non-student 
economic inactivity since 2012 should be concerning to policy makers, 
particularly in light of a fall in figures elsewhere in the UK.  In Britain, only the 
increase in full-time students has provided any significant upward pressure 
on the inactivity rate.  Policy efforts to address economic inactivity need 
to address the broader constraining factors to employment including the 
complexity of barriers for sick and disabled people, the cost and availability 
of childcare, educational inequalities, earnings and opportunities for in-work 
progression.   
7.4 Employment and religion
Data released by the Equality Commission for NI in its 27th Fair Employment 
Monitoring Report is in line with trends in recent years showing a continuing 
narrowing gap between the Protestant and Catholic communities in both the 
private and public sector.  See Figures 95 and 96.  
Protestant [%] Catholic [%]
Source: ECNI (2017)
Figure 95: Sectoral components of the private sector (% by community background) 2016
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The report is based on a monitored workforce of 534,502, approximately 
two thirds of the total NI workforce. While members of the Protestant 
community make up the majority of the monitored workforce, 51.6 per 
cent compared to a Catholic share of 48.4 per cent, the Catholic share of 
the monitored workforce continues to increase in line with trends over 
time.  Catholics comprise a greater proportion of applicants – 53.2 per cent 
compared to 46.8 per cent for the Protestant Community. In every year since 
2006 the greatest proportion of appointees have been Catholics.  It is noted 
that while over time the increase in the Catholics community’s share of the 
monitored workforce has approximated estimates of Catholics available for 
work, this was not the case in 2016.   
7.5. Quality and nature of work
As outlined above, unemployment rates have been declining in NI and 
there is agreement that the most challenging issues include the quality of 
employment. OECD data shows that many countries have seen a growth in 
non standard and atypical work1 and NI has followed this pattern with an 
increase in part-time, temporary and self employed work.  Analysis by the 
Nevin Economic Research Institute (NERI) (Wilson, 2017) shows growth in 
more insecure forms of employment in NI citing 1 in 3 workers employed 
in more insecure form of employment compared to traditional standard 
employment.  While traditional permanent jobs remain the norm, in 2016 
these kind of contracts comprised the lowest share of the labour market than 
at any time since 2008 (see Figure 97).
1 Non standard/Atypical work includes any contract that is not full-time 
with an open ended contract
employment including the complexity of barriers for sick and disabled people, the 
cost and availability of childcare, educational inequalities, earnings and opportunities 
for in-work progression.    
 
7.4 Employment and religion 
Data released by the Equality Commission for NI in its 27th Fair Employment 
Monitoring Report is in line with trends in recent years showing a continuing 
narrowing gap between the Protestant and Catholic communities in both the private 
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Figure 23 Sectoral components of the private sector 2016 
 
 
Source: ECNI (2017) 
 
Figure 24 Monitored NI workforce all employees % by community background 
2016 
 
  
Source: ECNI (2017) 
Source: ECNI (2017)
Figure 96:  Monitored NI workforce all employees (% by community background) 2016
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Figure 97:  Percentage Share of the Labour Market, 2008-2016 
 
Those most likely to be in insecure employment are younger workers (aged 
18-34), and women who are more likely to be in temporary work.  There 
has been considerable debate about Zero Hours Contracts (ZHCs) but there 
is still a dearth of information in NI about their prevalence and impact.  As 
McVicar (2017) shows, data for the UK based on Quarterly Labour Force 
Surveys indicates that again these are more prevalent among the young and 
women and tend to be  concentrated in particular occupations. In fact 60 
per cent are in two occupational classes – elementary occupations and care 
and leisure occupations.  They are however found in a range of occupations 
including those classified as ‘higher level’.  Office of National Statistics 
figures based on Labour Force Survey data do provide estimates of ZHCs in 
each UK region and these are shown in Figure 98 overleaf. However, it should 
be noted that the sample size for smaller regions like NI is very low.  
Source: Nevin Economic Research Institute (NERI) (Wilson, 2017)
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Figure 98:  Zero Hour Contract Prevalence by UK Region 2016 
 
There is a need for more information on those in more insecure work 
or atypical work in NI.  While international research evidence suggests 
there can be benefits for workers in terms of flexibility there can also be 
adverse impacts.  The section on welfare reform discussed the increasing 
conditionality being placed on low paid workers to increase their hours and 
earnings.  Given the changing nature of the NI labour market we need to 
know more about the extent to which people are choosing more atypical 
work and about how this impacts on job satisfaction, in work progression 
and earning potential. 
8.  EQUALITY AND       
 INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION
The NI school system is still dominated by division with only 6.4 per cent 
of the 1,016 primary and post primary schools designated as Integrated 
which means that the majority are within the two main systems, one for 
Catholics and one for Protestants.  Topping and Cavanagh (2016:15) state 
that the ‘school system largely reflects traditional divisions in society’ 
with ‘the majority of children and young people educated within single or 
majority identity settings’.  Statistics show that 70.4 per cent of pupils who 
attend controlled schools are Protestant whilst 96.3 per cent of pupils at 
Catholic maintained schools are Catholic (ibid).  This is discussed further in 
Dimension Four. 
Source: McVicar (2017)
 In employment on 
a zero hours 
contract 
(thousands) 
Per cent of people in 
employment who are 
on a zero hours 
contract 
Statistical Reliability 
UK 903 2.9 *  
England 768 2.9 *  
North East 34 2.8 ****  
North West 102 3.0 ***  
87 3.4 ***  
83 3.6 ***  
West Midlands 79 3.0 ***  
East of England 72 2.3 ***  
London 95 2.1 ***  
South East 127 2.8 ***  
South West 90 3.3 ***  
Wales 42 2.9 ***  
Scotland 78 3.0 ***  
Northern Ireland 16 1.9 ****  
Yorkshire and The Humber
East Midlands
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A persistent inequality in the education system has related to the lower 
attainment of children receiving Free School Meals (FSME) – discussed 
later in this section. In 2017/18  98,302 or 29.8 per cent of the total pupil 
population were entitled to FSMs, a slight decrease on the 2016/17 figure 
of 30.6 per cent.  A much higher proportion of children in Special Schools 
(51 per cent) were entitled to FSME in 2017/18 compared to 30 per cent in 
the primary sector and 28 per cent in post-primary.  In terms of religion and 
FSME 33 per cent of Catholics compared to 26 per cent of Protestants were 
entitled in 2017/18 (Department of Education (DE), 2018).  However, uptake 
to FSME remains at about 80.8 per cent as noted in Figure 99.
 
 
8.1 Primary Education
The Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) was 
conducted in 2015 and is an international research project which assesses 
knowledge and skills in maths and science among pupils aged nine and 
ten and 13-14 (Bradshaw, et al., 2018).  The TIMSS findings for NI relate 
only to nine and ten year olds and highlight a ‘strong association between 
NI primary school pupils’ socioeconomic status and their attainment in 
maths and science’ (p2).  The last survey in 2011 revealed that pupils in 
NI performed well in mathematics, outperforming 44 of the 50 countries 
who participated (DE, 2012). In terms of science the correlation was 
Source: Department of Education, 2018
Figure 99: Uptake of school meals (free and paid), by school type 2014/15 – 2017/18.
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80%
70%
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50%
40%
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1  Nursery only includes pupils in nursery schools
2  Primary includes pupils in reception and nursery classes
3  Data taken from Table 3
Nursery Schools Primary and Preparatory Departments Secondary (non grammar) Grammar Special
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found to be less than that for mathematics but NI still had the strongest 
correlation between score and socioeconomic status with those in the most 
disadvantaged communities scoring lower than in other countries.  
In 2016 the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) was 
conducted among year 6 pupils (age 9-10) and found that pupils in NI 
significantly outperformed 41 of the 49 countries and performance has 
remained stable since 2011.  It was only outperformed by two other 
countries, two less than in 2011 (Sizmur, 2017).  However, other countries 
such as Republic of Ireland and England improved significantly since 2011. 
Of particular interest was the gap between the genders with attainment in 
reading favouring girls, with this gap increasing from 2011. The average score 
of 574 for girls compared to 555 for boys, a difference of 18 was the same 
as Poland and comparable to the international mean difference of 19 scale 
points.  
A gender difference in terms of attainment is not recorded in either 
mathematics or science in TIMSS 2015 in NI. The TIMSS found the same 
average attainment score, which was also noted in TIMSS 2011.  Gender 
differences in mathematics were a feature of the performance of other 
countries taking part in the study such as Canada and England where boys 
performed better but this did not apply to science (Sizmur, 2017). Although 
these are positive results in terms of performance overall the two surveys 
indicate that at primary level lower socio-economic groupings score lower in 
maths and science whilst boys score lower in reading and literacy.
In NI the ‘selection process’ at age 11 currently operates through two parallel 
systems depending on the type of school a child wishes to progress on to 
within the ‘grammar sector’.  The Eleven Plus system, which had been in 
operation since 1947 was officially removed in 2008, however due to the 
failure of the main parties to agree on an acceptable alternative the two 
grammar school sectors in NI introduced separate tests for post primary 
transfer. These tests are administered by the Association of Quality Education 
(AQE) and the GL system.  The AQE website states that the system ‘started 
off as an alliance of parents, principals, governors and teachers who believed 
that the future of post primary education in NI  should be based on our 
excellent secondary and grammar schools’. The Company AQE Ltd was 
established to run and manage the Common Entrance Assessment (CEA), 
‘providing grammar schools in NI with a method of maintaining academic 
selection’.  The AQE mainly operates within Controlled Grammar Schools.  
This runs in parallel with the GL system, mostly used by the Catholic 
Grammar Schools,  which is part of the ‘Post Primary Transfer Consortium’ 
and 34 schools use this system to select admission to Year 8 in NI.
8.2 Post primary education
The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is conducted 
every three years since 2000 in NI and is led by the Organisation for 
Economic Development (OECD). In total over 70 countries took part in 
2015 with all members of the OECD participating.  The study assesses 
the ability of 15 year olds in science, maths and reading and each study 
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will focus on one area, with science being the focus in 2015.  The findings 
indicated that the science performance had not altered since 2006 with 
14 countries performing better than NI and 34 countries scoring at least 
10 points lower.  In terms of maths the change was also not significant 
with 18 countries scoring higher and 35 countries at least 10 points lower.  
Reading also remained unchanged with 12 countries scoring higher and 39 
countries 10 points lower (Jerrim and Shure, 2016).  Gender differences were 
not significant for maths and science but girls performed better in reading.  
However, after 6 months of schooling this gap narrowed to be less than most 
other developed countries (Jerrim and Shure, 2016). As with the TIMSS scores 
socio-economic differences are clear but are comparable to other countries. 
The report indicated that scores do not differ significantly between pupils 
from Protestant and Catholic community backgrounds. 
Figure 100 highlights the percentage of School Leavers achieving at least 
5 GCSEs Grades A*-C from data collected by the DE (2018).  According to 
this data those leaving school with at least five GCSEs at grades A* to C is 
83.8 per cent, a 7.3 per cent increase in five years and those achieving A* 
to C including GCSE English and Maths has increased 7.6 per cent in five 
years to 69.6 per cent. There are significant differences in GCSE attainment 
between grammar and secondary schools.  In 2016/17 96.6 per cent of 
Grammar school pupils achieved at least 5 GCSEs Grades A*-C compared 
to only 73.7 per cent in the Non-Grammar sector (DE, 2018).  In terms of 
attainment within gender 88.1 per cent of girls achieved at least five GCSEs 
at grades A*-C compared to 79.7 per cent of boys, an 8.4 per cent differential 
(DE, 2018).  More boys left school with no GCSE qualifications than girls 
in 2016/17, 82 (0.7 per cent) boys and 50 (0.5 per cent) girls.  All of these 
figures vary when GCSE English and Maths is filtered in with, in most cases, 
the percentage being less as noted in Figure 101.  
Source: Department of Education (2018)
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Figure 100:  Percentage of school leavers achieving at least 5 GCSEs Grades A*-C (including equivalents) 2016/17
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However, as highlighted there are significant socio-economic differences 
in the results with only 69.0 per cent of those entitled to free school 
meals achieving a grade A* to C compared to 89.1 per cent of Non-FSME.  
Figure 102 illustrates the top six and lowest six ranking schools for GCSE 
attainment (grades A*-C, including English and Maths) and the FSME for 
the school.  It is clear that the gap between the two measures in the top six 
outweighs the narrow gap in the six lower ranking schools showing that the 
schools with more FSME have lower GCSE attainment. 
Figure 102: Performance at GCSE and numbers of FSME
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Source: Department of Education (2018)
Figure 101:  Percentage of school leavers achieving at least 5 GCSEs Grades A*-C (including equivalents) 
including GCSE English and Maths 2016/17
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In terms of ethnicity, minority ethnic groups who continue to A-Level are 
likely to do as well as those of a white ethnic origin and the differential at 
GCSE is marginal.  Figure 103 illustrates the percentages under White and 
Minority Ethnic Groups.  Indeed, Asian children are the group most likely to 
perform highest at A-level and GCSE as shown in Figure 104.  In contrast 
to this Irish Travellers are the least likely to perform with fewer than five 
children achieving 5 GCSEs A*-C in 2016/17.  This shows the inequality that 
still exists for Irish Travellers in terms of educational achievement.
Figure 103: Qualifications of school leavers by ethnic origin 2016/2017
Source: Department of Education (2018)
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2016/17 Total
WHITE Numbers %
2+ A-levels A*-E (2) 12522 58.5
At least 5 GCSEs A*-C(2) 17954 83.8
At least 5 GCSEs A*-C(2) inc English and maths 14919 69.6
Total White 21421 100.0
IRISH TRAVELLER Numbers %
2+ A-levels A*-E (2) 0 0.0
At least 5 GCSEs A*-C(2) * *
At least 5 GCSEs A*-C(2) inc English and maths 0 0.0
Total Irish Traveller 12 100.0
ASIAN Numbers %
2+ A-levels A*-E (2) 138 75.4
At least 5 GCSEs A*-C(2) 171 93.4
At least 5 GCSEs A*-C(2) inc English and maths 143 78.1
Total Asian 183 100.0
BLACK Numbers %
2+ A-levels A*-E (2) 36 46.8
At least 5 GCSEs A*-C(2) 58 75.3
At least 5 GCSEs A*-C(2) inc English and maths 37 48.1
Total Black 77 100.0
MIXED ETHNIC GROUP Numbers %
2+ A-levels A*-E (2) 90 53.9
At least 5 GCSEs A*-C(2) 142 85.0
At least 5 GCSEs A*-C(2) inc English and maths 120 71.9
Total Mixed Ethnic Group 167 100.0
OTHER NON-WHITE Numbers %
2+ A-levels A*-E (2) 72 58.5
At least 5 GCSEs A*-C(2) # #
At least 5 GCSEs A*-C(2) inc English and maths 80 65.0
Total Other Non-White 123 100.0
TOTAL LEAVERS Numbers %
2+ A-levels A*-E (2) 12858 58.5
At least 5 GCSEs A*-C(2) 18425 83.8
At least 5 GCSEs A*-C(2) inc English and maths 15299 69.6
Total School Leavers 21983 100.0
Source: School Leavers Survey (2018)
Notes
1. Excludes special and independent schools
2. Includes equivalent qualifications
* Denotes fewer than 5 pupils
# Figure not provided under the rules of statistical disclosure
Figure 104: Qualifications of school leavers by ethnic origin sub-categories(1)
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When qualifications are analysed by gender and religion Catholic girls 
outperform at both A-level and GCSE whilst Protestant boys perform at a 
lower level. In 2016/17 36.6 per cent of Protestant boys entitled to FSME 
gained 5 GCSEs at grades A*-C (including English and Maths) compared to 
45.0 per cent of Catholic boys entitled.  Similarly, Catholic girls entitled to 
FSME did better than Protestant girls with 55.6 per cent compared to 48.9 
per cent (Figure 105). 
Figure 105: Performance by gender, religion and FSME 2016/17
8.3 Higher Education
In terms of progression to Higher Education 43.3 per cent of school leavers 
went on to Institutions of Higher Education in 2016/17.  Here again, there 
are gender differences with over half, 51.1 per cent, of girls continuing 
into higher education compared to only 35.8 per cent of boys.  Boys were 
more likely than girls to go into vocational training - 14.5 per cent of boys 
compared to only 5 per cent of girls.  When analysed by religion Catholics 
were more likely to continue into higher education with a figure of 45.8 
per cent compared to 40.2 per cent of Protestants (DE, 2018). HESA data 
for 2017 published by the Department for the Economy (2017) shows that 
females accounted for 56.8 per cent of NI students enrolments whilst a 
higher proportion of males (76.7 per cent) were studying full-time than 
females (73.8 per cent). FactCheck NI claim that 33.5 per cent of school 
leavers continue their studies outside of NI with some choosing to do so 
whilst others ‘have to leave’ for various reasons. Statistics by Department for 
the Economy released in August 2018 indicate that many students studying 
in GB do not return to NI to work and that 34 per cent of NI domiciled 
full-time leavers from GB HEIs in employment were employed in NI. This 
compared to 61 per cent employed in GB, 1.8 per cent in the Republic of 
Ireland and 3.3 per cent in other locations. However, of those who study in 
NI 88.6 per cent remain and are in employment (Dept of Economy, 2018).
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9.   HEALTH CARE OUTCOMES AND   
 INEQUALITIES IN HEALTH
Problems with health and social care services in NI have attracted 
considerable public and media attention in the period since the last report.  
There is no doubt, as shown below, that on a number of key indicators, the 
health service is NI is not performing well. Since 2001 there have been 
seven high level reviews of the health and social care system with a good 
degree of consensus about the nature and extent of change required to 
make the system more efficient and sustainable.  Progress on implementing 
fundamental change has been limited, not helped by the collapse of the 
Executive and Assembly in January 2017 and the resultant lack of ministerial 
direction.  However, the problems predate the latest political crisis and grew 
over the life of the Assembly since 2008.  As shown below, waiting times have 
been increasing over a number of years, many key targets have never been 
met and outcomes with regard to population health continue to be strongly 
linked to socio-economic status. There has been a consistent reluctance 
to make, what would in some cases be publicly unpopular decisions about 
the rationalisation and location of acute services and implement structural 
change.  However, due to the social determinants of many health outcomes, 
the solution to major challenges around population health will not be met by 
structural changes but by improvements in other areas of social policy such 
as education and training, employment and social security.
9.1 Health service waiting times
Figures from June 2017 up to June 2018 show that in-patient and out-
patient waiting times have grown over the previous year with inpatient 
waiting times up 15.5 per cent on the previous year and out-patient waiting 
times up 4.3 per cent in the same period (Department of Health, 2018a).  
Ministerial targets2 were not achieved in either area.  As can be seen from 
Figure 106 waiting times have increased very significantly from 2014.  
Waiting times have been consistently increasing from 2010 apart from a 
reduction in 2013. 
2 For in-patient/day case admissions the target is that less than 45 % of patients should be waiting more than 13 
weeks and no patient wait longer than 52 weeks.  The out-patient targets are that less than 50% of patients should be 
waiting over 9 weeks for a first consultant-led outpatient appointment; no patient6 should wait longer than 52 weeks.
Figure 106:  Waiting times for in-patient / day case admissions and consultant led first outpatient appointments
2018 number of 
weeks/ % waiting 
2016 number of 
weeks/ % waiting
2014 number of 
weeks/ % waiting
In-patient/
Day case 
Admission
13 weeks 52 weeks 13 weeks 52 weeks 13 weeks 26 weeks
63.1 % 21.6% 55.3% 12.6% 35% 10.84%
Out-patient 
appointment 
9 weeks 52 weeks 9 weeks 52 weeks 9 weeks 18 weeks
73.2% 32.1% 72.4% 19.1% 38.5% 14.3%
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Ministerial waiting targets have changed frequently fluctuating between 
greater or less stringency; for example more stringent targets set in 2014/15 
were changed back to pre 2014 targets in 2015/16. Analysis of overall 
performance shows that over the period from 2009 most targets were not 
met (Black, 2015). Figures compiled by the BBC in 2017 comparing like 
for like statistics across the UK showed that the NI target for almost all 
emergency department patients to be seen within four hours has never been 
met (BBC, 2017) and Cancer Research UK figures published in 2018 revealed 
that NI has never met cancer target times since their introduction 8 years 
ago.  While 95 per cent of people should begin treatment within 62 days of 
an urgent GP referral figures published in September 2017 show that only 62 
per cent had begun treatment within target period (Department of Health, 
2018).   NI is not unique in experiencing these problems.  Increasing demand 
and budgetary constraints across the UK have seen all systems under 
pressure but NI does have some of the worst performance figures in the UK.  
There has also been higher per capita spend on health care here although this 
can be justified by higher relative spending needs in terms of greater levels of 
disability and morbidity (Ball et al, 2013).
9.2 Population health
Despite general improvements in life expectancy and premature mortality 
rates there are significant equality gaps (Figure 107). Across a wide range 
of indicators, differential rates between the least and most deprived areas 
remain and in some cases have widened. The Life Expectancy differential 
(2008-2010) between the 20 per cent most deprived areas and the NI 
average was 4.5 years for men and 2.6 years for women. In the 2013-2015 
period the corresponding figure was 4.2 years for men and 2.9 years for 
women (Department of Health, 2017).
Figure 107:  Life Expectancy in Northern Ireland 
Source: The Northern Ireland Health and Social Care Inequalities Monitoring 
System Life Expectancy Decomposition Report (2017)
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Looking specifically at the most and the least deprived areas, the gap narrowed 
slightly from 7.3 years in 2010-12 to 6.6 years in 2014-16 for males; for 
females it remained constant at 4.5 years (Department of Health, 2018b).  
Rates of healthy and disability free life expectancies either declined or 
remained constant between 2010-12 and 2014-16 with the inequality gap for 
male disability free life expectancy widening from 10.2 to 12.7 years. The most 
deprived areas in NI continue to experience higher premature mortality rates 
with, for example, respiratory mortality rates among under 75’s being three 
and a half times higher in the most deprived areas than in the least deprived. 
The emergency admission rate among those living in the most deprived areas 
is almost three-quarters higher than that seen in the least deprived areas. The 
most acute inequalities relate to drugs and alcohol with mortality in the most 
deprived areas for both about five times the rate in the least deprived. 
The prevalence rate for mental health problems in the NI population remains 
high at 21 per cent for women and 16 per cent for men with people living in 
the most deprived areas twice as likely to experience mental health problems 
as those in the least deprived areas (Department of Health, 2017a).   The 
prescription rate for mood and anxiety prescriptions was 69% higher in 
the most deprived areas than in the least deprived areas (Department of 
Health 2016). There are high suicide and self harm rates with suicide rates 
the highest since records began in 1970 and a 19 per cent increase on those 
recorded in 2014 (Department of Health, 2017a).  Again, suicide rates in the 
most deprived areas of NI are three times higher than in the least deprived.  
The section on health inequalities provides illustration of the well-established 
relationship between health outcomes and socio economic status.  That the 
equality gap has not improved considerably over a period of years and in 
some areas has widened is a cause of concern. This is particularly so given 
the potential impact of recently introduced welfare reform measures as 
discussed earlier. Across the UK there is concern about the impact of Brexit 
on health and social care staffing levels.  However, there is no reliable data 
available for NI on the number of migrant workers in the health and social 
care sectors. In 2015 8.8 per cent of doctors in NI had qualified in other parts 
of the EU - the highest proportion in the UK. The figure is 11 per cent for GPs 
so of concern when there is already a shortage of GPs in NI (Dayan, 2018).
10. HOW DOES THE NI ASSEMBLY   
 PERFORM IN RELATION TO SOCIAL  
 POLICY MAKING? 
Most of the responsibilities devolved to the NI Assembly are in the area of 
Social Policy, albeit with finance for Social Policy largely dependent on the 
Block Grant from Westminster.  Since the collapse of the Assembly in January 
2017 there has been much discussion about the impact on delays in decision 
making and policy implementation.  In particular, there are persistent and in 
some cases growing inequalities in relation to socio-economic conditions, 
educational attainment and health status –as outlined earlier in this chapter.  
Before the current impasse the Assembly has seen a number of turbulent 
periods resulting in suspension.  Between 1999 and 2002 there were four 
short suspensions and a lengthy suspension between 2002 and 2008 when 
Direct Rule was introduced.  Examining the second period of social policy 
development under devolution between 2007 and 2011, Gray and Birrell 
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(2012) identified a ‘lowest common denominator’ – a lack of agreement on 
substantive areas of Social Policy leading to lowest common denominator 
decisions.  It is possible to identify a number of social policy decisions made 
since 2007 which do demonstrate a degree of consensus but these have 
tended to cover pragmatic measures which may have electoral value - as 
reflected in the cross party support against increases in or introduction of 
new local taxes.  A few policies could be described as more solidaristic, such 
as the abolition of prescription charges, free travel on trains and buses for 
the over sixties, the passing of the Financial Assistance Act (2009) and the 
mitigation measures with regard to welfare reform discussed earlier. 
The inability of the Executive to reach consensus on many aspects of Social 
Policy continued in the new mandate from 2011.  Even the Programme for 
Government was not published until six months after the election which is 
perhaps not surprising given that pre coalition negotiations were not policy 
specific. Failures to reach consensus on policy occurred even after much 
discussion and debate as in the case of highly publicised issues such as equal 
marriage and reform of abortion law. The challenges to effective policy making 
presented by the structures of devolved government in NI have been well 
documented (Knox, 2016; Gray and Birrell, 2012; Wilford and Wilson, 2001) 
including The Petition of Concern, the lack of collective responsibility  and the 
autonomy of individual ministers.  The Petition of Concern, designed to prevent 
discrimination, was used 115 times in the last Assembly term with 84 per cent 
of the vetoes related to 14 pieces of proposed legislation (most commonly with 
regard to the Welfare Reform Bill) (Smyth, C. 2016).   While there were to be new 
guidelines on The Petition of Concern following the Fresh Start Agreement there 
have been no changes.
The NI Executive and Assembly have not given priority to social policy, with 
relatively few debates on the nature, scope and consequences of welfare 
provision.  This is despite the dominance of social policies and services in 
terms of public expenditure and devolved policy-making powers. Such an 
approach stands in contrast to Scotland and Wales, where commitment 
to the welfare state has been to the fore in discourses in the Scottish and 
Welsh parliaments in a way rarely articulated in NI. Policy departures in 
Scotland and Wales indicate policies being made on the basis of ideology 
or philosophy which is distinctly ‘Scottish’ or ‘Welsh’. The development and 
formulation of social policy in NI has been affected not only by difficulties 
caused by the government struggling to agree policies, but also by a more 
general, low key and conservative approach to social policy. A number of 
factors contribute to this social policy environment - the lack of priority 
accorded to social policy, the lack of critical policy discussion, the lack of 
joined-up government, the dominance of communal issues and the lack of 
public and user involvement. 
The outcome is that NI has clearly fallen behind in a number of Social Policy 
areas as delays and minimal development have had a major impact on delivery 
and provision including in high profile areas such as education and health. In 
2012 NILT data showed that while there was still support for devolution, the 
public appeared to be less happy with what has been achieved and this has 
been further eroded by the collapse of the government in 2017 and questions 
about the capacity and capability of politicians and officials emerging from 
the Renewable Heat Inquiry.  Assessment of the work of the Assembly in the 
period up to 2016 shows that almost all of the pieces of legislation passed, and 
much that didn’t get passed, are versions of legislation passed in the English or 
Scottish governments and which had to be done and are important. 
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There are some exceptions to this which, include: The Rural Needs Act (NI) 
2016; The Shared Education Act (2016); The Education Act (2014) which 
was used primarily to set up the Education Authority; the Carrier Bags Act 
(NI) (2014), the first in the UK and taken up by other jurisdictions; the Local 
Government Act (2014) and the Historical Abuse Inquiry Act (2013).  The other 
pieces of primary legislation which were not copied or amended from other 
parts of the UK were two Private Member’s Bills – Lord Morrow’s Human 
Trafficking and Exploitation Act (2015) and Steven Agnew’s Children’s Services 
Co-operation Act (2015). 
Substantive areas of policy have not been progressed – in part due to the 
lack of government – but many have remained unresolved for a number 
of years.  A long awaited childcare strategy did not materialize and no 
policy has been developed to address the transfer of children from primary 
to secondary school. There is no anti-poverty or gender equality strategy 
and the social strategy intended to replace these has not been published 
in the absence of a minister. An OECD (2016) review of governance in NI 
commented on the weakness of scrutiny mechanisms in the NI Assembly. 
This is apparent with regard to the working of committees which the review 
said could do more in terms of contribution to policy development and 
providing a stronger change function to proposals developed by Executive 
departments. Compared to other devolved legislatures Assembly committees 
have conducted fewer inquiries. Most NI Assembly committees have 
conducted at least one inquiry during the last mandate; four committees 
carried out one inquiry; four committees had two inquiries and two had three 
inquiries.   The Department of Health carried out no inquiries though it did 
commission high level reviews.  The Committee for Regional Development 
notes seven inquiries, though some are very short. 
A relatively new common feature of the devolved administrations in the UK 
has been the emergence of outcome-based frameworks as key components 
of their policy-making processes.  The decision by the NI Executive to adopt 
an outcomes based approach to policy making has been broadly welcomed.  
The Draft Framework Programme for Government published in 2016 was 
based on the Mark Friedman model of outcomes based accountability (OBA). 
This was referred to as ‘a new approach which focuses on the major societal 
outcomes that the Executive wants to achieve’ (NI Executive, 2016a), with 
a focus on outcomes over a generation.  Fourteen high level and broad 
outcomes and 44 indicators would measure progress on the outcomes. The 
NI Executive was willing to see the use of the specific OBA methodology 
in central and local government, health and social care and the voluntary 
and community sector. Substantial numbers of staff from the civil service, 
public bodies and the voluntary sector have undergone training in the 
basics of OBA.  Outcomes-based approaches have developed as a common 
feature of strategies to improve social conditions. They have facilitated the 
monitoring of the performance of devolved governments, assisted with 
public transparency and accountability, and helped develop a shared set 
of priorities.  The Friedman OBA approach has the attraction of apparent 
simplicity in a formula that can be readily taught and applied using basic 
statistical data. The promotion and use of OBA has seen the development 
of theoretical criticisms of the principles and the value of this particular 
methodology (Birrell and Gray, 2018). As the draft framework was not passed 
by the Assembly before its collapse there has been little development in 
terms of the application of the approach.
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DIMENSION FOUR 
Cohesion and sharing
1. THE POLICY CONTEXT
Introducing official policy to address sectarianism, mistrust and high levels 
of separation has proven to be exceptionally challenging within the context 
of divergent motivations and competing interpretations of what a ‘shared 
society’ looks like. Previous efforts included the ambitious and integrationist 
policy document A Shared Future: Policy and Strategic Framework for Good 
Relations in Northern Ireland published in 2005 during a period of direct 
rule, which identified key responsibilities and tasks for all government 
departments. The policy explicitly promoted a ‘sharing over separation’ 
approach and action plans were produced which would allow departments 
to measure change against baseline ‘good relations’ indicators.  With a 
return of devolution in 2007, the local political parties took little ownership 
of the policy and it was quietly shelved.  After protracted negotiations, and 
under pressure to resolve an impasse over the devolution of policing and 
justice, as part of the Hillsborough Agreement a new consultation paper 
Cohesion, Sharing and Integration, was produced in 2010 by the two main 
political parties, the DUP and Sinn Féin, but was widely rejected for its lack 
of ambition and vision.   In May 2013, the NI Executive published a new 
good relations strategy, Together: Building a United Community (commonly 
shortened to T:BUC) which has remained the focus of departmental activities 
to progress ‘good relations’ in the region.  The strategy is described as ‘the 
framework for government action in tackling sectarianism, racism and other 
forms of intolerance while seeking to address division, hate and separation’ 
(OFMdFM, 2013:2).  It contains four key priority areas, with a total of 22 
‘tangible and practical commitments’ outlined under each.  The four priority 
areas are: 
• Our children and young people
• Our shared community
• Our safe community, and 
• Our cultural expression. 
From these commitments, seven ‘strategic headline actions’ were identified: 
1. Establishing ten new shared education campuses
2. Getting 10,000 young people, not in education, employment or training, 
a place on the new United Youth volunteering programme
3. Establishing ten new shared housing schemes
4. Developing four urban village schemes
5. Developing a significant programme of cross-community sporting events
6. Removing interface barriers by 2023; and 
7. Pilot 100 shared summer schools by 2015.
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The policy has been criticised as having an underlying assumption of the 
permanence of the two main community blocs and for its lack of ambition 
in terms of societal integration.  As part of the Fresh Start Agreement 
(November 2015), £60 million was secured to supplement existing funding 
earmarked for Good Relations programmes and projects.  
An annual report published by the NI Executive Office in July 2017 and 
newsletters issued at the T:BUC Engagement Forums provide updates from 
senior officials on progress across the seven strategic headline actions and 
four priority areas.  The most recent figures indicate that: 
1. Work is progressing on the five Shared Education Campuses announced 
to date (Limavady, Ballycastle, Moy Duneane/Moneynick and 
Brookeborough).  A third call for joint proposals from schools closed in 
January 2017, but decisions on this phase have not yet released. 
2. Phase 1 delivery of the Peace4Youth programme commenced in late 
2017.  10 projects were selected, these projects will involve 1,875 young 
people and will conclude towards the end of 2018/19.  
3. Five shared housing schemes (totalling 320 new homes) have been 
completed (in Cookstown, Crossgar, Newtownabbey, and two in south-
east Belfast), with a further five underway (in Banbridge, Dundrum, 
Ballymena, Ballynahinch and Ballynafeigh in Belfast). 
4. Strategic Frameworks were developed for five (rather than the target 
four) Urban Village Schemes (four in Belfast, one in Derry/Londonderry) 
by July 2016 in areas where there has previously ‘been a history of 
deprivation and community tension’ (Executive Office, 2016:2).  During 
2017/18 a total of 19 capital projects have been delivered within the 
five Urban Village areas with a further 53 community led revenue 
projects delivered across the areas.
5. The Department for Communities (DfC) is responsible for the delivery 
of a cross-community youth sports programme entitled ‘Uniting 
Communities’. The programme aims to use sport, physical and creative 
activity to ‘break down divisions in society and deliver a good relations 
programme with the emphasis on tackling sectarianism, racism and 
improving good relations’ (DfC, 2018). In the latest update (July 2018), 
the Department reported that the programme had engaged 500 young 
people in sports programmes and 46 young people in leadership training 
courses aimed at equipping them to deliver good relations programmes 
and develop action plans.  A Uniting Opportunities grant programme 
was launched in September 2017 to support the delivery of projects 
at community level.  To date, 18 projects have been awarded funding, 
aimed at those between 11 and 24 years who are categorised as 
either homeless, refugee or asylum seeker, care experienced, disabled, 
experienced poor mental health and/or addiction or offender (or at risk 
of offending).  An Early Engagement Project, delivered in a number of the 
Urban Villages areas, aimed at building the capacity of communities to 
deliver a cross-community youth sport programme during 2017/18.  A 
Young Leaders Training and Ambassadors Programme was established in 
January 2018 to provide a consistent approach to the delivery of Uniting 
Communities Programmes across all geographical areas. 
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6. An Interface Programme was established within the Department of 
Justice (DoJ) to deliver on the commitment made to remove all Interface 
structures by 2023. The Interface programme focuses on the structures 
that the DoJ are responsible for and structures put up by the NI Housing 
Executive at 15 Locations.  Of the 59 interface structures which the 
DoJ indicates ownership of, the latest update April 2016) indicates that 
11 structures have been removed since 2013 (this includes five gates 
on Derry Walls), four have been partially removed, and two have been 
reclassified.  
7. The original target to pilot 100 Summer Camps by 2015 was delivered, 
with over 4,200 young people (age 11 to 19) taking part in the first 101 
camps in 2015/16. Following an evaluation by the SIB in March 2016, 
the programme has been rolled out annually. Delivered in partnership 
with the Education Authority, youth, community and voluntary sector 
groups, schools and District Councils can apply for funding to deliver 
cross-community camps, with pre- and post- camp engagement.  In 
2017/18, 115 T:BUC camps were delivered, involving around 4,000 
young people.  
 
In addition, T:BUC Engagement Forums were established in March 2016 to 
support wide stakeholder engagement (particularly from the community 
and voluntary sector) to influence, shape and monitor the delivery of the 
T:BUC Strategy.  To date, six Engagement Forums have been held, focusing 
on a range of themes and providing an opportunity for both information 
sharing and networking.  Summary reports of the Forums are prepared by 
the Community Relations Council following each event.  The District Council 
Good Relations Programme is also delivered as part of the wider T:BUC 
Strategy, with each of the eleven District Councils in NI developing action 
plans aligned with the four priority areas to deliver at local level .  
In order to monitor progress on the delivery of the four priority areas 
identified by T:BUC, a set of eight outcomes and 22 ‘good relations 
indicators’ were developed, which are measured annually.  Drawing on a 
range of data sources, the most recent update was released in September 
2017 (McFarland and Crawford, 2017).  These include attitudinal survey 
data, PSNI data on hate crimes, numbers of first preference applicants to 
integrated schools, and NI Housing Executive figures of people presenting 
as homeless as a result of intimidation. While these indicators provide an 
overview of levels of societal changes in some areas, they do not provide 
detailed information on how the T:BUC policies, in particular, have impacted 
since their introduction in 2013.  Evaluations of headline actions have been 
undertaken in order to inform their future implementation and these do 
provide some insight in to the efficacy of individual programmes delivered by 
lead departments.  However, a broader overview of the success of the T:BUC 
strategy, as an approach to the delivery of a vision of ‘a united community, 
based on equality of opportunity, the desirability of good relations and 
reconciliation’  is lacking (OFMdFM, 2013:2). 
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2. WELLBEING
2.1  The measurement of happiness
In recent years, there has been global recognition of the need to measure 
factors beyond what a country produces (GDP) and to acknowledge the 
importance of individual and societal health, education and skills, how we 
spend our time and our general well-being.  The first World Happiness Report 
was published in 2012 following the United Nations General Assembly 
resolution inviting counties to measure levels of happiness among their 
populations as a means of improving policy decisions.   In the most recent 
World Happiness Report 2018, launched in March 2018, Finland ranked 
first (moving from 5th place in 2017), having measured highly in all the 
main indicators of happiness: health, income, good governance, freedom, 
generosity, caring, honesty.  The other top ranking countries included Norway 
(ranked first in 2017), Denmark, Iceland and Switzerland.  The UK ranked in 
19th position in both 2017 and 2018, while the Republic of Ireland moved up 
one place from 15th in 2017 to 14th place in 2018.  
Since 2010, the UK’s Office of National Statistics (ONS) has measured the 
personal well-being of people in the UK as part of the Annual Population 
Survey, with a sample size of 158,000 over 16-year olds in the 2016-2017 
survey.  As part of this survey, adults are asked four personal (or subjective) 
well-being questions to better understand how they feel about their lives.  
These questions are:  
• Overall, how satisfied are you with your life nowadays? 
• Overall, to what extent do you feel the things you do in  
your life are worthwhile? 
• Overall, how happy did you feel yesterday? 
• Overall, how anxious did you feel yesterday?
Since these survey questions were included, a significantly higher proportion 
of people in NI have reported high levels of life satisfaction, worthwhileness 
and happiness than the UK overall.  In addition, a greater proportion of NI 
respondents indicate very low levels of anxiety than in the UK.  Looking at 
the annual surveys since 2010, the results indicate that personal wellbeing in 
NI has been improving year-on-year since data was first collected.   
The latest figures, released by the ONS in April 2018 cover the period 
October 2016 to September 2017. In this period, 35.5 per cent of NI 
respondents reported very high levels of life satisfaction (a score of 9 or 
10) compared with 30.2 per cent in the UK overall. 40.8 per cent of NI 
respondents reported very high levels in terms of the feeling that the things 
they do in life are worthwhile compared with 35.6 per cent in the UK overall. 
34.7 per cent of NI respondents reported very high levels of happiness 
compared with 40.3 per cent in the UK overall, and 46.7 per cent of NI 
respondents reported lower levels of anxiety (a score of 0 or 1) compared 
with 39.9 per cent in the UK overall. 
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Figure 108:  Percentage reporting very high life satisfaction, worthwhile 
and happiness, and very low anxiety, UK and NI, 2016-17
 
Source: ONS, 2018c
It has been advocated that measures of well-being might be helpful in 
designing processes to promote social change in NI.  In 2015, the Carnegie 
UK Trust developed a ‘wellbeing framework’ to guide and support the work 
of all public services in NI in supporting innovative delivery approaches.  A 
review of the framework in 2017 undertaken by Strategem NI found that the 
proposed seven steps for developing a wellbeing framework and associated 
recommendations had influenced central government and a strong 
commitment from senior leadership level in the Civil Service was evident 
(Walsh, 2018).  The review focused on the 11 local councils which had been 
given new community planning powers as part of the local government 
reforms of 2015 and found that the language and substance of the wellbeing 
agenda was well integrated in to local government plans and programmes.  
Community Planning Partnerships were established in each district to 
improve the collaborative working between councils, statutory bodies, public 
agencies and the community and voluntary sector and the development 
of community plans.   In April 2018, the Carnegie UK Trust announced 
an investment of £350,000 to support up to three Community Planning 
Partnerships (Armagh City, Banbridge and Craigavon Borough Council, Derry 
City and Strabane District Council, and Lisburn and Castlereagh City Council) 
to implement a wellbeing outcomes approach through their Community 
Plan.  
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2.2  The measure of unhappiness –   
 suicide, self-harm and poor  
 mental health
While there are no specific measures for unhappiness, it has been widely 
acknowledged that a relatively high proportion of the population of NI 
has experienced mental ill-health compared to other parts of the UK.  In 
October 2016, a leading UK public mental health charity, the Mental 
Health Foundation published a summary of mental health research in NI, 
entitled ‘Fundamental Facts’ (Mental Health Foundation, 2016).  The report 
noted that NI has a 25 per cent higher overall prevalence of mental health 
problems than England.  It also noted that prescribing trends data suggests 
that NI has significantly higher levels of depression than the rest of the UK. 
The prescription rate for mood and anxiety disorders (depression, bipolar 
disorder, and anxiety disorders) increased by 20 per cent between 2009 and 
2013. 
One indicator of ill-health is those who report acute mental health issues 
to the Emergency Departments (EDs) of hospitals.  In November 2016, the 
Public Health Agency published the NI Registry for Self-Harm Three-Year 
Report (2012/13-2014/15), an analysis of the prevalence of self-harm and 
suicidal ideation presentations to the 12 local Emergency Departments (EDs) 
of NI’s hospitals.   Covering the period from 1 April 2012 to 31 March 2015, 
the report notes that 25,620 self-harm presentations to EDs were recorded, 
made by 16,301 individuals, which is an average of 23 presentations per day 
over the three-year period.  For the purposes of their report, self-harm was 
defined as ‘‘An act with non-fatal outcome in which an individual deliberately 
initiates a non-habitual behaviour, that without intervention from others 
will cause self-harm, or deliberately ingests a substance in excess of the 
prescribed or generally recognised therapeutic dosage, and which is aimed at 
realising changes that the person desires via the actual or expected physical 
consequences.’ (Public Health Agency, 2016:17).  
The majority (70 per cent) of presentations were brought to hospital by 
emergency services (e.g. ambulance and police).  While the overall average 
rate (across the three year study) was 23 presentations per day, increased 
numbers of presentations were observed on the following days: January 1st, 
New Year’s Day (mean n=43), March 18th (mean n=32) and July 12th (mean 
n=37). There was an even gender balance in presentations (12,800 by males 
and 12,820 by females).   The report notes that during the period March 
2012 to April 2015, the number of self-harm presentations recorded by the 
registry increased by 7 per cent (from 8,279 to 8,885), while the number of 
persons increased by 11 per cent (from 5,977 to 6,630). During this three-
year period, the highest rate of self-harm in NI observed was among 15-19 
year-old females and 20-24 year-old males, with peak rates of 832 per 
100,000 for females and 844 per 100,000 for males in these age groups.
In addition, the Public Health Agency reported on rates of suicide ideation 
during the three-year period, which indicate those who present to EDs 
with thoughts of self-harm and/or suicide, but where no physical act has 
taken place. 10,563 ideation presentations were recorded with 67 per cent 
attributable to males, in contrast to the even gender balance among self-
harm presentations.  Just over half (53 per cent) of all ideation presentations 
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involved alcohol.  Across the three-year period, an average of 10 
presentations involving ideation were recorded per day.  The largest number 
of ideation presentations were recorded in the Belfast HSCT area (n=2,914), 
accounting for 28 per cent of all ideation presentations made during this 
period, despite a 19 per cent population share.
In November 2017, the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency 
(NISRA, 2017b)reported the number of deaths by suicide in NI at 297 (211 
males and 76 females) for 2016. This figure was down from the highest 
levels recorded (since 1970) of 318 in 2015.  ‘According to the Samaritans, 
the suicide rate in the North now exceeds the UK average, with its figures 
showing an 18.5 per cent increase since 2014 compared to a 3.8 per cent rise 
in the UK as a whole’ (The Irish Times, 29 July 2018). The overall suicide rates 
in the Republic of Ireland continue to fall since 2011, and are at their lowest 
rates since 1993 (Samaritans, 2017).  
In November 2017, the Public Health Agency allocated an additional 
£500,000 for suicide prevention and mental health services in the Belfast 
area, with £300,000 to be distributed to community and voluntary sector 
groups which provide support, therapies and training and £200,000 to 
pilot crisis de-escalation and street triage services. A Draft Strategy for 
Suicide Prevention entitled Protect Life 2 (Department of Health, 2016a) 
was published for consultation in September 2016. In March 2017, the 
Department of Health released a summary report of the 104 responses 
received.  The new strategy was due to be published in 2017 but, with the 
lack of a working Assembly and Executive, this strategy has not been signed 
off.  In the interim, the Public Health Agency organised a series of stakeholder 
engagement events in March 2018 that ‘will inform the future procurement 
of services to implement the pending ‘Protect Life 2’ suicide prevention 
strategy’ (PHA, 2018).  
3. SHARING AND SEPARATION  
 IN HOUSING 
3.1  Public Housing
Public housing accounts for around 16 per cent of housing stock in NI.  The 
majority of housing (63.4 per cent in 2016) is owner-occupied (NIHE, 2017a). 
Previous Peace Monitoring Reports have observed the decline in social 
housing and corresponding growth in the private-rented sector, an issue 
discussed in Dimension Three of this report. In May 2018, the total housing 
stock figure was reported as 780,000, with a vacancy rate of 3.7 per cent.  
This is a decrease from the 7.2 per cent figure of 2011.  The vacancy rate is 
highest in the private rented sector at 7 per cent, a reduction from 13 per 
cent in 2011, which reflects the growing demand in this sector.  
Figure 109 indicates that the percentage of occupied social dwellings 
(Housing Executive and Housing Associations dwellings combined) has not 
significantly changed, going up one percentage point from 2009 to 2016. 
In 2016, it was estimated that there were approximately 121,000 occupied 
social dwellings. The private renting has overtaken the social sector as the 
second largest housing tenure in NI from 2009 onwards. 
Figure 109:  Tenure excluding vacants 2006 – 2016
 
The 2016 Northern Ireland House Condition Survey, (NIHE, 2017) reports 
on the conditions of homes in the owner occupied, private rented and social 
housing sectors.  As shown in Figure 110 levels of unfitness in the occupied 
social housing sector are statistically very low, but 1.6 per cent of occupied 
Private Rented and Others housing has been deemed unfit.  
 
 
Waiting times for social housing remain very long in high demand areas and 
those who traditionally would have lived in social housing are moving in 
greater numbers in to the private rented sector.  In March 2018, the NIHE 
published the Private Renters Survey 2016, which interviewed 144 tenants 
across NI.  Twenty-two per cent of respondents indicated that they were in 
privately rented accommodation due to tenure reasons, including difficulties 
accessing waiting lists for social housing and inability to purchase own 
home.  Fifty-nine per cent of respondents were in receipt of Local Housing 
Allowance.  With welfare reform changes in recent years, the rolling out of 
Universal Credit and the freezing of LHA rates, more tenants will be liable 
to pay a shortfall or the amount they have to pay will increase to cover the 
balance of rent to the landlord after the LHA rate has been applied.  
The Social Housing Reform Programme (SHRP) was introduced by the 
Department for Communities in 2013 to review and assess the existing 
delivery structures for social housing in NI.  To inform this review, the NIHE 
commissioned a study on the affordability of social rents in NI, which was 
published in May 2017.  The study considered the possible impacts of a 
gradual rise in NIHE rents, which may be inevitable, given the significant 
investment required to raise the standards of current housing stock, the 
number of households (estimated as 22,097 in the NI Executive’s Draft 
Programme for Government Framework 2016- 2021; NI Executive, 2016a) 
experiencing housing stress, and the UK-wide reform of the welfare benefit 
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2006 2009 2011 2016
Number % Number % Number % Number %
Owner Occupied 468,900 66.5 461,800 62.4 469,100 61.7 494,660 63.4
Private Rented and Others 80,900 11.5 124,600 16.8 125,500 16.5 135,980 17.4
Housing Executive 93,400 13.3 85,650 11.6 85,900 11.3 85,340 10.9
Housing Association 21,500 3.1 24,550 3.3 24,800 3.3 35,550 4.6
Vacant 40,300 5.7 43,400 5.9 54,700 7.2 28,470 3.7
Total 705,000 100.0 740,000 100.0 760,000 100.0 780,000 100.0
Source: NIHE, 2018
Figure 110:  NI’s Dwelling Stock by Occupation - Unfitness by Tenure 2016
Occupied Occupied Unfit Vacant Vacant Unfit Total Unfit
Owner Occupied  494,660 (65.8%) 5,660 (1.1%) 17,260 (60.6%) 7,430 (43.0%) 13,090
Private Rented and Others  135,980 (18.1%) 2,180 (1.6%)  9,820 (34.5%) 1,100 (11.2%) 3,280
Social Housing  120,890 (16.1%) *(<1.0%) 1,390 (4.9%) * (<1.0%) *
Source: NIHE, 2017
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system. The report concluded that welfare reforms ‘may increase the 
vulnerability of tenants, especially when the current mitigation package ends 
in 2019-2020’ (NIHE, 2017). 
3.2  Residential segregation
The second and third Peace Monitoring Reports (Nolan, 2013; 2014) provided 
analysis of the overall levels of residential segregation (owner-occupied, 
private rented and social housing stock), based on the 2011 census.  These 
figures indicated that while the levels of segregation have proven very 
slow to change over the past two decades, there has been a decline in the 
proportion of ‘single-identity’ wards (above a threshold of 80 per cent of one 
religion) from 55 per cent to 37 per cent, though this decline has affected 
Protestant areas more than Catholic.  The 2011 census indicated that 61 (of 
582) wards were at least 90 per cent Catholic, while only two were over 90 
per cent Protestant, reflecting changes in the social mobility of the growing 
Catholic population and the arrival of ‘new communities’ in to traditionally 
Protestant areas.  
Since 2000, the NILT Survey has included a question about people’s 
preferences regarding living in single-identity or mixed-religion 
neighbourhoods.  The results consistently indicate that the majority of adults 
would prefer to live in mixed-religion neighbourhoods, with that figure 
increasing by 7 percentage points between 2015 (71 per cent) to 2017 (78 
per cent). 
 
In 2015, the NIHE published a five-year Community Cohesion Strategy 
(2015-2020) to tackle the deeply segregated nature of social housing, with a 
particular commitment to the development and promotion of mixed housing 
‘where it is practicable, desirable and safe.’ (NIHE, 2015:3).
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Figure 111:  If you had a choice, would you prefer to live in a neighbourhood with people of only your own 
religion, or in a mixed-religion neighbourhood? Percentage, 2000-2017 (discontinuous)
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The Strategy builds on previous programmes of the Community Cohesion 
Unit, including the Shared Neighbourhood Pilot Programme (2008-2011) 
which aimed to support and encourage 30 shared neighbourhoods across 
NI and the follow-up  Shared Communities Programme (2011-2014) which 
delivered a further 20 Shared Neighbourhoods within that three year period.  
In addition, an EU-funded BRIC (Building Relationships in Communities) 
Programme (2010-14) was designed to develop the good relations capacity 
of the NIHE and to develop good relations plans and programmes for 88 
NIHE estates. The Strategy noted that over 90 per cent of social housing 
areas remain segregated into predominantly single communities, with this 
rising to 94 per cent in Belfast. This Strategy aimed to deliver across five key 
themes: 
1. Segregation/Integration 
2. Race Relations 
3. Communities in Transition 
4. Interface Areas 
5. Flags, Emblems and Sectional Symbols
 
The Strategy contains a range of targets centred on the five thematic areas, 
including: 
• Work with the OFMdFM TBUC, Department for Social Development, 
Housing Associations and others to bring proposals forward for 10 
‘Shared Future’ capital build projects of mixed housing schemes in the 
medium term.
• Develop support programmes of action to address the issues of 
residential segregation and integration in 72 communities across 3 years, 
through a new BRIC 2 programme
• Support interface communities by supporting local plans for the 
regeneration and re modelling of interface areas.
• Deliver the Interface Normalisation programme on behalf of the 
Department of Justice. This programme provides additional security 
measures to resident’s homes at interface locations that are proposing 
transformation.
• Develop a comprehensive and up to date database of all sectional 
symbols on Housing Executive land and property. 
• Identify areas ready for positive intervention in collaboration with 
Regional/Area Offices
Under the NI Executive’s Together: Building a United Community (TBUC) 
strategy, five ‘shared’ housing schemes - containing not more than 70 per 
cent of one community - have been completed in Belfast (two locations of 
67 and 86 homes), Saintfield (12 homes), Newtownabbey (97 homes) and 
Cookstown (58 homes), with a further five schemes ongoing.  In September 
2017, it was reported that four Catholic families were forced to leave their 
homes in a mixed housing development Cantrell Close, off the Ravenhill Road 
in south-east Belfast (Irish News, 29 September 2017). The NIHE confirmed 
that a number of families had presented themselves as homeless, claiming 
sectarian intimidation (BBC NI News, 29 September 2017). It was claimed 
that loyalist paramilitaries had been behind the intimidation and the PSNI 
confirmed that the Paramilitary Task Force were involved in the investigation 
of the incidents (Belfast Telegraph, 28 September 2017). The intimidation of 
Cohesion and sharing
179
the families was widely condemned by local political leaders on all sides.  A 
week after the families left their homes, it was reported that some of the 
UVF flags which had been flying were removed by community workers from 
the East Belfast Community Initiative (EBCI) (BBC NI News, 9 October 2017).  
Other flags were not removed until December 2017, and political flags re-
appeared in 2018. The incident raised important questions as to what body 
is responsible for the removal of flags from public spaces.  The PSNI have 
publicly stated that they are not responsible for flag removal unless there 
is ‘a substantial risk to public safety’ or where it is believed that a criminal 
offence has taken place. (Belfast Telegraph, 15 September 2017). 
In June 2018, banners depicting republican attacks including the Shankill and 
Enniskillen bombings, the La Mon bombing and Bloody Friday were erected 
around the Global Crescent and Cantrell Close developments.  The banners 
included the hashtag ‘Stand up against sectarianism’ and their erection was 
supported by the EBCI.  The Chief Executive of the social housing scheme 
responsible for the mixed housing estate was noted as saying: ‘There was no 
consultation with the people who live in this area and the imagery used is 
not appropriate for a shared living scheme which is home to families from 
all backgrounds. We strongly feel that this is not an appropriate way to 
display events of the past’ (Belfast Telegraph, 4 June 2018).  In the context 
of the constraints associated with the development of mixed housing 
developments, the lack of clarity over who, and how, to manage those who 
aim to create ‘chill factors’ for residents requires action. 
4. SHARING AND SEPARATION  
 OF SCHOOLS
4.1  The management of schooling
As the fourth Peace Monitoring Report outlined, there are historic reasons 
for the unusual education structures in NI which has allowed for a variety 
of management types to develop and take root at nursery, primary and 
secondary levels. 
These seven types are: 
Controlled schools (de facto Protestant).  These schools are funded and 
managed by the Education Authority for NI (EA) which was established under 
the Education Act NI 2014 and became operational in April 2015.  The EA 
delivers on the provisions previously the responsibility of the five separate 
Education and Library Boards (Belfast, North Eastern, South Eastern, Southern 
and Western).   
Each school (primary and secondary) has a Board of Governors which 
includes representatives of transferors (mainly the Protestant churches) and 
representatives of parents, teachers and the EA.  The EA is the employing 
authority for teachers in Controlled schools.  
Voluntary (maintained) schools (de facto Catholic).  These schools are 
managed by Boards of Governors which are made up of nominated trustees 
(mainly representatives of the Catholic Church) and representatives of 
parents, teachers and the EA.  The Council for Catholic Maintained Schools 
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is responsible for the management of the Maintained sector and is the 
employing authority for teachers in Catholic Maintained schools.  The 
Catholic schools trustee service is funded by the Department of Education 
(DE) to provide support and advice to trustees on area planning.
Voluntary (non-maintained) schools (grammar schools).  These schools 
are managed by Boards of Governors, who act as the employing authority 
for staff in the schools.   The Board of Governors include representatives 
of parents, teachers, foundation governors and (in most cases) the EA and 
the DE.  Voluntary Grammar schools vary in the rates of capital grant to 
which they are entitled depending on the management structure they have 
adopted.  The vast majority are entitled to 100 per cent capital grants.
Grant Maintained Integrated Schools.  Established to ensure that children 
from both Protestant and Catholic backgrounds are schooled together, each 
Integrated School is managed by a Board of Governors including trustees and 
representatives of the DE, parents and teachers.  The Board of Governors is 
the employing authority and is responsible for the employment of staff.  
Independent schools (de facto private schools).  These schools are not 
grant aided and are funded by parental fees and income from investments.  
They set their own admissions policy and curriculum.   There are very few 
schools of this particular type in NI.  
Irish-Medium: The DE has a duty to encourage and assist in the development 
of Irish-Medium education.  Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta (CnaG) was 
established in 2000 by DE with a remit to promote, assist and encourage 
Irish-Medium education. Currently there is a total of 92 schools providing 
Irish-medium Education to over 6,000 children at pre-school, primary and 
post primary level. There are Controlled and Maintained Irish-Medium 
schools and units.  
Special Schools: A Special school is a Controlled or Voluntary school which is 
organised to provide education for pupils with special needs.
The most recent (July 2018) enrolment figures for schools and funded 
pre-school education for 2017/18 indicate that there are a total of 773 
institutions in NI providing funded pre-school education, 817 primary schools 
(including preparatory departments) and 199 post-primary schools.  One-
third (66) of post-primary schools are grammar schools and the remaining 
two-thirds (133) are non-grammar. Sixty-two per cent of 16 and 17 year olds 
are in sixth form in school (51 per cent of boys, 68 per cent of girls). 
The average number of pupils per class in primary school (year 1 – year 7) 
remains steady at 25. There has been an increase of over 2,000 pupils in 
primary school (years 1-7) on the previous year, representing the highest 
total since 1999/2000.  Ninety-one per cent of three year olds in the 
population (23,500) are in funded pre-school education, a small drop on the 
previous year.  There has been a 4.4 per cent rise in the number of newcomer 
pupils (i.e. with English as an additional language) (1,277 pupils), with the 
most frequent first languages of newcomers being Polish, Lithuanian and 
Portuguese (DE, 2017).  In 2017/18, a total of 6,184 pupils were in Irish-
medium education, comprising of 923 places within 27 voluntary and 
private pre-school education centres, 4,156 primary places within 35 primary 
schools or Irish medium units, and 1,105 post-primary places within two 
schools and three Irish medium units (DE, February 2018).  
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Figure 112:  No. of pupils by religion in schools, by school type, 2017-18
School Management Type Religion of Pupils
Protestant Catholic Other Christian
Non 
Christian
No Religion/
not recorded Total
Nursery Schools / Classes & 
Reception / Voluntary and Private 
Pre-School Centres (funded 
places only) (combined figures)
6657 11,067 822 229 4,725 23500
Primary (Yr. 1 – Yr. 7)
Controlled 50,695 6,057 5,042 893 16,486 79,173
Catholic Maintained 635 75,634 632 738 1,608 79,247
Other Maintained 260 2,833 36 * # 3,388
Controlled Integrated 1,621 1,199 235 84 1,070 4,209
Grant Maintained Integrated  1,807 2,511 413 # # 6,017
TOTAL 55,018 88,234 6,358 1,800 20,624 172,034
Preparatory (Yr. 1 – Yr. 7)
Controlled 46 * # * 26 80
Voluntary 740 # # # 410 1,630
TOTAL 786 223 224 41 436 1,710
Secondary (non-grammar)
Controlled 21,801 1,047 1,117 154 3,545 27,724
Catholic Maintained # 35,393 # 275 # 37,075
Other Maintained * 683 * - # 734
Controlled Integrated 1,541 407 117 35 487 2,587
Grant Maintained Integrated 3,803 3,916 523 127 1,238 9,607
TOTAL 27,711 41,446 2,138 591 5,841 77,727
Grammar  (Yr. 8 – Yr. 14)
Controlled 10,016 1,327 806 112 1,850 14,111
Voluntary (Cath Managed) 336 27,212 174 119 351 28,192
Voluntary (Other Managed) 12,878 2,708 1,605 323 3,001 20,515
TOTAL 23,230 31,247 2,585 554 5,202 62,818
Special Schools
Controlled 2,036 2,208 169 52 924 5,389
Catholic Maintained 7 245 * # # 267
Other Maintained 31 29 * * # 79
TOTAL 2,074 2,482 172 60 947 5,735
EOTAS Centers 11 31 * - # 50
ALL SCHOOLS 115,487 174,731 12,300 3,275 37,782 343,574 
*Fewer than 5 cases       # Number suppressed
Source: Statistical Bulletin 2/2018 (Revised 17 July 2018).  Annual enrolments 
at schools and in funded pre-school education in NI, 2017-18. 
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4.2  Integrated and Shared Education 
The Department of Education (DE) has had a duty to encourage and facilitate 
integrated education since the Education Reform Act of 1989.  Since May 
2016, the passing of the Shared Education (Northern Ireland) Act requires 
the DE to ‘encourage, facilitate and promote shared education’.  The Act 
understands ‘shared education’ as meaning the education together of (a) 
those of different religious belief, including reasonable numbers of both 
Protestant and Roman Catholic children or young persons; and (b) those who 
are experiencing socio-economic deprivation and those who are not. 
The DE Annual Enrolment figures for 2017-18 indicate that there were over 
23,000 pupils enrolled in integrated schools – almost 10,900 in primary 
schools and more than 12,000 in post-primary schools (around 7 per cent 
overall).  This figure has increased by almost 500 pupils compared with 
2016-17 and over 1,500 compared with five years ago.  This growth is seen 
mainly in primary schools and could be explained by the fact that three 
primary schools transformed to integrated status in the last two years.  With 
funding from DE, the NI Council for Integrated Education (NICIE) promotes 
the strategic development of Integrated schools and provides advice and 
guidance to all Integrated schools, both Controlled and Grant Maintained. 
It is worth noting that mixing of those from different religious backgrounds 
is taking place within the Catholic Maintained and Controlled School Sectors.  
The 2017-18 enrolment figures indicate that 6,057 who identified as 
Catholic attended Controlled Primary schools, and a further 2,374 Catholics 
attended Controlled Secondary or Grammar schools.  635 who identified as 
Protestants attended Catholic Maintained Primary Schools and 336 attended 
Catholic managed Voluntary Schools.   The number of Protestant pupils who 
attended Catholic Maintained Grammar Schools was not provided.  It is also 
worth noting that a sizeable number of pupils are recorded as no religion/not 
recorded in all the school categories. 
On a busy day for the media due to the 2017 Assembly Elections, the DE 
published The Report of the Independent Review of Integrated Education 
(dated November 2016) by Professor Margaret Topping of QUB and NICIE 
President Colm Cavanagh on the 2nd of March 2017.  The remit of the 
study was to make recommendations in three areas: 1. how to develop and 
grow integrated education; 2. how to develop a more integrated system 
in its widest sense to bring together increasing numbers of Protestant and 
Catholic pupils within all schools (as distinct from the co-operation of 
separate shared schools); and 3. the allocation of £50 million per year for the 
period 2016-2026 made available for capital expenditure under the Fresh 
Start Agreement.  The report included 39 wide-ranging recommendations 
on how to support further integration, including the call to review both the 
existing legal definition of ‘integrated’ education and the religious balance 
criteria for integrated schools to take greater account of the greater diversity 
in the society and changing demographics.  It also recommended that 
the Education Authority (EA) should pro-actively plan, set objectives for, 
and monitor progress on increasing provision of school places within the 
integrated sector.  The report expressed concern that in September 2016, 
seven of the 20 integrated post-primary schools and 21 of the 45 primary 
schools were oversubscribed at first preference applicate stage. (Topping and 
Cavanagh, 2016.
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With limitations on the growth of the integrated sector and schools coming 
under increasing pressure to rationalise the number of unused school 
places, discussions on the development of school collaboration whereby 
schools could retain their own ethos and identity, but would develop 
partnerships with other local schools to share teaching and resources, have 
gained increasing ground and attention since the early 2000s.  In 2007, 
the independent donor foundation, The Atlantic Philanthropies and the 
International Fund for Ireland co-funded a ‘Sharing Education Programme’ 
(SEP) to encourage regular cross-community contact between existing 
schools.  Managed by Queen’s University Belfast, the first Programme 
(SEP1, 2007-2010) involved 65 schools in 12 collaborative partnerships, 
with around 3,700 pupils participating in shared classes.  SEP2 (2009-2013) 
involved 80 schools in an additional 11 partnerships and one carryover 
partnership. The Fermanagh Trust and the North Eastern Education and 
Library Board (the PIEE Project) ran a further two shared education projects.  
158 schools formed 54 partnerships and approximately 35,800 pupils took 
part in around 28,300 hours of shared activity. (Social Change Initiative, 
2017).  Since 2014, the government and The Atlantic Philanthropies have co-
funded a Shared Education Signature Project (SESP) with a budget of £25m 
to be spent over a four-year period. Managed by the Education Authority 
(EA), the SESP aims to engage the majority of schools and pupils across NI 
in substantive shared education.  In 2016, the Special EU Programmes Body 
allocated 35.3 million euros from the PEACE IV Programme to the ‘provision 
of direct, sustained, curriculum based contact between pupils and teachers 
from all backgrounds through collaboration between schools from different 
sectors in order to promote good relations and enhance children’s skills and 
attitudes to contribute to a cohesive society.’   Since September 2017, SEUPB 
have provided co-funding to the Education Authority and its partner Léargas 
in the Republic of Ireland to deliver a Collaboration and Sharing in Education 
(CASE) programme to provide support for primary and post-primary schools 
with no or limited previous experience of providing shared education 
opportunities.  This programme will run until 2022.  
The Department of Education’s School Omnibus Survey 2016 reported that 
58 per cent of respondents (242 schools) stated that they had partnered in 
shared education; 42 per cent had not.  The most common type of shared 
activities which schools noted that they had partnered on were ‘projects 
with pupils from other schools’: 72 per cent; ‘shared resources’: 47 per cent 
and ‘shared classes with pupils from other schools (other than under the 
Entitlement Framework): 42 per cent. Respondents were also asked to specify 
which facilities they have used in the shared education partnership(s) in the 
last academic year.  Figure 113 details the responses given.
Figure 113:  Which facilities 
schools have used in the shared 
education partnership(s) in the 
last academic year?
Source: NISRA / Department of 
Education, School Omnibus 
Survey 2016.
Base 231 respondents; multiple 
responses allowed
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5. SHARING PUBLIC SPACE
5.1  Culture wars
The term ‘culture wars’ has now become firmly established in the NI political 
dictionary to refer to a range of diverse issues ranging from flag, parades 
and language rights.  For instance, Wilson (2016) used it to suggest that, 
‘Northern Ireland’s politico-military conflict has morphed into a politico-
cultural one’ (Wilson, 2016:123).  Nothing during the period covered by this 
report would suggest this has changed in any significant way.  Instead, the 
tendency appears to be for tensions over some issues to ease, only to be 
replaced by others, adding to the toxicity of the political discourse in recent 
times.  All of this was acknowledged by those behind the bid submitted in 
November 2017 by Belfast City Council, in partnership with Derry City and 
Strabane Council, to be the UK’s candidate for the 2023 European City of 
Culture.  In this instance the authors of the bid paraphrased the often used 
quotation by Carl von Clausewitz that, ‘war is the continuation of politics by 
other means’, to suggest that, in the case of NI, culture is often ‘used as a 
continuation of conflict by other means’ (BBC NI News, 2 November 2017).
5.2  Flags
As Wilson (2016) noted in the fourth Peace Monitoring Report, the 
immediacy of street protests and the political furore that broke out in late 
2012 over the flying of the Union flag over Belfast City Hall has significantly 
subsided. It would be wrong, however, to conclude that the issues related to 
political allegiance, cultural expression and territoriality it brought into the 
open have been resolved. 
In June 2017, there was public criticism over the erection of Union and 
UVF flags in two mixed housing estates in south Belfast.  In September 
2017, reports emerged that four Catholic families living in one of the mixed 
housing developments, Cantrell Close, had been forced to leave their homes, 
claiming they had been the victims of sectarian intimidation.  Although 
the intimidation of the families was widely condemned by all of the main 
political parties and the flags were later taken down by people associated 
with the East Belfast Community Initiative, the incident reignited the wider 
debate about the flying of flags in public spaces (BBC NI News, 5 October 
2017). In May 2018, the issue resurfaced when UVF flags again appeared 
on lampposts near to Cantrell Close, although they were removed within 
hours. Several days later, the DUP MLA for the South Belfast constituency, 
Christopher Stalford, welcomed a new flag protocol for the area that sought 
to avoid the problems of the previous summer.  This included proposals 
that flags would only be erected in mid-June and be taken down in early 
September; that no flags associated with any paramilitary grouping would be 
put up; that there should be no more than one on any lamp post; and that 
only the Union flag and NI flag would be flown.  Political representatives 
from the other main parties in the area expressed their reservations, with one 
Alliance councillor describing it as a ‘slap in the face to Ormeau residents’, 
and stating that it ‘does nothing to build community in our shared space’ 
(Belfast Telegraph, 30 May 2018). 
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The NILT Survey has regularly recorded the views of the public regarding 
their attitude to flag flying.   In 2017, respondents were first asked their level 
of agreement with the statement:  I support the flying of flags on lampposts 
throughout Northern Ireland on special dates for particular celebrations.
These responses indicate that attitudes towards the flying of flags on 
lampposts throughout NI on special dates for particular celebrations are split, 
with 40 per cent of respondents supportive of this view and some 39 per 
cent opposed. The figures also indicate a significant variation according to 
religious affiliation with the highest level of support for this particular form 
of flag flying from Protestant respondents with 57 per cent in favour and 28 
per cent opposed.  These results were reversed amongst Catholic respondents 
with 28 per cent in favour and 51 per cent opposed.  Respondents were 
also asked for their level of agreement or disagreement on the following 
statement:  If flags appear on lampposts I would like them all taken down 
straightaway, even if this causes trouble.
ALL
%
Catholic
%
Protestant
%
No Religion
%
Strongly Agree 6 1 12 7
Agree 34 27 45 26
Neither Agree nor Disagree 16 14 14 21
Disagree 16 17 15 17
Strongly Disagree 23 34 13 24
It depends on the flag 2 3 1 2
Don’t know 3 3 1 4
Figure 114:  Attitudes relating to the flying of flags on lampposts throughout NI on special dates for particular 
celebrations.
Source: NILT, 2017
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Forty-seven per cent of respondents agreed with this statement and 29 
per cent disagreed.  Given that Figure 115 above indicates that Catholic 
respondents are less supportive of the flying of flags on lampposts, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that this group are most supportive of taking flags 
down straightaway with 61 per cent in favour.  The corresponding figure 
among Protestant respondents was 39 per cent. 
In the 2017 NILT survey, respondents were asked their views on whether the 
Union flag should be flown over public buildings in NI.  The results (Figure 
116) indicate that a small majority – 53 per cent of respondents – support 
the flying of the Union flag over public buildings on designated days only.  
Just over a fifth of respondents – 21 per cent - believed that it should be 
flown all the time and 15 per cent thought it should not be flown at all from 
any public building. As with the other questions the difference in opinion 
became much more marked when religious designation was taken into 
account.  Support for flying the Union flag at all times differs from 3 per cent 
of Catholic respondents and 40 per cent of Protestants.  In contrast just 4 per 
cent of Protestant respondents felt that the Union flag should not be flown 
on public buildings and this varied from 29 per cent of Catholics.  However, 
there is a small majority in both groups willing to support the flying of the 
Union flag on designated days only from public buildings with 58 per cent of 
Catholics and 51 per cent of Protestants. 
ALL
%
Catholic
%
Protestant
%
No Religion
%
Strongly Agree 23 30 15 25
Agree 24 31 24 18
Neither Agree nor Disagree 18 15 16 25
Disagree 21 13 30 20
Strongly Disagree 8 4 11 6
It depends on the flag 3 4 1 1
Don’t know 4 3 3 4
Figure 115:  If flags appear on lampposts, I would like them all taken down straightaway,  
even if this causes trouble
Source: NILT, 2017
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Figure 116:  Attitudes to Union flag flying on public buildings in NI 
Given the divergence in the views expressed, it is clear that questions around 
flags remains a controversial one and is therefore likely to continue to cause 
problems for policy makers.  As QUB researchers, Paul Nolan and Dominic 
Bryan note in their 2016 report Flags: Towards a New Understanding, ‘It is of 
course easier to look back and explain how things went wrong than it is to 
look into the future and show how to get it right.’ (Nolan & Bryan, 2016:2). 
5.3  The Commission on Flags, Identity, 
Culture and Tradition
While there has been a general consensus about the nature and extent 
of inter-communal tensions over cultural expression in NI, a solution 
to this most pernicious of issues has proven difficult to reach.  To date, 
the typical approach for political leaders faced with unpalatable and 
unpopular choices (particularly from their own electorate), has been to 
propose the establishment of independent bodies to investigate and make 
recommendations on ways forward.  The 2014 Stormont House Agreement 
(SHA) made provision for the establishment of a Commission on Flags, 
Identity, Culture and Tradition.  The body itself was to be made up of 15 
members – eight to be drawn from outside government with the remaining 
seven nominated by the leaders of the political parties that made up the NI 
Executive at that time. The two largest parties in the Executive, then the DUP 
and SF, could nominate two members each and the next three largest parties, 
then the APNI, SDLP and UUP could each nominate one. 
The Commission was to have been established by June 2015 and then 
given 18 months to produce a report and recommendations agreed to by 
a majority of its members. Although the main focus was to be on flags 
and emblems, it had a remit to look at wider issues of identity, culture and 
tradition.  Further political wrangling throughout 2015 meant that the 
deadline for the launch of the Commission was missed. In the autumn of 
2015, the British and Irish governments reconvened a new round of talks with 
the main political parties in NI and this produced the Fresh Start Agreement 
% Catholic % Protestant % No Religion
The Union flag should be flown from all public  
buildings all the time 3 40 20
The Union flag should be flown on designated  
days only from all public buildings 58 51 51
The Union flag should not be flown at all from  
any public building 29 4 13
Don’t know 10 5 16
Source: ARK NILT, 2017
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in November 2015, which again included the proposal for the Commission. 
Consequently, it was not until 20 June 2016 that its membership was 
formally confirmed by Arlene Foster and Martin McGuinness, then 
respectively First Minister and deputy First Minister.  Its remit remained the 
same and the objective of producing a final, agreed report within 18 months 
was still in place – therefore giving a target date for early 2018.
Attention turned to the membership of the Commission with concerns 
expressed about the balance in representation between those nominated 
from the political parties and those outside of government. Given the large 
number of political nominees, there were concerns it could turn into a 
‘talking shop’ where party representatives would simply use the body to 
repeat old arguments. An additional issue of concern lay with the gender 
imbalance of the Commission, with the appointment of only one female 
member to the body, an issue raised by the Commissioner for Public 
Appointments in June 2016.   
The political commentator and former Sinn Féin local government candidate, 
Chris Donnelly, questioned whether the body had an in-built unionist 
majority, which could affect its final recommendations (Slugger O’Toole, 20 
November 2016). However these were claims that the co-chair, Dr Dominic 
Bryan, a noted expert on flags and identity based at Queen’s University 
Belfast, was keen to discount from the outset. He told the BBC, ‘The end 
game here is not to produce something that ends up further creating 
division…What I hope that we’re able to do through this Commission is to 
find ways in which we can foster positives, but also deal with some of the 
fundamental problems that we have’ (BBC NI News, 21 June 2016).
With that in mind, the work of the Commission got underway with an 
extensive list of public engagements and meetings held with various 
stakeholder groups and organisations as well as members of the public. It is 
currently unclear when the final recommendations will be made public.   In 
January 2018, the Irish News quoted unnamed government officials as saying 
that the absence of devolved government in NI meant that any report from 
the Commission would not be published until it had been read and signed 
off by ministers in the NI Executive (Irish News, 19 January 2018).  In March 
2018 both the Belfast Telegraph and the News Letter, reported that, through 
his online platform ‘Unionist Voice’, the loyalist blogger Jamie Bryson had 
published what was claimed to be leaks from a draft of the Commission’s 
report. It  was reported that unionist members were holding out against 
proposals that would effectively give the Irish tricolour parity of esteem with 
the flying of the Union flag over all public buildings in NI. In addition new 
regulations would be introduced which would effectively result in a statutory 
licensing system for bonfires. The last communique issued following a 
Commission meeting was published on its website in November 2017.  In 
June 2018, the BBC reported that the Commission has cost £647,094 since 
its formation two years previously. (BBC NI News, 2 June 2018). 
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5.4  Bonfires
Recent years have seen increasing attention focussed on the practice of 
building and burning of bonfires, particularly in Belfast, connected with 
the annual 12th July celebrations. A range of problematic issues have been 
associated with these, including where they are sited; the burning of effigies, 
flags and other emblems; the burning of hazardous items such as tyres; 
issues around public safety; the question of responsibility / liability for any 
damage or costs connected with them; and anti-social behaviour. An activity 
previously seen as the preserve of individual communities within local 
neighbourhoods has a wider influence, with government and other statutory 
organisations increasingly involved. The Detail obtained figures from the NI 
Fire and Rescue Service indicating that, between 2013 and 2017, it had dealt 
with some 1,809 bonfires at an estimated cost of some £300,000.  Around 
36 per cent of these calls were to deal with bonfires during the month of July 
(The Detail.tv, 9 July 2018).
Alongside this has been a sense of unease as to the nature and extent of 
paramilitary control over bonfires.  In February 2018, the Irish News published 
extracts from a leaked, confidential draft report produced by academics from 
Ulster University, Duncan Morrow and Jonny Byrne, relating to this issue.  
The work had been commissioned by the Community Relations Council 
following discussions at a T:BUC Engagement Forum and included discussions 
with public bodies such as the PSNI, Fire Service, the NIHE, the Environment 
Agency and the eleven district councils.  The draft report concluded that 
bonfires were one of the means by which loyalist paramilitaries ‘extend their 
legitimacy and control community activities’ (Irish News, 26 February 2018).
While the custom of bonfires is more prevalent among the loyalist/unionist 
community, it also has some tradition in nationalist/republican areas. 
Bonfires have marked the anniversary of the introduction of internment in 
NI on the 8th of August 1971 as well as the annual Catholic Feast of the 
Assumption on the 15th August.  From the late 1980s there were deliberate 
efforts made to move away from the practice – largely due to the anti-social 
behaviour associated with them – in favour of community-based festivals, 
such as the annual Féile an Phobail in West Belfast in early August.  In spite 
of such initiatives, some bonfires are still organised in republican areas.  In 
July and August 2017 there were disturbances and attacks on police, council 
workers and property in the New Lodge and the Markets area as well as in 
parts of West Belfast.  There have also been similar problems in the Bogside 
area of Derry City in August 2016 and 2017 where bonfires built close to the 
Lecky Road flyover have resulted in disorder.  In 2018, further problems arose 
when boards bearing the names of four men killed by dissident republicans 
were burned on a bonfire. (BBC NI News, 16 August 2018). 
The obvious challenge for policy makers is how to respond.  The search for a 
solution to the issue of bonfires is part of the wider ‘culture war’ debate in 
which opinion in NI remains largely divided along sectarian lines. NILT Survey 
data from 2017 (Figure 117) indicates that 40 per cent of respondents 
agreed or strongly agreed that bonfires were a legitimate form of cultural 
celebration some 37 per cent disagreed or strongly disagreed. 
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Fifty-five per cent of Protestant respondents either strongly agreed or agreed 
that bonfires are a legitimate form of cultural celebration and 27 per cent 
disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement. Twenty-four per cent of 
Catholic respondents either strongly agreed or agreed with the statement, 
with 51 per cent disagreeing or strongly disagreeing.
Respondents were also asked how much they agree or disagree with the 
statement: ‘Bonfire organisers should be held to account if there is property 
damage or injuries as a result of their bonfires.’ Responses can be seen in 
Figure 118.  
 
Source: NILT, 2017 
ALL
%
Catholic
%
Protestant
%
No Religion
%
Strongly Agree 57 66 51 55
Agree 29 21 37 28
Neither Agree nor Disagree 8 6 7 11
Disagree 1 1 2 1
Strongly Disagree 2 2 2 0
Can’t Choose 3 4 1 4
Figure 117:  Attitudes to bonfires as a legitimate form of cultural celebration
Figure 118:  Attitudes to accountability of bonfire organisers as a result of damage or injury. 
ALL
%
Catholic
%
Protestant
%
No Religion
%
Strongly Agree 9 1 18 9
Agree 31 23 37 32
Neither Agree nor Disagree 18 19 16 23
Disagree 17 20 17 14
Strongly Disagree 20 31 10 18
Can’t Choose 5 6 3 3
Source: NILT, 2017 
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Eighty-six per cent of respondents agreed that if property was damaged 
or injuries were caused by bonfires, then organisers should be responsible, 
with only three per cent disagreeing.  In contrast to the question concerning 
the legitimacy of bonfires as a form of cultural celebration, there was little 
difference between the religious or identity groups.  
At present the task of a finding a way forward lies with the Commission on 
Flags, Identity, Culture and Tradition.  In the continuing absence of any final 
recommendations, the onus continues to fall on public bodies to address 
the issue at a local level. For several years, Belfast City Council has run a 
‘bonfire and cultural expression programme’, which seeks to ‘help the way 
July bonfires are managed and provide support to increase opportunities for 
positive cultural expression’.  In return for receiving funding of up to £1,250 
those organising bonfires must abide by certain restrictions relating to the 
location, how long material could be collected for, what type of material 
could be burned, and adhere to existing health and safety legislation.  While 
there has been significant improvement in the management of bonfires in 
recent years, the siting and composition of some bonfires has remained 
contentious.  In June 2017, the media reported that the City Council was 
engaged in removing material from a number of sites on the understanding 
that it would be returned to the local community before the 11th of July.  It 
subsequently emerged that some 3,000 pallets stored by the City Council 
under this agreement had been stolen.
In order to halt further material being added to four bonfire sites in 
East Belfast in 2017, the City Council had sought a court injunction on 
the grounds of public safety and damage to property. Such a move was 
opposed by unionist councillors who accused Sinn Féin and other parties of 
attempting to ‘dictate how loyalists should celebrate their tradition’ (Belfast 
Telegraph, 10 July 2017). In a joint statement, DUP and PUP leaders on 
Belfast City Council, called for the establishment of a ‘Cultural Convention’ 
to ensure that the unionist community can ‘go forward with one voice in 
promoting our culture, heritage and tradition, as well as to ensure that our 
celebrations continue to be bigger, better and more successful than ever 
before’ (Ibid). 
On the night of the 11th July 2017, problems arose over a bonfire built 
close to a ten-storey apartment complex in the Sandy Row area of South 
Belfast. Although fire crews were on hand to prevent the spread of flames to 
the building itself, a number of residents reported that their windows had 
been damaged by the excessive heat. This led to a public debate as to who 
was financially responsible for rectifying damage caused to privately owned 
buildings. The NIHE, on whose land the bonfire had been built, denied it was 
liable.  The Northern Ireland Office (NIO) said it did not operate any scheme 
that could offer compensation in such circumstances. Eventually after some 
initial concern and anger, it was made clear that the residents would not 
have to pay for any repairs, as the building’s insurance policy would cover the 
costs.
For Belfast City Council the events of June and July 2017 prompted a review 
of its response to bonfires.  On 3 July, the Council voted to pursue a Chief 
Executive-led review in to the collection and storage of bonfire material, and 
the longer-term approach to bonfires in the city of Belfast.  This review was 
conducted by Dr Tom Frawley, a former NI Ombudsman.  In August 2017, a 
motion proposed by Sinn Féin was passed which stated that it was ‘opposed 
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to bonfires where they present a threat to life, property, the environment, 
where they cause damage to public amenities and where they facilitate 
hate crime.’ It also went on to add that, ‘This council gives permission to 
our council officers to remove bonfire materials or employ contractors to 
facilitate the removal of bonfire materials from council sites and other 
sites, which belong to statutory agencies and those which are in private 
ownership.’ (BBC NI News, 2 August 2017). 
The motion was rejected by Unionist councillors and in response DUP, UUP 
and PUP party groups on the Council jointly undertook a consultation within 
their own constituencies on the bonfire issue.  Published in March 2018, the 
resultant report, Towards a Respectful Future, (DUP, UUP, and PUP, 2018)
offered a strong defence of the practice. It made clear that attempts to 
place rules and restrictions on bonfires are part of ‘a concerted campaign 
against traditional Unionist celebrations’, and this in turn, ‘feeds into a 
sense of alienation’ (2018:2).  While recognising that, in recent times, some 
bonfires across Belfast had been problematic, it was also keen to stress that 
no one they had spoken to ‘felt that bonfires were an inappropriate way 
of celebrating their culture’ (2018:3).  Instead of the perceived aggressive 
approach outlined by the Council motion in August 2017 it suggested the 
need to recognise ‘that each neighbourhood and bonfire is unique’ and 
that, ‘greater emphasis should be placed on local characteristics in order 
to provide appropriate support’.  The authors recommended that it was 
desirable that as many as possible should engage with the ongoing bonfire 
programme run by the City Council. 
A short time after Towards a Respectful Future was published, Tom Frawley 
reported back to Belfast City Council.   In an extensive report, he emphasised 
the complexities of the problem and of finding a way forward in the absence 
of any political agreement on the matter.  He argued that, in the future, 
any Council plans had to be based on a ‘commitment to protecting people, 
property and the environment’, through strict adherence to the law and in 
trying to ‘ensure that July bonfires reflect a positive expression of cultural 
identity’ (Frawley, 2018:110).  However, under that sort of approach, the 
current status quo would no longer be acceptable and difficult realities 
would have to be faced. This would include challenging the ‘perception’ that 
bonfires ‘have taken place in a very permissive atmosphere’.  That had led 
to circumstances under which there had been a failure to ‘properly’ conduct 
a rigorous risk assessment of potential threats to the public at large as 
well as property and the environment.  As a result ‘behaviour’ that would 
normally be deemed ‘illegal’ was overlooked thereby creating ‘the conditions 
for potentially more serious activity’.  The report recognised that the task 
of making progress was being hindered by the lack of political consensus.  
(Frawley, 2018:114-115).
In terms of bonfire management, the report concluded that the only viable 
option was self-regulation, and for all public bodies and interested parties 
to reach agreements on what would be deemed as safe conditions under 
which bonfires could be held. It argued that, ultimately this was the ‘best way 
forward in securing bonfires as an expression of positive cultural identity: that 
also protects people, property and the environment’. (Frawley, 2018:105).  
In 2018, two large bonfire sites in East Belfast – Bloomfield Walkway and 
Cluan Place gained attention, due to the apparent threat to neighbouring 
properties.  A court order was issued to reduce the size of the Bloomfield 
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bonfire and, on the 11th July, PSNI officers accompanied contractors in an 
operation to remove material from both sites.  While the operation at Cluan 
Place was relatively peaceful,  the operation at Bloomfield saw disturbances 
as protestors set the bonfire alight before it could be dismantled and then 
attacked the police with stones and fireworks.  Later that evening there was 
further unrest in parts of East Belfast and Newtownards as the PSNI warned 
that elements of the UVF were planning to take advantage of the situation 
to provoke further trouble (BBC NI News, 11 July 2018).
The Frawley report noted that some 330 bonfires took place across NI on 
the night of the 11th July, around 75-80 of which were in Belfast.   In March 
2018, Mid-Ulster District Council voted by 20 votes to nine to introduce a 
‘Bonfire Management Programme’ which would introduce a licensing scheme 
for any bonfires sited on council-owned property.  Unionist councillors 
criticised the proposals as taking a ‘heavy-handed regulatory approach’ and 
being a threat to cultural expression by a Sinn Féin dominated council (Mid-
Ulster Mail, 27 March 2018).  The impact of this decision by the nationalist 
controlled council was further investigated in an episode of the BBC NI 
Spotlight on 5 June.  During this programme Keith Buchanan, the DUP MLA 
for Mid-Ulster, claimed the policy was latest example of ‘British identity…
being eroded like snow off a ditch’.  According to him, the Council was taking 
a draconian approach when only two bonfire sites out of thirteen in the area 
were deemed as high risk. 
5.5  Parading
While issues surrounding flags and bonfires have come to the fore in recent 
years, there has been a noticeable lessening in the tensions and controversies 
that previously accompanied the summer marching season in NI.  Since its 
inception in 1998, the Parades Commission has been tasked with the role of 
supervising and overseeing the thousands of public processions and related 
public meetings that take place each year.  The Parades Commission provides 
annual figures on the number of events held and from Figure 119 it can be 
seen that there has been a drop in those classified ‘sensitive’ and those in 
which restrictions are then applied. 
 
Figure 119:  Number of Parades notified to the Parades Commission per year
Total Protestant-Communalist
Catholic-
Communalist
Non-
communal
Deemed 
‘sensitive’
Restrictions 
Applied
2013-14 4,665 2,766 119 1,780 491 437
2014-15 5,074 2,918 176 1,980 619 583
2015-16 5,030 2,851 219 1,960 571 548
2016-17 4,643 2,598 140 1,905 363 342
Source: Parades Commission, 2018.
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While official figures for the year 2017-18 are not yet available, in October 
2017 ‘The Detail’ produced a report with some preliminary figures from 
the Parades Commission that covered the period from April-August 2017 
(Winters, 2017). These indicate that there were 3,368 parades with 145 of 
these - or less than five per cent - being considered sensitive. 131 parades - 
or less than four per cent - had some form of restriction placed upon them.  
These figures appear to indicate that there has been a lessening in tensions 
around what was previously seen as a core issue of contention in the wider 
‘culture wars’.
Developments in late 2016 aimed at resolving the long-running dispute 
in the Ardoyne area of North Belfast between local residents and the 
Orange Order over a disputed Twelfth of July parade also indicates positive 
movement.  In 2013, the Parades Commission ruled against the return leg of 
an Orange Order parade passing a small section of the Crumlin Road.  This 
ruling led to the establishment of a loyalist protest camp in nearby Twaddell 
Avenue and led to increased levels of tension and, often violent protest in the 
area.  By December 2016, the policing costs to cover the small protest camp 
and the regular street demonstrations in the area was estimated at £22 
million. (Belfast Telegraph, 2 December 2016).
For some time talks had taken place between both sides, with the help of 
outside facilitators, to find a way out of the impasse.  In September 2016, 
two appointed mediators, Rev Harold Good and Jim Roddy, publicly stated 
that an agreement had been reached. The effective ending of the dispute 
was to be achieved by a series of steps with local Orangemen agreeing to 
suspend their protests and dismantle the Twaddell protest camp.  In return, 
local residents would permit the return leg of the 12th July parade at 8.30am 
on Saturday 1 October 2016. The bands taking part would only be permitted 
to play hymns as the participants passed the disputed part of the route 
and there would be a limit on the number of banners on display. (Belfast 
Telegraph, 1 October 2016). 
The agreement reached set out a future process that would seek to provide 
a more permanent solution.  A ‘Community Forum’ was to be established 
which would allow both sides to continue their discussions.  In addition, 
local Orange lodges would ‘instigate a voluntary moratorium on applying 
for a [future] return parade’, and in return this ‘moratorium would allow for 
a process between the lodges and [nationalist residents group] CARA to 
seek agreement on future return parades and if agreement is achieved, the 
moratorium would be lifted’.  (BBC NI News, 24 September 2016,). 
Based on the agreement reached, the Parades Commission gave permission 
for the march to take place.  However, disagreements between the CARA 
(Crumlin Ardoyne Residents Association), who had agreed to the deal and 
GARC (Greater Ardoyne Residents Collective), who had not supported it, 
emerged. GARC announced plans to hold a rally to protest at the deal on 
Friday 30 September. Although this passed off peacefully there were verbal 
confrontations between GARC representatives and a Catholic priest from the 
area, Father Gary Donegan on the morning of 1 October 2016 as the Orange 
parade took place. Fr. Donegan had been involved in the negotiations that 
had led to the deal and was accused of taking sides against local residents.  
(BBC NI News, 1 October 2016). 
Following the Twelfth of July celebrations in 2017, PSNI’s Assistant Chief 
Constable Alan Todd told the BBC, ‘We have dealt with a number of minor 
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incidents throughout the day and have made a small number of arrests but 
these were very much in the margins of what has been widely described as 
the most peaceful Twelfth of July for some years and a model for years to 
come’ (BBC NI News, 13 July 2017).  
A further example of the apparent progress comes from Derry City. 
The County Derry Orange Order demonstrations (taken on rotation to 
venues across the county) were due to take place in Derry/Londonderry in 
2018.  In the week leading up to the 12th of July 2018, there were nightly 
disturbances in the Bogside area of the city and concerns that the parade 
itself could further raise tensions.   However, the day itself passed off 
relatively peacefully with only one minor incident reported (BBC NI News, 13 
July 2018).  The accumulation of years of groundwork to build relationships 
between individuals and communities in the city and the development of 
the ‘Maiden City Accord’ in 2014 appears to have created a more conducive 
atmosphere in the city.  
In October 2017, the Grand Master Orange Order of Ireland, Rev. Mervyn 
Gibson was quoted in The Detail as saying: ‘It is true that there was less 
tension on the streets this year than in previous years and it was definitely 
a better 12th July all around.  What the figures that The Detail has gathered 
don’t necessarily reflect, however, is the reality of the mood on the ground. 
What the statistics actually reveal is the position of the Parades Commission.  
They don’t show that the legislation in place to deal with parading in NI is 
inherently flawed. There aren’t problems with parades, the problems lie with 
people getting offended by parades. The reason we are seeing a relatively 
small number of protests is because the Parades Commission is doing the 
protestors’ job for them.’ (The Detail.tv, 28 October 2017). That point was 
again reinforced by Darryl Hewitt, Portadown District Master, at an event to 
mark the 20th anniversary of the Drumcree protest.  Since 1998, the local 
Orange Lodge has been banned from completing their return parade down 
the Garvaghy Road following their annual church service on the first Sunday 
in July. Reiterating that he and his colleagues vowed to pursue the protest 
for the ‘long haul’ he stated, ‘It is time for our politicians to stand up and be 
counted and remind the Government that this issue will not be going away’ 
(Belfast Telegraph, 9 July 2018). 
6. ARTS AND SPORTS
6.1  The Arts
The Draft Programme for Government Framework (2016-2021) recognised 
the importance of the arts sector to NI society both in social and economic 
terms.  One of the key recommendations was the continuing need to develop 
a sustainable and vibrant film, animation and television production sector. 
The government agency responsible - Northern Ireland Screen - set out 
ambitious targets for itself in its report Adding Value, Volume 2 (NI Screen, 
2017).  By the end of March 2018, it committed itself to having invested 
£42.8 million in the sector.  This investment was predicted to generate 
almost £251 million total expenditure on goods and services as well as 
creating 2,800 full-time equivalent job years, valued at nearly £108 million. 
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On the back of the success achieved by the production of the television 
series Game of Thrones at locations across NI and at the Titanic Studios in 
Belfast, a decision was made in April 2016 to build a new £20 million studio 
complex on the north foreshore of Belfast Lough, including two film studios, 
workshops plus production offices. The official opening of these in July 2017 
was accompanied by news that a new television series by Warner Horizon 
Television, based on comic book hero Superman, would be filmed there  
(BBC NI News, 7 June 2017).
Despite these positive developments, the domestic arts scene has been 
significantly affected by government funding cutbacks in recent years.  In 
July 2016 the Arts Council of NI faced a cut of 4 per cent to its budget 
allocation or in financial terms a reduction of almost £500,000 from £10.95 
million to £10.49 million for the year 2016-17. There was no let-up in 
subsequent years. In April 2018, it was reported that 43 arts organisations 
had their funding cut by the Arts Council of NI, which had had its annual 
funding programme reduced by 4.7 per cent in 2018/19.  In addition to the 
43 organisations which received cuts, the council was unable to give any 
money to seven arts groups which had received annual funding in 2017/18.  
The campaign group Art Matters NI noted that arts spending in NI per head 
of population was now below £5 per year, and that this was less than half 
the equivalent spend in Great Britain and in the Republic of Ireland (BBC NI 
News, 11 April 2018).
The decision of the UK to Brexit has also negatively impacted on the arts 
scene in NI. In November 2017, Belfast City Council and Derry City and 
Strabane Council jointly applied to be the UK’s candidate for the 2023 
European City of Culture. Although the proposal was not fully costed or 
made public, a draft plan did set out an ambitious programme that would 
seek to alter the current position where, ‘culture is still seen by some and 
used at times as a tool to intimidate and exclude’ and instead under the title 
‘@home’, seek to ‘create a step change to move beyond this’ (BBC NI News, 
2 November 2017). However a few weeks later, those UK cities competing 
for the nomination – Belfast, Dundee, Leeds, Milton Keynes and Nottingham 
– were informed by the European Commission that it had cancelled Britain’s 
turn to host the European City of Culture. Citing Brexit, it stated that, as a 
consequence of the decision to leave the European Union in 2019, the UK 
was no longer eligible to be considered as a candidate to be a host city  
(BBC NI News, 23 November 2017).
6.2  Sport
In a divided society such as NI, sport can provide an interesting insight into 
the state of relations between the two main communities. While sport has 
the capacity to unite people in a common cause it can often act as a useful 
indicator of the underlying tensions that remain.
Back in the summer of 2016, fans of both NI and Republic of Ireland soccer 
were able to enjoy their teams reaching the European Championship Finals 
(Euros) in France for the first time.  In sport, success can also be measured 
off the field of play and the positive impact of thousands of Irish fans, both 
North and South, was recognised when they were awarded the Medal of 
the City of Paris by the Mayor for their ‘enthusiasm, jolliness…fair play…
exemplary sportsmanship’  (BBC NI News, 30 June 2016).  
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However, another set of soccer fans in Ireland were able to celebrate ultimate 
success at Euros 2016 - Portuguese exiles had reason to welcome the first 
major senior football trophy won by their nation. The town of Dungannon, 
County Tyrone – home to a large Portuguese community – saw hundreds 
take to the streets to celebrate, without any complaints about their flag-
waving activities (Mid Ulster Mail, 11 July 2016). 
If events of the summer of 2016 marked a positive image for the game 
of soccer, the challenges it still faced in NI re-emerged just over a year 
later. In July 2017, the NI League champions, Linfield, whose support 
is largely from within the Protestant / loyalist community, were drawn 
against the League champions of Scotland, Glasgow Celtic, a team with a 
significant fan base among the Catholic / nationalist community. Almost 
immediately, concerns were raised that the first leg of the match scheduled 
for Belfast on Wednesday 12 July posed a major security threat. Although 
it was subsequently re-scheduled for Friday 14 July, the threat of crowd 
disturbances continued and led to Celtic not taking up the ticket allocation 
given to their fans for the game in Belfast. While the match passed off 
relatively peacefully, a number of incidents in which objects were thrown at 
Celtic players led to Linfield being handed a £8,800 fine and a partial stadium 
closure for their next European tie. Just over a week later, at the return leg 
in Glasgow, it was Celtic’s turn to face punishment from UEFA, with a fine of 
£20,615, when a section of their support unfurled paramilitary-style banners 
(BBC Sport, 28 July 2017). 
The mix of sport and politics is often an unhelpful one. An example of 
this came with the re-emergence of a dispute between the two football 
associations on the island of Ireland, the Irish Football Association (IFA) in the 
North and the Football Association of Ireland (FAI) in the South. The issue 
centred on the eligibility of players – in particular the fact that someone born 
in NI can opt to play for the Republic of Ireland if he holds an Irish passport. 
During a newspaper interview, the current NI manager, Michael O’Neill, was 
quoted as saying that the FAI was deliberately targeting Catholic players who 
had represented NI at underage level to switch their allegiance to play for 
the Republic. While later claiming his words had been taken out of context, 
O’Neill stood by his belief that eligibility should be a ‘football issue’ and that 
the FAI, like any other international association, should avoid putting pressure 
on young players to declare for a particular country but which may then at a 
later date deem them not good enough (Belfast Telegraph, 12 March 2018).
Attendance of politicians at sports events is often used as a symbolic gesture 
of change or reconciliation within divided societies.  On Saturday 28 January 
2017 James Brokenshire, then Secretary of State for NI, became the first 
person to hold that post to attend a GAA match when he attended the 
McKenna Cup Final in Newry (BBC NI News, 30 January 2017). While some 
welcomed his attendance, others highlighted that he had only taken his seat 
in the crowd after the Irish national anthem had been played.  In June 2018, 
speculation began to mount as to whether DUP Leader and Fermanagh-
native Arlene Foster would attend the Ulster Football Championship Final 
between Donegal and Fermanagh in Clones on Sunday 24 June 2018.  In the 
days preceding the game she met, and was photographed with, members 
of the Fermanagh team and management.  However, it was still unclear as 
to whether she would attend.  On the 24th of June 2018, Arlene Foster did 
attend the game at the invitation of the GAA and stood for the Irish national 
anthem (BBC NI News, 24 June 2018). 
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With the day full of symbolism, she recognised the significance of what she 
had done:  ‘… I am a leader of a political party that wants to have a shared 
society in Northern Ireland and to do that you have to take steps forward 
and to do that we have to build a respect and tolerance and that’s what 
I want to do.’  However, she also made clear that ‘I hope that others take 
the chance to step forward as well and to understand and appreciate and 
tolerate another culture perhaps that is not theirs.’   
(RTE News, 25 June 2018,). 
The role of the GAA and its place in NI also became a focus of attention in 
October 2017. In an interview with the Sunday Independent on 29 October 
Peadar Heffron, a former PSNI officer who had been seriously injured by 
a dissident republican bomb, recounted how he had been treated by his 
former GAA Club. He spoke of how he had been effectively ostracised when 
he had first joined the PSNI and how that had continued in the wake of the 
attack that had resulted in having a leg amputated. The interview and its 
aftermath prompted a renewed focus on the GAA and the debate over its 
past and present role in relation to developments within NI.  Such negativity 
can however sometimes overshadow the outreach work that the GAA has 
engaged in.  In 2014, the Ulster GAA set out on a number of initiatives in 
Building Better Communities (GAA, 2014).  These included the Cúchulainn 
Cup, which was aimed at engaging schoolchildren from all backgrounds in a 
programme of coaching and competitions.  In addition the Ulster GAA have 
worked with the Irish Football Association (IFA) and Ulster Rugby in a joint 
project called a ‘Game of Three Halves’ which seeks to bring people from 
diverse backgrounds in order to meet and engage with each other.  There are 
other examples of individual GAA clubs trying to participate in new ways to 
reach out to non-traditional GAA communities and groups.  For instance in 
June 2018 the Bredagh GAC club in south Belfast participated with the local 
Ballynafeigh Orange Order in a series of activities that allowed members 
from both to learn a little more about the culture and activities of each other 
(BBC NI News, 30 June 2018).
In March 2018, the Irish men’s senior rugby team captured its third Grand 
Slam as it completed its Six Nations campaign undefeated. This triumph 
was also welcomed on the back of setback for the game at the end of 2017 
when the Irish Rugby Football Union (IRFU) failed with a proposal for Ireland 
to host the 2023 Rugby World Cup. It had been envisaged that this would 
involve games during the tournament being played on both sides of the 
border. Within NI, matches were to be played at the Kingspan Stadium in 
Belfast, home to Ulster Rugby, as well two GAA stadiums – Celtic Park in 
Derry and at the re-developed Casement Park. Although the bid made much 
of its all-island approach and had support right across the political spectrum 
this had little impact for those on the World Rugby Council charged with 
making the final decision. Instead the Irish submission was ranked lowest 
of the three proposals behind France and South Africa with concerns raised 
specifically about the lack of experience of hosting major sporting events, 
commercial and financial fears as well worries over the suitability over some 
of the designated stadiums (Irish Examiner, 1 November 2017).
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7. PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC LIFE 
7.1  Women’s representation 
Since the fourth Peace Monitoring Report was published, there have been 
two elections – one Westminster and one Assembly election. The Assembly 
election of March 2017 came only 10 months after the previous one in May 
2016.  Precipitated by the financial scandal surrounding the Renewable Heat 
Incentive (RHI) Scheme and the resignation of Martin McGuinness as deputy 
First Minister, this was the first election since the reduction in the number 
of seats in the Assembly from 108 to 90, with one seat removed from 
each constituency.  Losses for political parties were inevitable, with mainly 
Unionist parties taking the hit.  
As with every election since the first Assembly election in 1998, the March 
2017 election saw a slight increase in women’s representation, with a total 
of 30 per cent of the elected representatives (27 of the 90 seats) women.  
Nineteen per cent of MLAs elected in the 2011 Assembly election were 
women. The 2017 figure still lags well behind the other devolved regions 
of the UK, with the Welsh Assembly having 45 per cent female political 
representation, and the Scottish Parliament 35 per cent.  The 2016 General 
Election in the Republic of Ireland returned 35 women (22 per cent) as TDs 
to the Dáil. 
Of the five main political parties in NI, three are currently led by women, 
with Arlene Foster becoming leader of the DUP in December 2015, Naomi 
Long leader of the Alliance Party in October 2016.  Mary Lou McDonald (who 
holds a seat in the Irish Dáil) became President of Sinn Féin in February 2018 
and Michelle O’Neill, MLA, was appointed as Vice-President of the party 
having previously succeeded Martin McGuinness as leader of the Assembly 
party in January 2017.  All three women topped the polls in their respective 
constituencies. 
Following the resignation of Sinn Féin’s Barry McElduff after the controversy 
over the Kingsmill bread tweet, a Westminster by-election was held in May 
2018.  Sinn Féin put up the only female candidate on the ballot paper (the 
DUP, UUP, SDLP and the APNI also contested the election) and Orfhlaith 
Begley became the first woman to hold the West Tyrone seat since the 
parliamentary constituency was created in 1997, winning nearly 47 per cent 
of the votes cast.  Following this by-election, currently five of the 18 MPs in 
NI are female, up three on the 2015 General Election.  
As noted earlier, only one woman was appointed to the Commission on 
Flags, Identity, Culture and Tradition, giving rise to some commentary and 
criticism. The political parties had been asked to nominate seven members to 
the Commission - all were male.  An additional eight members were drawn 
from outside of Government, following a public recruitment process, with 
only one woman appointed (Dr. Katy Radford).  The Commissioner for Public 
Appointments (CPA) expressed her disappointment at the gender balance 
of the Commission, noting that the outcome was ‘at total odds with the 
gender equality targets for public appointments agreed by the NI Executive’ 
in March 2016. While acknowledging  that the Flags Commission is not a 
regulated body under public appointments legislation and therefore, strictly 
speaking, the targets do not apply,  in a letter to OFMdFM, she noted that 
‘the difference between the two types of bodies did not justify ignoring the 
Dimension Four
200
principle of diversity and female representation set out in the Executive 
targets’ (Strictly Boardroom, 23 June 2016).  The 2016-17 Annual Report 
of the CPA noted that women held 41 per cent of public appointments, 
although this figure falls to 23 per cent at Chair level.  In September 
2017, the CPA noted that gender equality targets for boards of public 
bodies has been made ‘impossible to attain’ as new members cannot be 
recruited without a government minister in place, with departments making 
‘unprecedented’ numbers of extensions to the tenures of board members and 
chairs (Irish News, 25 September 2017). 
7.2  Ethnic Minority Population  
While NI remains the least diverse region of the UK, it does have some long-
established ethnic minority communities, including the Chinese, Traveller 
and Jewish communities.  The enlargements of the European Union in 2004 
and 2008 led to an increase in the population of new migrants, driven, 
in part, by the increased availability of low-wage jobs, particularly in the 
agricultural and food processing sectors.  The census data indicates a rise in 
the ethnic minority population from 0.8 per cent (14,259) in 2001 to 1.8 per 
cent (32,414) in 2011.  Figure 120 below indicates how this figure is broken 
down, based on categorisations included in the census, which does not allow 
distinctions to be made between European nationals and those identified as 
the non-White population.   
Figure 120:  Population by Ethnicity in NI, 2011 
Ethnicity Population Percentage
All usual residents 1,810,863 100
White 1,778,449 98.20
Chinese 6,303 0.34
Indian 6,198 0.34
Mixed 6,014 0.33
Other Asian 4,998 0.28
Black African 2,345 0.14
Irish Traveller 1,301 0.07
Pakistani 1,091 0.07
Black Other 899 0.05
Bangladeshi 540 0.03
Black Caribbean 372 0.02
Other 2,353 0.14 
Source: Census, NISRA, 2011
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As the 2011 census data will not have captured the extent of newcomers 
over the past seven years, one indicator of the rising levels of migration to NI 
is in the annual school enrolment figures (Figure 121).  The Department of 
Education defines a newcomer pupil as ‘one who has enrolled in a school but 
who does not have the satisfactory language skills to participate fully in the 
school curriculum, and the wider environment, and does not have a language 
in common with the teacher, whether that is English or Irish.’  It does not 
refer to indigenous pupils who choose to attend an Irish medium school. (DE, 
2017).
 
Figure 121:  Number of Newcomer Pupils at Schools in NI  
The figures indicate that there has been a steady year-on-year increase 
in post-primary pupils without the satisfactory language skills.  The more 
significant increase is seen in the numbers of primary school pupils, which 
have doubled from 5,632 in 2011 to 11,423 in 2018.   
In 2015, the UK Prime Minister David Cameron announced that 20,000 
Syrian refugees fleeing from the violent conflict in the region would be 
resettled in the UK under the Government’s Vulnerable Persons Relocation 
(VPR) scheme. The NI Executive offered to receive groups on a phased basis 
from early 2016.  As of August 2018, 1,096 refugees have been settled 
in both cities and towns across NI. From 1 July 2017, those admitted to 
the UK under the VPR Scheme are granted full Refugee Status with full 
access to employment and public funds and rights to family reunion.  A 
Strategic Planning Group led by The Executive Office (TEO) coordinates 
the response of the Executive Departments.  A Reception and Resettlement 
Group led by the Department for Communities (DfC) is made up of all 
public agencies who may be required to provide services to refugees, local 
government and voluntary sector organisations with expertise in this field.  
The group considers and addresses the practical steps needed to meet the 
immediate needs of the new arrivals.  A spokesperson for the Department 
of Communities noted in August 2018 that ‘All children of school age are in 
school, many of the adults have found employment and other are studying. 
Importantly too, many are also getting involved in local community groups 
and activities.  The whole scheme has been such a success because of the 
combined efforts from the public, community and voluntary sectors as well 
as from families and individuals across NI in the streets, villages, towns and 
cities where the refugees have settled.’ (Belfast Telegraph, 17 August 2018). 
2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18
Primary 
Pupils 5,130 5,392 5,632 6,481 7,424 8,678 9,507 10,394 11,423
Total Post-
Primary 2,402 2,450 2,482 2,518 2,501 2,451 2,530 2,643 2,839
Special 
Schools 47 60 62 91 101 113 129 141 169 
Source: Department of Education, 2017. 
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The NILT Survey has fielded questions on attitudes to minority ethnic 
communities since 2005, examining self-reported prejudice, perceptions of 
prejudice, acceptance of minority ethnic groups in intimate relationships, and 
levels of interaction.  The 2017 survey indicated strong support among the 
population for providing protection to refugees, with 57 per cent of people 
agreeing that refugees who are escaping Syria should be allowed to come 
to NI.  Only 17 per cent disagreed. Twenty-five per cent neither agreed nor 
disagreed, or did not know. (NILT, 2018).   
In 2016-17 the PSNI recorded 1,054 racist incidents in 2016-17 (down from 
1,356 in 2014-15 and 1,221 in 2013-14) (PSNI, 2018). Focusing on levels 
of racism in the society, the NILT survey respondents were asked to reflect 
on whether they felt there was more, less, or about the same levels of racial 
prejudice in NI as opposed to five years ago (Figure 122).  Nearly half of 
respondents felt there was more racism in the society in 2017 than in 2012.  
In July 2017, the leaders of the far right, anti-immigration group Britain First 
spoke at a poorly attended anti-terrorism rally outside Belfast’s City Hall.  
Britain First leader Paul Golding and deputy Jayda Fransen were subsequently 
arrested by the PSNI in November 2017 and prosecuted for using 
‘threatening, abusive or insulting words’ during their speeches.  In July 2018, 
it was reported that Britain First were to hold their first official meeting in NI 
(Belfast Telegraph, 24 July 2018). 
7.3  LGBT Rights and Visibility  
NI is currently the only part of the UK that has not legalised same-sex 
marriage.  It was observed in the fourth Peace Monitoring Report that this 
issue is often viewed as ‘a touchstone of tolerance in the region’ (Wilson, 
2016).  If this is the case, there is reason to be hopeful that marriage equality 
in NI is a matter of time and a prevailing political environment. The NILT 
data from 1989 to 2013 (when the questions were last fielded) indicates 
that the attitudes of the public towards same-sex relationships have changed 
dramatically.  The percentage of respondents who believed that sexual 
relations between two adults of the same sex was ‘always wrong’, dropped 
from a high of 76 per cent in 1989 to 27 per cent in 2013.  
In 2005, only 35 per cent of respondents agreed that lesbian or gay couples 
should have the right to marry. In 2013, the majority of the sample (59 
per cent) felt that marriage between same-sex couples should be legally 
recognised and granted the same rights as ‘traditional marriages’. Almost 
three-quarters of people aged between 18 and 24 supported this position.  
An Ipsos MORI poll in 2015 recorded 68 per cent support for same-sex 
marriage.  A further Ipsos MORI survey in 2016 indicated that 70 per cent 
of the public backed marriage equality. A Sky Data opinion poll published in 
April 2018 to coincide with the twentieth anniversary of the Belfast / Good 
Friday Agreement reported that 76 per cent of the NI public support equal 
marriage, with only 18 per cent opposed.  All of these polls have indicated 
that support cuts across both religion, gender and rural/urban divide.  
These changing views are worth noting as the most recent vote in the NI 
Assembly calling for the introduction of marriage equality indicated that the 
views of politicians have also shifted. In November 2015, 53 members of 
%
More now 49
Less now 13
About the same 29
Other (please 
specify) 0
Don’t know 8
Figure 122:  Do you think there is 
generally more racial prejudice in 
NI now than there was 5 years ago, 
less, or about the 
same amount?
Source: ARK, NISRA, 2011
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the Assembly voted in favour of a motion which called on the Executive to 
introduce marriage equality legislation, with 52 voting against.  Although a 
majority had voted in favour, only four Unionist politicians had, and the DUP 
lodged a petition of concern which effectively blocked the vote.  While noting 
that ‘slowly but surely, politicians are catching up with public opinion’, LGBT 
rights campaigners indicated that they would continue to campaign on the 
issue. (BBC NI News, 2 November 2015). 
Following on from the passing of the marriage equality referendum in 
the Republic of Ireland, which led to the Thirty-fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution of Ireland, the Love Equality campaign was established in April 
2016.  Love Equality is a consortium of the main LGBT organisations, the 
trade union and student union movements and human rights organisations 
within NI who have campaigned for the introduction of legislation in NI for 
equal civil marriage for same sex couples.  With the collapse of the Assembly 
in January 2017, the campaign has moved to Westminster and the possibility 
of legislation being introduced from there.  In March 2018 a Private 
Member’s Bill on same-sex marriage in NI was introduced by a Labour MP 
but was blocked on the second reading.  The UK Prime Minister Theresa May 
has insisted that a decision on same-sex marriage is a devolved matter which 
must wait for the restoration of the devolved Assembly.  Campaigners have 
accused May of sacrificing LGBT rights to appease the DUP who have been in 
a supply and confidence arrangement with the Conservatives since the 2017 
Westminster elections.  Separate challenges to the ban on same sex marriage 
were brought through the courts by two same sex couples but were rejected 
in both cases, with the judge insisting that the ban does not contravene the 
European Convention on Human Rights.  
In September 2016, eight days after replacing the previous Health Minister 
Jim Wells of the DUP, the new Health Minister, Michelle O’Neill lifted the ban 
on gay and bisexual men donating blood (with a one-year deferral), so long 
as they meet the other donor criteria.  This decision brought NI in to line 
with in England, Scotland and Wales which had reversed the ban in 2011. 
During 2018, politicians became more visible in their support for LGBT issues.  
In June 2018, Sinn Féin deputy leader, Michelle O’Neill and the DUP Leader 
Arlene Foster both spoke at the PinkNews reception at Stormont.  While the 
presence of Arlene Foster and her acknowledgement of the value of the LGBT 
community’s contribution to NI was welcomed, others were disappointed 
that she did not apologise for previous comments about gay people by 
members of the DUP. (Irish News, 30 June 2018). The following month, 
Parliament Buildings at Stormont hosted the ‘Alternative Queer Ulster’ 
event, with speakers from across the LGBTQ calling for equality.  As events at 
Stormont require cross-community support, the co-sponsors were the DUP’s 
Paula Bradley and Sinn Féin’s Megan Fearon, though neither attended on the 
day.  Following the event, Jim Wells, DUP MLA called for a ban on Stormont 
hosting LGBT events ‘promoting alternative lifestyles’ (Belfast Telegraph, 30 
July 2018).  
In August 2018, thousands joined Belfast’s annual Pride parade.  For the 
second year in a row, participants in the parade included uniformed officers 
from the PSNI, and the Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service (NICS) 
sent his first tweet in his new role, noting that ‘As an employer to 23,000 
people, the NICS respects and values diversity and is committed to delivering 
an inclusive workplace for all our people.’  
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During a special event hosted by Ulster University  as part of the wider 
Belfast Pride Festival in July 2018, a Chief Superintendent of the PSNI 
expressed concern at the under-reporting of homophobic hate crimes, 
noting that ‘What I would hope is that it is not an indication around loss of 
confidence in the police.’  (Belfast Telegraph, 31 July 2018). 
Following the results of a UK-wide survey undertaken in July 2017 which 
received more than 108,000 responses, the UK Government published a new 
LGBT Action Plan outlining firm commitments to tackle a range of issues 
facing LGBT people.  While campaigners in NI welcomed this development, 
they remained unsure which of the actions would extend to NI and 
expressed regret that the often promised Sexual Orientation Strategy for NI 
had not materialised.
 
8. THE STATE OF COMMUNITY    
 RELATIONS  
 
The 2017 NILT Survey and the 2017 Young Life and Times Survey (which 
seeks the views of 16 year olds) both indicate a drop in those who feel 
that relations between Protestants and Catholics are better than they were 
five years ago between 2016 and 2017 (Figure 123).  Interestingly, adult 
respondents who felt that relations between Catholics and Protestants will 
remain ‘about the same’ was steady, at 36 per cent in 2016 and 37 per cent 
in 2017. 
 
  
Looking at the longer term trends, Figure 124 indicates that, while the overall 
trend is up for adults, it is currently below the high of 2007, and that young 
people’s views are, in general, very similar. 
Question 2016 2017 % point drop
% adults who think community relations now is better 
than five years ago.  59 49 10
% 16 year-olds who think community relations now is 
better than five years ago.  49 46 3 
% adults who think community relations will be better in 
five years time.   55 43 12
% 16 year-olds who think community relations will be 
better in five years time 45 37 9
Figure 123: Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics are better than they were  
five years ago between 2016 and 2017
Source:  2017 NILT Survey and 2017 Young Life and Times Survey
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In terms of optimism for the future, despite the 2017 dip, the overall trend 
is upwards, with both adults and young people holding similar views on how 
relations will be in five years’ time (Figure 125). 
 
 
 
Figure 124:   Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics are better than they were 5 years ago
Figure 125:  Percentage saying relations between Protestants and Catholics would be better in 5 years time
Source:  2017 NILT Survey and 2017 Young Life and Times Survey
Source:  2017 NILT Survey and 2017 Young Life and Times Survey
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Looking at the longer term trends, figure 17 indicates that, while the overall trend is 
up for adults, it is currently below the high of 2007, and that young people’s views 
are, in general, very similar.   
 
 
In terms of optimism for the future, despite the 2017 dip, the overall trend is upwards, 
with both adults and young people holding similar views on how relations will be in 
five years’ ti e (Figure 18).   
 
 
 
9. CIVIL SOCIETY AND PEACEBUILDING 
Previous NIPM Reports have observed the continued absence of the Civic Forum 
which was first established in October 2000 as a consultative body represent the 
voices of a wide range of civil voices, as part of the provisions mandated in the 
Belfast / Good Friday Agreement.  Suspended in 2002, there appears to have been 
no appetite among the main political parties for its re-establishment.  Given the lack 
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are, in en ral, very simil r.  
 
 
In terms of optimism for the future, despite the 2017 dip, the overall trend is upwards, 
with both adults and young people holding similar views on how relations will be in 
five years’ time (Figure 18).   
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9. CIVIL SOCIETY AND      
 PEACEBUILDING 
 
Previous Peace Monitoring Reports have observed the continued absence 
of the Civic Forum which was first established in October 2000 as a 
consultative body to represent the voices of a wide range of civil voices, as 
part of the provisions mandated in the Belfast / Good Friday Agreement.  
Suspended in 2002, there appears to have been no appetite among the 
main political parties for its re-establishment.  Given the lack of a legislative 
Assembly in NI since January 2017, the absence of such an advisory forum 
seems perhaps a minor issue in the face of the lack of access to power for 
those within civil society seeking legislative change and policy commitments. 
That said, civil society organisations continue to engage with the political 
parties on a range of issues, including abortion rights, same sex marriage and 
legacy issues, and to demand action from the NI Secretary of State.  
In April 2017, a consortium of peacebuilding practitioners published a 
discussion paper entitled Galvanising the Peace: The Future for Conflict 
Transformation in Northern Ireland which reflected the views from extensive 
civil society consultations (45 facilitated workshops involving 642 
participants across NI) during 2015.  The report outlined the findings of their 
discussions in three main areas: the state of the peace process; outstanding 
obstacles to peace; and solutions to enable progress towards a peaceful, 
inclusive and prosperous future.  Among its recommendations, the report 
called for the acceptance of a broad vision of reconciliation for NI, a clear 
and public commitment from the Executive to end segregation in education 
and teacher training, an ambitious and well-resourced action plan to support 
the equal and full participation of women as active peacebuilding agents, and 
the exploration of ‘new and imaginative ways to work to break the logjam 
of issues that are currently clogging the political system.’  (Galvanising the 
Peace Network, 2017:12)  
The Building Change Trust part-funded the development of a Civic Assembly 
in NI, which is due to be piloted in the autumn of 2018.   The concept 
of a citizen’s assembly is one in which a body of citizens are randomly 
selected from the population to be broadly representative of the public to 
form a structure through which issues can be considered and deliberated 
upon.  Selected members meet over a specified time period, apply fresh 
thinking and deliberate over a chosen topic, draw conclusions and make 
recommendations which are then submitted to the relevant decision-making 
body for consideration. This form of deliberative democracy has gained 
recent attention due to the establishment of the Irish Citizens Assembly 
in the Republic of Ireland which was established under statute in 2016 to 
consider and has met on 12 occasions to explore five previously identified 
topics.  The Assembly met five times between November 2016 and April 
2017 to take evidence and deliberate on the Eighth Amendment to the Irish 
Constitution which concerns abortion rights, submitted its recommendations 
and final report to the Oireachtas in June 2017.  It was said that the 
Assembly had helped to ‘break years of political deadlock and reach a 
consensus on this highly polarising issue.’ (Palese, 2018).   
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On issues of good relations and reconciliation, civil society organisations also 
continue to deliver programmes on behalf of government departments and 
strategies (including Together: Building a United Community driven by the 
Executive Office and the Special European Union Programme Body’s PEACE 
IV programme).  This programme is delivered within both the six counties 
of NI and the six border counties of Ireland (Cavan, Donegal, Leitrim, Louth, 
Monaghan and Sligo).  This fourth iteration of the programme (2014-2020) is 
worth 270 million euros. It has a narrower range of activities than previously, 
with a specific focus on four core objectives: Shared Education; Children and 
Young People; Shared Spaces and Services, and Building Positive Relations.  
While some actions are being delivered by local authority-led partnerships, 
the PEACE Programme continues to be a significant source of funding for 
community and voluntary sector organisations, within an overall constricting 
funding environment. While there have been some indications of a PEACE 
V Programme post-2020, the detail of this (particularly in light of Brexit) 
remains unclear.  Interestingly, the Funding Peace research report published 
by Corrymeela in June 2018 indicated that this reduction in overall funding 
avenues was not their main challenge.  Some respondents felt that how 
resources were targeted and the administrative burden associated with some 
funding streams was more significant, and that for some organisations, more 
limited funding ‘had led to creative and collaborative ventures that had 
generated significant added value to their practice. (Morrow et al, 2018:7). 
There has been controversy over the delivery of the Social Investment Fund 
(SIF), which was established by the NI Executive in 2011 with investment of 
£80 million to ‘make life better for people living in targeted areas by reducing 
poverty, unemployment and physical deterioration’ (TEO, 2018) over a four-
year period. In 2016, it was reported that Charter NI, a group linked to the 
Ulster Defence Association, had received £1.7 million from the fund, while 
the organisation was itself represented on the east Belfast steering group 
which awarded the grant.  The fund was criticised for the decision-making 
procedures by the steering group appointed to distribute funding, with the 
former head of the Committee on Standards in Public Life Sir Alistair Graham 
noting that, to him, the system appeared ‘flawed’ and in need of ‘root and 
branch reform.’ (Belfast Telegraph, 18 November 2016).  In 2018, there 
was criticism of the level of spend of the fund over the seven years since 
establishment (BBC NI News, 19 April 2018).  The current projected end date 
of the programme is now set at 2020 and the Executive Office had indicated 
that the £80 million budget has been committed to 68 projects by local 
Steering Groups across the nine SIF target areas.
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